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卷六十四 志第十六: 河渠一

Volume 64 Treatises 17: Rivers and Canals 1

Chapter 64 of 元史 · History of Yuan
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1
Rivers and Canals I
2
· 穿
Water has been a scourge for China since antiquity. Understand why water harms, and you understand how it can help; since floods cannot be predicted, those who prepare in advance, or act after the fact yet still succeed, may truly be said to govern water well and turn its power to lasting gain. Long ago Yu controlled the Great Flood, cleared the Nine Rivers, and banked the Nine Marshes to secure benefits for ages to come; the Earth Office chapters of the Zhou Rituals preserve remarkably detailed regulations for reservoirs, embankments, trenches, and canals. In that era, virtually nowhere in the empire lay outside the scope of hydraulic management. Once the ancient royal land-allotment and well-field systems had broken down, hydraulic projects came to be discussed as a separate field of policy. Shi Qi of Wei opened the Zhang River, Zheng Guo of Qin brought in the Jing, and in Han times Zheng Dangshi, Wang Anshi, and others alike proposed canal cuts or flood-control measures. Each of these men put his plan to the test and ultimately succeeded; their achievements remain traceable in Sima Qian's Treatise on Rivers and Canals. After them, men eager for novelty and credit mostly talked of "creating benefits," while the disasters they caused could scarcely be reckoned. Water by nature flows downward and spreads; to pen it in, blunt its force, and check its rush is a task of extraordinary difficulty. Only by yielding to its current and channeling it—storing where one can to guard against drought, releasing where one must to shed flood—does the harm subside and immeasurable good follow.
3
西
Once the Yuan ruled the empire, they established a central Directorate of Waterways and regional river-and-canal commissions, charged with promoting irrigation and maintaining embankments. They tapped the Shuangta and Baifu springs into the Tonghui Canal to feed the grain route, freeing the capital from overland grain haulage; they redirected the Hun and cleared the Luan, so Wuqing and Pingluan no longer feared silting and inundation; they dredged the Ye and dammed the Hutuo, sparing Zhending from breach and erosion. They cut the Huitong Canal at Linqing to link north and south by water; opened Shaanxi's Three White canals to water the fields of Guanzhong; and drained surplus from rivers and lakes, built sea walls along the coast, so that the people of western Zhejiang were spared inundation. Men of real hydraulic expertise, foremost among them Guo Shoujing, were never altogether lacking in that age. Such were the works of that dynasty—achievements that cannot be effaced from memory. I therefore set down the dates of each project and the order of its labor, recounting each undertaking in turn in this Treatise on Rivers and Canals.
4
The Tonghui Canal
5
西西 便 便
The Tonghui Canal takes its source from the springs of Baifu, Wengshan, and the surrounding hills. In the twenty-eighth year of the Zhiyuan era (1291), Guo Shoujing of the Directorate of Waterways, commissioned to advance hydraulic works, proposed: "Cut a canal from Tongzhou to Dadu; where the old sluice route allows, lead clear water while using the muddy stream for irrigation. From Baifu village in Changping, take the Spirit Mountain spring, bend west and south through the Shuangta, Yu, Yimu, and Yuquan streams, enter the capital at the West Water Gate, pool southward at Jishuitan, issue southeast through Wenhua Gate, and run east to Gaolizhuang in Tongzhou to join the Bai River—a total of 164 li and 104 paces. Twelve clear-water outlets were to be sealed, spanning 310 paces in all. Ten dam-and-lock sites, twenty structures altogether, would regulate the flow for grain transport—a clear and lasting benefit." The court approved the plan. Work began in the spring of 1292 and was declared finished in the autumn of 1293; the canal was given the name Tonghui, "Universal Benefit." The project mobilized 19,129 soldiers, 542 artisans, 319 boatmen, and 172 convict laborers, for 2,850,000 work-days; it consumed 1.52 million ingots of paper money, 38,700 shi of grain, and timber, stone, and other materials in proportion. When construction began, the chancellor and all officials below him were ordered to take up basket and spade and lead the laborers by example. Where the new locks were built, workers often unearthed bricks and timbers from earlier works, to the wonder of all who saw them. Once shipping was open, both state and private interests benefited. Before this, official grain for the fifty li between Tongzhou and Dadu had been hauled overland by the tens of thousands of shi each year, a burden the people could scarcely endure; that practice was now abolished entirely.
6
西西西 西 西 西
The dams and locks were named as follows: Guangyuan Lock; two Xicheng locks—the upper one li northwest of Heyi Gate, the lower three paces west of the Heyi water gate; the Haizi lock, inside the capital; two Wenhua locks—the upper southeast of the Lizheng water gate, the lower one li southwest of Wenhua Gate; two Weicun locks—the upper one li southeast of Wenhua Gate, the lower one li west of it; two Jidong locks at Wangjiazhuang, southeast of the capital; two Jiaoting locks at Yinwangzhuang, twenty-five li southeast of the capital; two Tongzhou locks—the upper outside the west gate, the lower outside the south gate; two Yangyin locks, thirty li southeast of the capital; and two Chaozong locks—the upper a hundred paces south of the Wanyi granary, the lower a hundred paces below it.
7
西
In the fourth month of 1294, ministers of the Central Secretariat proposed: "The locks on the newly opened transport canal should be garrisoned by 1,500 troops to guard them and to patrol passing vessels for wrongdoers aboard." The proposal was approved. In the seventh month the Ministry of Works reported: "The locks and dams on the Tonghui Canal cost a vast sum; though the project succeeded, its upkeep depends entirely on dedicated overseers who inspect and repair them regularly. We propose appointing three superintendents to command the work crews, patrol the line exclusively, and receive official seals and salaries. The Xicheng lock is to be renamed Huichuan, the Haizi lock Chengqing, the Wenhua lock to keep its old name, the Weicun lock Huihe, the Jidong lock Qingfeng, the Jiaoting lock Pingjin, the Tongzhou lock Tongliu, the Hemen lock Guangli, and the Yangyin lock Puji."
8
In the sixth month of 1311, provincial ministers reported: "The locks on the grain canal from Tongzhou to Dadu were first built in haste, entirely of timber; after years the wood rotted and failed all at once, forcing repairs under emergency—labor that cannot be sustained. For a permanent solution, brick and stone should be used, with repairs carried out in orderly stages." The court approved. Repairs were not finished until the fourth year of the Taiding era (1327).
9
In the third month of 1332, Central Secretariat ministers reported: "When the Tonghui Canal was cut under Emperor Shizu, its locks depended entirely on the headwaters from Baifu, Yimu, and the other springs to sustain grain transport. Now branch streams and powerful monasteries illegally breach the dikes to irrigate paddies, run water mills, and water gardens, shallowing the canal and hindering transport—we ask that this be forbidden." An edict followed: "From Baifu and Wengshan to the Dadu grain canal, no one may use influence to breach dikes or divert springs; the Grand Secretariat for Agriculture and the Directorate of Waterways are to enforce the ban strictly."
10
西
The Dam River, also called the Seven Futong Dams In the third month of 1302, the Capital Region Grain Transport Office reported: "A million shi of tribute grain each year depends entirely on the boatmen and dam workers. From the ice break until the river froze—240 days—they moved more than 4,600 shi daily, with 1,300 boatmen and 730 dam workers under command, every man on duty and working day and night without pause. This year's flood breached more than sixty dam sections; though repairs are done, heavy rains may wash them out and drain the canal. We have surveyed weak, shallow, and low stretches of the embankment and request further work." Work ran from the fourth day of the fifth month to the twelfth of the sixth: nine Shen'gou dams, 15,153 work-days in all. Two Wangcun dams, 713 work-days; one Zhengcun dam, 1,125 work-days; three Xiyang dams, 1,262 work-days; and three Guocun dams, 1,987 work-days. One lower Qiansi dam, 10,000 work-days; for a grand total of 30,240 work-days.
11
The Golden Water River
12
The Golden Water River rises on Yuquan Mountain in Wanping county and enters the capital through the south water gate of Heyi Gate—hence its name.
13
西
In the second month of 1292, Right Vice-Chancellor Masuhu and others reported: "The Golden Water River crosses the Yunshi Great River, the Gaoliang, and the Xi by trestle flumes, all now damaged—we ask that they be rebuilt." Work began that June and was finished the following February.
14
殿西
In the seventh month of 1311, by imperial order the Golden Water was diverted into the old pool before the rockery in the west garden of the Guangtian Hall, with four sluice gates to regulate the flow. Construction began in the intercalary seventh month and was finished in the ninth; twenty-nine workers logged 2,723 work-days, or sixty-five days of actual labor after delays.
15
The River before Longfu Palace
16
The river before Longfu Palace shares its water with the Taiye Pool. In the fifth month of 1322, an edict declared: "Under Emperor Shizu, washing one's hands in the Golden Water was forbidden; now men wash their horses there. When autumn comes, dredge and cleanse it, and forbid anyone to defile the water." Accounts were drawn up for dredging; work began in the fourth month of the third year and was finished in the fifth, with 800 soldiers and 5,635 work-days in all.
17
The Haizi Shore
18
西
The Haizi shore, adjoining Longyu Hall above, was faced with stone on all sides. The Haizi, also called Jishuitan, collects the northwestern springs, flows into the capital, and pools here in a sheet wide as the sea—whence the people of the capital gave it its name.
19
In the second month of 1319 the Directorate of Waterways planned repairs to join the old stone revetments: 305 blocks, each four feet long, two and a half feet wide, and one foot thick, with 3,000 jin of lime—305 work-days, fifty corvée laborers, and ten masons; work began on the fifth day of the ninth month and was finished on the eleventh.
20
西
In the third month of 1323 the Dadu River Intendant Office reported: "The east-west road along the south shore of the Haizi lies at a vital junction between the two cities; the Golden Water seeps above while wind and waves from the Haizi erode below. The road is narrow and often collapses into mud, making travel difficult—paving it with stone would be a lasting remedy."
21
In the fourth month of 1324 the Ministry of Works supplied materials; work began in the seventh month and was finished in the eighth, employing 287 workers in all. The Shuangta River
22
便
The Shuangta River rises at the Yimu Spring in Mengcun, Changping county, runs east past Shuangta post-station to Fengshan village, and joins the Yu River. On the sixth day of the fourth month of 1266, the river patrol officer reported: "The Shuangta River is about to flood; unless we prepare now, it may breach—and at the last moment nothing can be done. He tallied materials to seal the outlets and petitioned the Directorate of Waterways, noting that the newly cut Shuangta channel was not yet firmly established. The flood season is upon us; if the works fail, the released current will disrupt grain transport." The Secretariat approved; the State Revenue Office furnished supplies; and the Directorate of Waterways sent workers to make repairs. Five outlets were sealed in all, at a cost of 2,155 work-days.
23
The Lugou River
24
The Lugou River rises in the Dai region and is called the Little Yellow River for its muddy current. It enters Wanping county from Fengsheng prefecture and, forty li from the capital at Dongmagu, splits into two branches.
25
祿 祿 調
In the eighth month of 1235, an edict declared: "Liu Chonglu recently reported: 'With more than two hundred water workers I have closed the breached comb-gap on the Lugou River on schedule; unless the dikes are strengthened, sudden floods may destroy the work, or profiteers may breach it for irrigation—we ask that this be forbidden. Liu Chonglu is to take charge and prevent breach or illegal diversion; offenders shall be punished under the statute on violations of imperial orders—two years' penal servitude and seventy strokes of the cane. When repairs are needed, laborers and tools shall be requisitioned from the appropriate offices. Of the former boatmen and workers, fifty may remain under an appointed officer. He is entrusted with command, to patrol constantly and investigate thoroughly, with an annual rotation of duty; any office that fails to comply shall be punished."
26
Baifu and Wengshan
27
西西
Baifu and Wengshan are the source of the Tonghui Canal's headwaters. The Baifu spring lies in Changping county, bends west and south through Wengshan marsh, and enters the capital by the West Water Gate.
28
In the sixth month of the seventh year of the Dade reign (1303), the lock overseer at Wengshan and nearby sites reported that unceasing rain had begun on the twenty-ninth day of the intercalary fifth month. At midnight on the ninth day of the sixth month, mountain torrents surged over the dikes and burst through the sluice. The Directorate of Waterworks then sent officials to oversee military laborers. Work began on the twenty-first day of the ninth month and stopped at month's end, with 993 soldiers actually put to the task. In the third month of the eleventh year, the Directorate of Waterworks reported that inspections had found more than thirty li of collapsed dikes along the Baifu and Wengshan rivers. They recommended weaving brushwood wattles at the outlets to relieve the water pressure. Eleven wattle outlets were slated for repair. Construction began in the fourth month and finished in the tenth.
29
In the first month of the first year of the Huangqing reign (1312), the Directorate of Waterworks reported that the Baifu and Wengshan dikes had many sections that were low, thin, collapsed, or sunken, and ought to be repaired. The following spring, labor began in the second month and was completed in the eighth. The work covered thirty-seven li and 215 paces in all, at a cost of 73,773 work-days. In the fourth month of the first year of the Yanyou reign (1314), the Directorate reported that from the foot of Baifu Wengshan down to the dikes and weirs at Guangyuan Lock, heavy silt had left the channel shallow and blocked, the spring flow too weak to pass freely. They proposed dredging. The project was costed accordingly, and a thousand soldiers were assigned to dredge and clear the channel.
30
In the eighth month of the fourth year of the Taiding reign (1327), the Directorate reported that from the third through the sixth day of the eighth month, unbroken rains had sent mountain floods crashing through the wattle outlets at Wengshan and elsewhere, inundating private farmland. Materials and labor were estimated, and the case was referred to the Ministry of Works for funds and repairs. Work began on the twenty-sixth day of the eighth month and ended on the twelfth day of the ninth. Two thousand military laborers were deployed, consuming 90,000 work-days over forty-five days.
31
西西
The Hun River is essentially the Lugou River. It runs from Daxing County through Dong'an Prefecture and Wuqing County into Huozhou. In the tenth month of the second year of the Zhida reign (1309), the Hun River broke through the great dike west of the Left Capital Guard camp and flooded south, drowning the wheat on the garrison farms of the Left and Right Assistants and the Rear Guard. The Left Capital Guard then reported that on the fifth day of the tenth month the river had torn open the dike at Wangfu Village in Wuqing County—a breach more than fifty paces wide and some five chi deep. Water spread southwest across the flat land and wrapped around the circular camp granary; almost nothing stayed dry. They feared that when the ice melted the following spring and summer rains arrived, the breach would widen into a permanent channel and harm both troops and civilians. They asked either to relocate the camp offices or to assign more soldiers and civilians to plug the break and avert disaster. On the twelfth day of the second month of the third year, the provincial office approved the plan and ordered the Left and Right Assistants, the Rear Guard, and Dadu Circuit to send officials to oversee the work, which was finished on the twentieth day of the fifth month.
32
西 西西 西
On the seventeenth day of the sixth month of the first year of Yanyou, the Left Guard reported that on the fourteenth the Hun River had broken through the dike at Liujiazhuang in Wuqing County. Seven hundred soldiers were dispatched, along with laborers from Dong'an Prefecture, to repair it together. In the third month of the third year, the provincial office deliberated: "The Hun River has burst dikes and weirs, drowning crops and harming soldiers and civilians. The matter has already been reported to the throne. Inspectors were sent out. From Shijing Mountain at Jinkou upstream to the old dikes on the Wuqing County border, the line measured 348 li in all. Of this, forty-seven large and small sections could be rebuilt on old foundations; nineteen flood-damaged spots needed patching; eight stretches lacked dikes and required new construction; and two needed dredging. The estimate was 380,100 work-days, 35,000 military laborers, and ninety-six days to finish. A single continuous build would demand too much labor to succeed. The work should be spread over three years. The provincial office and Censorate should send officials and first mobilize ten thousand soldiers, civilians, laborers, and craftsmen to tackle the most critical sections." On the twentieth day of that month, the Bureau of Military Affairs memorialized allocating three thousand soldiers under a vice commissioner of the Central Guard to supervise the repairs. In the fifth month of the seventh year, the Garrison Farm Intendant reported that on the twenty-first day of the twelfth month of the previous year, garrison households on patrol had found more than 200 paces of the Hun River dike north of Guangfu Garrison on the verge of collapse. They feared that when the ground thawed in early spring and the river rose, flooding would follow, and asked for repairs. The Directorate of Waterworks assigned the moat garrison, together with officials from the Garrison Farm Intendant and Wuqing County, to supervise repairs on one thin, sunken stretch of dike north of Guangwu Garrison—2,500 work-days; one low, thin section north of Yongxing Garrison—4,166 work-days; one washed-out section west of Luoli Village—3,733 work-days; one collapsed section north of Yongxing Garrison—6,518 work-days; from the east bank west of Beiwang Village to Baifener, south to the west crossing at Hancun Village—6,093 work-days; from the east bank west of Liuxingzhuang north to the Baoseng Centurion garrison, south to Baifener—30,712 work-days. In all, the work required 53,722 work-days.
33
In the fourth month of the fourth year of Taiding, the provincial office noted that in the sixth month of the third year, prolonged rains had sent mountain floods over the mulberry groves, jujube orchards, fields, and gardens of Daxing County. They had already written the Bureau of Military Affairs to assign three thousand men from the seven guard garrison farms and available troops to make repairs. The Bai River
34
The Bai River lies four li east of Huozhou. It rises north from Lu County in Tongzhou, runs south into Tongzhou, turns southeast to the Xianghe County border, then flows east through Wuqing County to the Jinghai County line.
35
西 西 西 西西便 西
In the ninth month of the thirtieth year of the Zhiyuan reign (1293), the Grain Transport Office reported that Tongzhou's grain canal depended wholly on the Bai, Yu, and Hun rivers, which merged to form the Lu River—a route ships had used for years. That year the newly opened lock canal had diverted the upper reaches of the Hun and Yu rivers, leaving the thirty-odd li from Li'er Temple to Tongzhou shallow and sluggish. Spring and summer brought drought; in places the depth fell to only two chi. Grain barges could not pass and had to transfer cargo to smaller boats, delaying transport for months and costing grain. Earlier the Directorate of Waterworks had surveyed the Bai River and, from the east bank below Wujiazhuang, cut a diagonal channel southwest for about two li along the main stream to bring Yu River water below Shenggou Dam and keep transport boats moving. New measurements showed that from the upper bend at Shenggou and the Yu River to the Bai River in front of Longwang Temple at Wujiazhuang, and southwest to the dam channel, the distance was 800 paces. Inspection showed that the upper Yu had been dammed shut, its water entirely diverted to the Tonghui River. Only the three minor streams—Baifo, Linggou, and Yizimu—still fed the Yu, and their flow was too slight to carry boats. They proposed closing the Bai River at Longwang Temple below Wujiazhuang, opening a small canal to the southwest, and drawing water from the upper bend of the dam channel into the Yu so grain transport could resume. At Shenggou, Leyear's five granaries held more than 700,000 shi of old and new grain, and relay-cart haulage was slow and arduous. Surveyors therefore examined the pooled water of the Tonghui north of Tongzhou city, which reached a channel west of Shengou Village—very close to the Leyear and Guangchu granaries. They proposed reopening 400 paces north from the pool along the old channel to the northwest corner of Leyear Granary, where small boats could load and unload with ease. The Metropolitan Secretariat approved the plan. From north of Tongzhou on the Tonghui River to the northwest of Leyear Granary, the combined water-and-land route measured 500 paces and required 80,650 work-days.
36
西 西 使便 調
In the fifth month of the second year of Dade, the Central Secretariat directed the Directorate of Waterworks to repair thirty-five sections of grain-canal dike from Yangcun to Hexiwu, budgeting 19,140 bundles of reeds, 2,649 military laborers, and thirty days. The Directorate then split its staff, sending moat-garrison officers to Yangcun to inspect damaged dikes in turn and supervise river patrol laborers. Heavy rains swelled the water and doubled the work beyond the original estimate. From Siyunkou north through the dikes at Caicun, Qingkou, Sunjiawu, Xinzhuang, and Hexiwu, they used the allotted reeds and grass to patch weak sections and build new crescent dikes with considerable success. At four outlet points on opposite banks at Yangcun, reeds ran short, so soldiers were sent to cut and gather more. Work stopped in the ninth month. The Yangcun River links upstream to the Tonghui and other waterways and downstream to the Hutuo and on toward the Yangtze and Huai, letting official and private craft reach the capital directly to the benefit of state and people alike. Yet Yangcun's dikes failed as fast as they were rebuilt—the work had not been done solidly, and labor was wasted. Unfinished sections should wait until the following spring, when the water fell and the soil dried, before soldiers were sent back to finish.
37
In the tenth month of the sixth year of Yanyou, provincial officials reported that grain transport, stored provisions, and southern merchant traffic all reached the Tonghui River via Zhigu. The banks were crumbling and the channel silting shallow. Without prompt dredging, boats would be blocked and prices would surely spike. Since the Directorate of Waterworks held sole responsibility for water control, they proposed assigning one official to inspect on schedule, repairing collapses and shoals as found. Where labor fell short, local offices should supply helpers, and negligence should be punished. The court approved.
38
便 調
On the eleventh day of the first month of the first year of Zhizhi (1321), the Grain Transport Office reported that the summer shipment of more than 1,890,000 shi of sea grain depended on a clear channel for the round trip. At the Xiaozhigu branch mouth, where tides flowed back and forth, silt had choked more than seventy spots and grain boats could not pass. They asked the Directorate of Waterworks to dredge. The Ministry of Works replied that spring planting was underway and many people were going hungry. Without soldiers to help, civilian labor would not suffice. The Bureau of Military Affairs answered that troops were unavailable. The provincial office noted that drafting civilians now, at the height of eastern fieldwork, would threaten the harvest. They ordered Dadu to recruit three thousand day laborers, paying each one tael of hired-labor cash and one sheng of coarse rice daily under a responsible official who verified and disbursed wages each day, with the Directorate of Waterworks and Grain Transport Office jointly supervising. Work began on the eleventh day of the fourth month and finished on the tenth day of the fifth.
39
On the sixth day of the sixth month of the first year of Zhihe (1328), the Linqing Imperial River Ten-thousand Households Office reported that on the second day of the eighth month of the fourth year of Taiding the river had overflowed, destroying about fifty paces of the north-gate dike, washing away more than a hundred old piles, with the bank still giving way. The Ministry of Works held that collapsed banks ought to be repaired. The Directorate had already costed materials and labor, with supplies drawn from various offices; three thousand workers were needed. Drafting civilians in spring would harm farming, so they asked the Bureau of Military Affairs for troops. The provincial office approved repairs to the old dikes and widening of the east bank at the new river mouth—59,937 work-days, three thousand soldiers, and ten carpenters.
40
便 使
In the third month of the second year of Tianli (1329), the Grain Transport Office reported that the channel opened by Administrator Liu the Second opposite his camp made grain transport more circuitous than the old river. They asked for inspectors to survey and reopen the old route. On the ninth day of the fourth month the memorial was approved. Seven thousand soldiers were assigned under Vice Minister of War Deng Heng, Vice Director Ali of the Directorate of Waterworks, and Grain Transport Commissioner Taibuhua to dredge and reopen the channel. Winter cold intervened, and work waited until the ice broke up. In the third year the Ministry of Works ordered Dadu to recruit three thousand laborers from the nearby countryside, paying three sheng of coarse rice and one tael of Zhongtong cash daily. The Ministry of War reassigned Vice Minister Xin, together with the original commissioners, to dredge and reopen the channel.
41
In the sixth month of the first year of Zhishun (1330), the Directorate reported that on the night of the twenty-third the Bai River had surged more than one zhang. Officials had already rushed laborers to the newly repaired protective dike at Guanyin Temple. The water had since dropped more than one chi; construction should wait until the summer low-water season. The Imperial River
42
西
The Imperial River enters from Wei County on the Daming Circuit border, runs about ten li north and south through Quanyuan Township at Yucun in Yuancheng County, flows northeast to Baojia Ford, and descends to three mouths on the Guantao County line. Upstream it comes from Jiaohe County and runs down into Qingchi County. The Yongji River, thirty li west of Qingchi County, rises in Nanpi County, enters Qing Prefecture, and is now also called the Imperial River.
43
穿
On the sixth day of the seventh month of the third year of Zhiyuan (1266), the Directorate reported that the transport canal—more than 2,000 li long—moved public and private cargo by grain transport to enormous benefit. Since the wars began it had gone unrepaired. South of Qing Prefecture and north of Jing Prefecture, more than thirty breaches had opened in the banks and fifteen li of channel were silted shut. In the guisi year the court sent four thousand laborers to build dikes and dredge, and boats could pass again. Another thirty-odd years had since passed with no one officially in charge. In the Cangzhou region the river stood higher than the surrounding land and depended entirely on dikes and weirs for protection. Garden owners dug through the dikes to sink wells—sometimes more than one zhang deep, even two—to draw water for vegetables and flowers. Riverfront residents also stripped earth from the dikes, slowly opening breaches that released the current. Boats ran aground and grain transport stalled; homes were swept away and crops drowned. North of Changlu and south of Suojia Matou, hidden piles and stakes beneath the water wrecked boats and ruined grain cargo. The ministry proposed that deputy officials in riverine prefectures and counties also oversee river defense—patrolling their districts, leading repairs at any breach, pulling hidden stakes, and forbidding garden owners to pierce dikes for wells, plant trees, or strip earth. The Metropolitan Secretariat approved. In the seventh year provincial officials reported that the Imperial River had flooded Wuqing County. Dredging would take ten laborers and eighty days. The court approved.
44
西
In the seventh month of the third year of Yanyou, Cangzhou reported that Qingchi commoners had petitioned: when the Imperial River had overflowed at Wuqiao County in Jing Prefecture in earlier years, Ten-thousand-household Commander Qiannu, fearing for his garrison fields, had sent soldiers to seal the old outlet called Lang'er Mouth. With no escape for the water, it had flooded homes and tens of thousands of qing of ripe fields. They asked for officials to dredge a channel and send the water to the sea. Then, on the fourth day of the seventh month, the east bank at Liuxiekou in Wuqiao County broke for more than thirty paces. Centurion Yiseng again blocked Lang'er Mouth with troops. Water backed up with no outlet, threatening more than thirty villages—Zhangguan, Xuhe, Mengcun, and others—with flooded millet, grain, and homes. Cangzhou sent inspectors and coordinating dispatches to reopen the channel, but the orders were ignored. In the fifth month of the fourth year, the Directorate sent officials with Hejian Circuit officers to survey the sealed Lang'er Mouth—twenty-five paces east to west, twenty chi north to south, the south bank one zhang four chi high, the north more than two zhang. They also traced the old channel below Lang'er Mouth to Cangzhou, some thirty-odd li, where ancient traces ran wide, including the old flood-relief route called Pan River. The plan was to reopen Lang'er Mouth, deepen the old channel, cut through the pooled water, and run north of Cangzhou city to the Hutuo River and the sea.
45
In the ninth month of the first year of Taiding (1324), the Directorate supervised 5,898 laborers. Work began on the twenty-eighth day of that month and finished on the second day of the tenth. The Luan River
46
西
The Luan River rises in Jinlianchuan, passes north of Songting, runs east of Qian'an and west of Ping Prefecture, and reaches the sea at Luan Prefecture. Wang Zeng's Record of a Journey North notes: "Forty li from Pianqiang Ridge one crosses the Wuluan River; Luan Prefecture lies to the east, named for the river."
47
沿 調 便
In the eighth month of the twenty-eighth year of Zhiyuan (1291), provincial officials memorialized that Yao Yan, ordered to dredge the Luan for grain transport to the Upper Capital, asked for craftsmen, tools, and exposed granary support along the river, plus advance preparation of five hundred transport boats, ten thousand boatmen, and twenty-four thousand tow-path laborers for the coming year. They deliberated together: the southeast had suffered famine in recent years and the people were exhausted. Building boats and drafting laborers was no small burden; doing both at once would crush the region. They asked to build ten boats first, assign boatmen proportionally, and trial the route—expanding only if it proved workable. The emperor approved the memorial but ordered fifty boats into service first, with capable men chosen to manage the effort jointly.
48
西西 西
On the thirteenth day of the eighth month of the fifth year of Dade (1301), Pingluan Circuit reported that from the ninth day of the sixth month rain had fallen without pause until the night of the fifteenth, when the Luan, Fei, and Ru rivers all burst their banks. Old protective dikes east and west of the city collapsed, as did walls on the east, south, and west. Water swept into the city, carrying off the three outer river gates, buildings and grain inside and outside the walls, crops, and livestock. Many drowned—and still the rain would not stop. By the night of the twenty-fourth the Luan, Qi, Fei, and Ru rivers surged again into the city, and nearly every building left standing was swept away. Vice Director Ma of the Ministry of Personnel was then assigned, with Directorate officials, to rebuild the east and west dikes—311,050 work-days, 8,087 ingots and fifteen liang of cash, 3,110 shi and five dou of coarse rice, and piles and timber worth 274 ingots, twenty-six liang, and four qian.
49
西 調 調
On the sixteenth day of the sixth month of the fourth year of Yanyou (1317), the Upper Capital Retention Office reported that on the first day of the first month the northwest bank of the Imperial River south of the city had been gnawed away by the current and was slowly collapsing. Without repairs, spring floods the next year would wash away private homes. Kaiping County also reported that from the twenty-sixth day of the fourth month rain had fallen until the night of the twenty-eighth, when the Luan at the east gate rose and damaged the north bank. They proposed repairs. The Retention Office judged that midsummer rains would send the river over its banks again with serious damage. Officials were dispatched at once to supervise laborers and craftsmen. Kaiping had mobilized civilians, but the young and weak could not manage the labor. They asked for soldiers instead so the work could finish quickly. On the twenty-first day of the fifth month, the Retention Office reported that the Luan had risen and broken the dikes. Repairs would need six hundred soldiers; the Bureau of Military Affairs should assign them with state rations. The court decreed that the moment had come: the Bureau of Military Affairs should be instructed at once to mobilize troops. The Tiger Guard Command dispatched three hundred soldiers to do the work.
50
西 西
On the thirteenth day of the third month of the second year of Taiding (1325), the Yongping Circuit Garrison Farm Directorate reported that all state revenue came from the people and that nothing they produced mattered more than farming. This garrison cleared land and collected grain for the inner capital granaries — a weighty responsibility. At Longwan Head in Zhangjia Village, some five li northeast of Fangma City, officials had once assigned laborers to build dikes against the Luan. The line ran southwest to the Qingshui River and Gongan Bridge, all within the garrison's lands. Last year's rains had sent the river over the dikes and scoured everything away, drowning the garrison farmers' crops and leaving them with no harvest for the year. With the farming season at a lull, failure to repair the dikes in advance would surely bring disaster. The Ministry of Works wrote the Directorate of Waterworks, which sent garrison waterworks officers and Luan Prefecture officials to inspect the site and have local offices assign laborers to rebuild the dikes. On the tenth day of the fifth month of the third year, the Upper Capital Retention Office and the circuit chief directorate reported that the dike north of the Luan at Mashikou, south of the Great West Gate, was being undercut and slowly collapsing. Without advance repairs, summer floods would threaten the residents. The Capital Construction Office was sent to survey and estimate materials; the Ministry of Works then ordered the Upper Capital branch to proceed. On the second day of the seventh month, Right Chancellor Taishi Temür and others reported that the ordo's winter camp had been wrecked by ice floes on the Luan and that protective dikes should be built. They asked the Bureau of Military Affairs to supply twelve hundred soldiers. The request was approved. The Bureau of Military Affairs applied to send twelve hundred soldiers.
51
The Hejian River
52
The Hejian River lay within Hejian Circuit. In the third month of the third year of Taiding, the Directorate of Waterworks reported on Hejian Circuit's flood problem. The ancient Jian River, beginning outside the north gate, should be dredged as before to Dacheng County to bleed off upstream flow into the Salt River. The ancient Chen Yudai River should be cleared from Junsikou to Guixin County in Xiong Prefecture to drain marsh water into the Yi River. Huanglong Harbor should be cut from Suojingkou to Daiyaokou in Wen'an County to link the marsh waters, pass through Huoshao Marsh, and discharge into the sea. Thirty stretches of river needed dredging in all — thirty thousand laborers could finish in thirty days. That month the province approved the plan and sent investigating officials with the assigned Directorate Vice Director Sun and local officers to raise thirty thousand corvée laborers from nearby counties, each paid one liang of cash and one sheng of rice per day, starting on the ancient Chen Yudai River. Drought and famine soon forced a halt to spare the people; the project would wait for a good harvest year.
53
西
The Ye River ran outside the west gate of Pingshan County in Zhending Circuit. It came from Jingxing County, passed ten li northeast of the county seat, and joined the Hutuo River.
54
On the eighteenth day of the first month of the first year of Yuanzhen (1295), Chancellor Wanze and others reported that the late emperor had once ordered the Ye River in Zhending opened. Corvée labor had been mobilized, but when the emperor died the work was halted. They asked to follow the old plan and complete the work. The request was approved.
55
西西西西 西 便 西
On the second day of the seventh month of the first year of Huangqing (1312), Zhending Circuit reported broken dikes at Longhua, Panguan Village, and elsewhere. After estimating labor and materials, it asked provincial officials and the Directorate to inspect from northwest Pingshan along the Hutuo–Ye confluence and the urgent outlet at Zhending's southwest gate. The plan called for rebuilding an overflow stone dike on the Ye's old course, repairing the Longtang dike downstream, opening one li of channel southeast to Shuinian Village, and cutting one li west of Puwu Bridge. From northwest Pingshan upstream to Ningjin downstream, silt would be dredged and dikes built to split the upper flow back into the old channel and tame its force. The Cheng Tong and Cheng Zhang stone bridges also blocked the flow; two flood-relief channels were proposed as a durable, practical fix. Farther downstream, from Luancheng south toward Ningjin in Zhao Prefecture, the northern rivers' lower reaches were low-lying. Floods through Luancheng and Zhao Prefecture could wreck stone bridges and choke the channel. They proposed opening a flood-relief channel north of Luancheng, east of Shengmu Hall on the Ye's east bank, to lift the threat from Zhending. The province approved. In the second month of the following year Directorate officials inspected the site with circuit and surveillance officers. The Ye River work, from the lone stone north of the Dragon Spirit Temple at Pingshan's north gate, ran five thousand eight hundred and six paces; five thousand laborers would log one million eight hundred and seven work-days and could finish in thirty-six fair-weather days.
56
The Hutuo River
57
西西
The Hutuo rose in the western hills. It ran one li south of Zhending County, one li north of Gaocheng County, and ten li north of Pingshan County; the Universal Gazetteer places it twenty li southwest of Lingshou County. The river linked the Zhending prefectures; everywhere it ran it was known as Hutuo water.
58
退 西 便
In the eleventh month of the seventh year of Yanyou (1320), Zhending Circuit reported that the Hutuo's north-bank dike south of the county city had breached and was flooding close to town — a stretch rebuilt every year. Its source had once been modest and separate from the Ye; after the two rivers merged the current grew fierce and repeatedly broke the great Jin-era dike. In the thirtieth year of Zhiyuan (1293), Circuit Darughachi Hasan had proposed opening the Ye as a separate channel, which cut Hutuo flow by three or four tenths. In the seventh month of the first year of Zhida (1308), floods swept away more than a hundred households at the south gate and silted the Ye's mouth, sending its water back into the Hutuo. Breaches followed year after year. From the tenth year of Dade through the first year of Huangqing, repairs consumed more than two million fascine bundles of reeds and grass and more than a million ingots in corvée grain and hire wages. From the third to the fifth month of the first year of Yanyou, two hundred and seventy-odd paces of dike were rebuilt. At Mingtang, Panguan, and Miancun, bridge timber served as piles; more than five hundred conscripts labored over a month without finishing. Grain prices had soared and food was scarce. Able-bodied men served in person; single-son households had to hire substitutes at three to five strings a day. One job barely ended before the next corvée began. On the eighth day of the seventh month, one thousand two hundred and forty paces of dike at Li Yufei's village and the villages of Mufang and Huying collapsed. The circuit asked for inspectors and laborers to build crescent dikes. In the second year of Yanyou, former circuit chief Masihu had opened the Ye, but it had silted shut again. This year's rains had overflowed the north bank in several places and drowned the crops. The river had once run south of Kangjia Village; at some unrecorded time it shifted to the north. Years of taking fill from the north side of the dike had left the south high and the north low, so the current pressed downward and ate away the bank. From Mufang Village west to the city-protecting dike east, more than two thousand paces in all would have to be repaired by spring. Earthen dikes of piles and brush were no lasting solution either. If the old dry channel south of Mufang were dredged to send water south, the north mouth gated shut, and dikes built from south-bank fill down to Hetou Village to rejoin the main stream, the city would stand farther from the river and might be spared. Directorate inspectors found a thousand-pace cut-off dike planned against an old bank only sixty paces wide — too narrow, they feared, to hold a thousand-pace flood. They proposed instead to strengthen broken, thin stretches on the north bank with extra labor and fascine revetments. Because drought and flood had left the people short of food, upper and middle households in each county would be assessed equally, with wages and rice paid from official funds. Work would start on the twentieth day of the second month: five thousand laborers, one million six hundred and seven thousand one hundred and nineteen work-days, thirty-two days to finish. Ten north-bank flood dikes totaling one thousand nine hundred and ten paces — three million four hundred and seven thousand seven hundred and fifty cubic chi, of varying height and width — would need twenty-five revetment frames (one hundred and fifty beams), three hundred fifty thousand eight hundred bundles of grass, two hundred eighty thousand six hundred forty bundles of reeds, and seven thousand two hundred bundles of brushwood.
59
便
In the third month of the first year of Zhizhi (1321), Zhending Circuit reported that Hutuo floods kept breaking dikes and drowning fields. Corvée repairs were under way with surveillance officers reviewing the work. Dredging the old channel south of Mufang to send water southeast, gating the north bank, and building dikes from south-bank fill to Hetou Village might, they hoped, keep the people safe. Directorate and Zhending officials inspected and argued that water should be managed by following its nature, not forcing it where it did not wish to go. Gating the Hutuo, cutting a thousand-pace dike, and opening a sixty-pace old channel for thirty li to turn the flow southeast would make rain-season floods beat both banks while the cut-off dam fought the river's nature. A sixty-pace channel could not absorb a thousand-pace flood. Water would choke upstream and stall downstream until the dikes burst — wasting state funds and civilian labor for nothing. Following the river's natural course and strengthening the old north-bank dike with extra materials and proper fascine revetments would truly serve both state and people. The province approved ten north-bank spillwater dikes totaling one thousand nine hundred and ten paces — five hundred laborers and one million six hundred and seven thousand three hundred and thirty-nine work-days.
60
便
On the seventh day of the eighth month of the fourth year of Taiding (1327), provincial officials reported Zhending Circuit's plea: the Hutuo had flooded year after year. The Directorate, surveillance commission, circuit officers, riparian counties, and elders had met. The river rose in the Wutai hills and, below Wangmu Village pass in Pingshan, joined the Ye from Pingding Prefecture's Niangzi Temple spring. Summer and autumn rains sent it spreading through the towns. Annual dike work exhausted the people without ending the floods. They proposed cutting a channel from Wangzi and Xin'an villages, more than four li long, into the old gully at Lujiawan and opening two hundred paces farther to join the Ye and split the current. They also proposed dredging thirty li of the old south-bank course at Mufang and building north-bank pile-and-fascine dikes to hold the river eastward. Materials would be gathered this year, work would start in the ninth month, and the project would finish in the eleventh. Stone, iron, lime, craftsmen's wages, and rations would come from the state — more work for less toil, they argued, and lasting safety. The Ministry of Works replied that doing both rivers at once would overtax the people. Open the Ye first, they said; if Zhending's corvée fell short, hire labor from neighboring Shunde Circuit at one liang five qian of Zhongtong cash a day and compensate any farmland taken. Directorate officers would lead skilled garrison hydraulics officers to supervise the circuit and counties; the surveillance commission would lend force until the work was done; the Hutuo project would wait. The plan was approved. In the ninth month Directorate officials, the surveillance commission, and Zhending Circuit were ordered to supervise local offices in the joint repair. Zhending Circuit later reported that work had begun on the fifth day of the intercalary ninth month, but Zhao Prefecture, Lincheng, and other counties said frozen ground made labor impossible and asked to wait for spring. The workers were sent home on the seventh day of the tenth month. The ministry agreed that with the laborers gone, the spring delay should stand. Corvée cash already paid totaled twenty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-two ingots; land compensation, six hundred and thirty.
61
The Huitong River
62
西西西
The Huitong River began southwest of Anshan in Xucheng County, Dongchang Circuit, ran northwest through Shouzhang and Dongchang to Linqing, and crossed into the Imperial River.
63
便 西
In the twenty-sixth year of Zhiyuan (1289), Shouzhang magistrate Han Zhonghui and Astrological Commission clerk Bian Yuan proposed in turn a canal with locks to bring Wen River water to the Imperial River for public and private shipping. The province sent Transport Vice Commissioner Ma Zhizhen with Yuan and others to survey the ground, estimate costs, and map a workable route. The court allocated one million five hundred thousand strings of paper cash, forty thousand shi of rice, and fifty thousand jin of salt for wages and tools, conscripted thirty thousand corvée laborers from neighboring circuits, and posted investigating officials Masu'er, Minister of Rites Zhang Kongsun, and Minister of War Li Chuxun to direct the project. Work began on the jihai day of the first month that year, from southwest of Anshan in Xucheng to the Imperial River at Linqing — more than two hundred and fifty li — with thirty-one locks spaced by height and distance to hold and release water. It was finished on the xinhai day of the sixth month after two million five hundred ten thousand seven hundred and forty-eight work-days. The canal was named the Huitong River.
64
In the twenty-seventh year, after Ma Zhizhen reported rain-wrecked banks and a silted channel, the province ordered dredging and repair. Three thousand grain-transport station households marked for release were kept on the project and allowed to cut timber and quarry stone. Each year afterward a sealed Directorate deputy led clerks, couriers, and garrison officers on patrol to supervise repairs, swap wooden locks for stone, and tackle the worst damage first. The work was not fully finished until the second year of Taiding (1325).
65
Huitong Town had three locks and two earthen dams north of Linqing County. The head lock measured one hundred by eighty chi, with forty-chi straight flanks and thirty-chi sloping wings, two chi high and two zhang wide at the opening. Work began on the first day of the first month of the thirtieth year of Zhiyuan (1293); six hundred and sixty workers finished on the twenty-ninth day of the tenth month. The middle lock stood three li north of the Narrow-Boat Lock. Work ran from the twenty-third day of the seventh month of the second year of Yuanzhen (1296) to the thirteenth day of the third month of the second year of Dade (1298) with four hundred and forty-three workers; dimensions matched the upper lock. The Narrow-Boat Lock lay one hundred and fifty-two li north of the Lihaiwu Lock. Built from the fifteenth day of the eighth month to the twenty-fifth day of the ninth month of the first year of Yanyou (1314) by five hundred workers, it had a nine-chi opening and the same length and width as above. There were two earthen dams.
66
The Lihaiwu Lock stood twelve li north of the Zhoujiadian Lock. Work ran from the second day of the second month to the twentieth day of the fifth month of the second year of Yuanzhen with five hundred and twenty-seven workers; dimensions matched the Huitong Town locks.
67
Zhoujiadian stood twelve li north of the Seven-Stage Lock. Built from the twenty-first day of the first month to the twentieth day of the eighth month of the fourth year of Dade (1300) by four hundred and forty-two workers; dimensions as above.
68
The Seven-Stage Lock came in two parts three li apart. The north section was built from the first day of the fifth month to the sixth day of the tenth month of the first year of Dade (1297) by four hundred and forty-three workers; dimensions matched Zhoujiadian. The south section stood twelve li north of the Acheng Lock. Built from the twentieth day of the first month to the fifth day of the tenth month of the second year of Yuanzhen by four hundred and fifty workers; dimensions matched the north lock.
69
The Acheng Lock also had north and south sections three li apart. Built from the fifth day of the third month to the twenty-eighth day of the seventh month of the third year of Dade (1299) by four hundred and forty-one workers; dimensions as above. The south section stood ten li north of Jingmen's north lock. Built from the twenty-fifth day of the first month to the first day of the tenth month of the second year of Dade by four hundred and forty-six workers; dimensions as above.
70
Jingmen's north and south locks lay two and a half li apart. Built from the first day of the sixth month to the twenty-fifth day of the tenth month of the third year of Dade by three hundred and ten workers; same dimensions. The south lock stood sixty-three li north of the Shouzhang Lock. Built from the twenty-third day of the first month to the twenty-ninth day of the sixth month of the sixth year of Dade; dimensions matched the north lock.
71
Shouzhang stood eight li north of the Anshan Lock. Work ran from the first day of the first month to the twentieth day of the fifth month of the thirty-first year of Zhiyuan (1294). Anshan stood eighty-five li north of the Canal-Opening Lock, built in the twenty-sixth year of Zhiyuan (1289). The Canal-Opening Lock stood one hundred and twenty-four li north of the Jizhou Lock.
72
The Jizhou Lock had three sections; the upper stood three li north of the middle. Built from the twelfth day of the third month to the twenty-eighth day of the seventh month of the first year of Dade. The middle lock stood two li north of the lower. Built from the first day of the third month to the sixth day of the sixth month of the first year of Zhizhi (1321). The lower lock stood six li north of the Zhaocun Lock. Built from the thirteenth day of the second month to the twenty-first day of the fifth month of the seventh year of Dade (1303).
73
Zhaocun stood seven li north of the Shifo Lock. Built from the eighteenth day of the second month to the twentieth day of the fifth month of the fourth year of Taiding (1327).
74
Shifo stood thirteen li north of the Xindian Lock. Built from the tenth day of the second month to the twenty-ninth day of the fourth month of the sixth year of Yanyou (1319).
75
Xindian stood twenty-four li north of the Shijiadian Lock. Built from the twenty-seventh day of the first month to the first day of the fourth month of the first year of Dade (1297).
76
Shijiadian stood fifteen li north of the Zaolin Lock. Built from the third day of the second month to the twenty-third day of the fifth month of the second year of Dade (1298).
77
Zaolin stood ninety-five li north of the Mengyangbo Lock. Built from the fourth day of the second month to the twenty-second day of the fifth month of the fifth year of Yanyou (1318).
78
Mengyangbo stood ninety li north of the Jingou Lock. Built from the fourth day of the first month to the seventeenth day of the fifth month of the eighth year of Dade (1304).
79
Jingou stood twelve li north of the Narrow-Boat Lock. Built from the twenty-fifth day of the intercalary first month to the twenty-third day of the fourth month of the tenth year of Dade (1306).
80
The Gutou Lock had two sections: the north Narrow-Boat Lock stood two li north of the lower lock. Built from the sixth day of the second month to the fifteenth day of the fifth month of the second year of Yanyou (1315). The south lock stood one hundred and twenty li north of Xuzhou. Work began in the second month and finished on the fourteenth day of the fifth month of the eleventh year of Dade (1307).
81
The Sanchakou Lock connected to the Salt River, standing eighteen li north of the Tushan Lock. Built from the nineteenth day of the first month to the thirteenth day of the fourth month of the second year of Taiding (1325). Tushan stood twenty-five li north of the Sanchakou Lock and connected to the Salt River. There was the Yanzhou Lock.
82
There was the Gangcheng Lock.
83
便
On the twentieth day of the second month of the first year of Yanyou (1314), provincial officials reported that the Jiangnan Branch Secretariat shipped all tribute goods to the capital via the Huitong Canal. The river had grown shallow and sluggish, and large vessels packed it so tightly that other boats could not get through. Each year the provincial and central secretariats sent inspectors. Those officials reported that when the canal was first opened, only boats of one hundred and fifty materials were allowed. In recent years powerful men and wealthy merchants, greedy for profit, had built boats of three or four hundred materials, even five hundred, to sail this river, blocking official and private traffic alike. A small stone lock at Gutou, limiting passage to one-hundred-and-fifty-material boats, would solve the problem. We propose adopting this plan: let the Central Secretariat and the Directorate of Waterways dispatch officials to place a small lock at Gutou, and after inspecting suitable sites at Linqing, place another small lock there as well, forbidding boats of more than two hundred materials from entering the canal for transport. The proposal was approved.
84
使 便
On the tenth day of the fourth month of the third year of Zhizhi (1323), the Branch Directorate of Waterways reported that at Jingou, Gutou, and other places east of Pei County on the Huitong Canal, the terrain was high and steep; in drought the water ran shallow and boats stalled. The provincial authorities had already approved two overflow weirs. Recently, in the second year of Yanyou (1315), a restrictive lock had been added above the Gutou Lock to limit large boats. Whenever heavy rains came, the bypass channels of all three locks and the cross-river earthen dams were washed away. From autumn corvée laborers were requisitioned to cut firewood; by winter when the water fell, or at the start of the following spring, repairs began. The work was enormous—thousands of laborers and more than a hundred thousand bundles of firewood—and took months to finish, at ten thousand times the usual labor and expense. Moreover, in the sixth year of Yanyou (1319) heavy rains caused flooding; bypass channels, earthen dams, and the stone wings of the locks were eroded day by day until earth and stone parted to depths of several zhang. The repairs needed were twice as great and remained unfinished to this day. If the stone already on hand at Jingou, Gutou, and the restrictive lock were now used to build one dam-lock in the Gutou bypass channel, and the restrictive lock were moved to the bypass channel of either the Jingou or Gutou lock: when water was high, all main locks could open so water flowed freely; when it was low, the main Jingou lock would close, the restrictive lock above it would open, and at Gutou the restrictive lock would close while the main lock opened for boats. In this way annual repair costs would be saved and corvée laborers spared the misery of working in freezing water—a true case of one effort bringing lasting ease. A dispatch was sent to the Ministry of Works ordering delegated officials to consult with local authorities. Officials were then dispatched from the river garrison to meet with Jining Circuit officers for inspection. They questioned Zhou Dexing, chief of the Jingou Lock, who reported that every summer and autumn the lock embankments were washed away in the rains. Repairs had to wait for the water to fall, then laborers gathered firewood for the work—a process taking at least two or three months, with misery beyond words when icy water rose in winter. Upon review the censor reported that at the beginning of Yanyou the former provincial officials had also requested a restrictive lock to limit large boats. The censors found the proposal correct and asked that it be adopted. It was then resolved that shuttle-board boats and the like were fit for the Imperial Canal and the Yangtze-Huai routes and should be sent wherever they belonged. Two restrictive locks would be placed between the Jingou and Gutou locks, each one zhang wide, to limit large boats. Boats wishing to transport on the Tonghui and Huitong canals would be limited to one hundred and fifty materials; violators would be punished and their vessels confiscated. Powerful pleasure boats from the capital and Jiangnan with red prows and floral decoration would likewise be barred. The plan was to dismantle and move the Gutou restrictive lock south of the Jingou main lock, making a transit ring-lock. On the empty ground to the north a stone overflow weir would be built: when water rose, all three locks large and small would open; when it fell, the main lock would be sealed and boats would pass only through the restrictive lock. If small-material boats or official heavy cargo truly needed passage, they could petition superiors for temporary opening of the main lock and additional lock boards at Jingou to store water for navigation. The cross-river earthen dam at Gutou would be rebuilt as a stone dam per precedent, and all three former earthen dams removed. A stone overflow weir was newly built in the river at the Jingou Lock: one hundred and seventy chi long, one zhang high, and one zhang wide. In the Gutou bypass channel a cross-river dam was built: one hundred and eighty chi long, one zhang one chi high, two zhang wide at the base and one zhang at the top.
85
退 西
In the fourth month of the fourth year of Taiding (1327), censorate officials reported that in inspecting the canal from Tongzhou to Zhen and Yang, and convening the Branch Directorate and officials and people of riverine prefectures and counties, they found the benefits and harms reduced to two points: blockage and breach, and passage. Your humble servant has reviewed the matter: since antiquity every state that established itself had fixed norms for drawing grain transport. Since Emperor Shizu gathered counsel from all sides to aid the myriad people, dredged rivers and canals, drew in the Qing, Ji, Wen, and Si, and erected locks to regulate water, he linked Yanji and the Jiang-Huai in a thousand-li waterway unmatched since antiquity. If later generations faithfully kept the established rules and merely restored what fell into ruin, that alone would be a benefit without end for ten thousand ages. Water's nature is changeable and never constant; long neglect lets old norms decay, and even the wise cannot set things right afterward. For this reason, after detailed inspection, weighing past against present and joining everyone's counsel, I venture a few views. If they are adopted, charge the Directorate of Waterways to guard them carefully without lapse—that will suffice. Without getting to the root of benefits and harms, sending inspectors year after year with formal reports only harasses people and helps nothing. The Directorate's original north and south restrictive locks were each nine chi wide; boats of up to two hundred materials with a beam of eight chi five cun could pass. The ignorant public, insatiable for profit, hemmed in by the restrictive locks, refitted boats with lowered sides and lengthened holds—eighty or ninety chi, even one hundred chi, all five or six hundred materials. Once inside a lock they could not turn; they ran aground and blocked other boats, because the restrictive-lock rule limited width but not length. Your servant went to Zhenzhou and questioned a master shipwright, who said a lock-passing boat with an eight-chi-five-cun beam should be six zhang five chi long, reckoned at two hundred materials. On this basis I propose erecting a stone gauge on the bank below the restrictive lock: any boat entering must be measured, and none longer than the gauge may pass; violators shall be punished. Long boats already inside the lock should be given a deadline to leave. The Secretariat sent this down to the Directorate of Waterways, which delegated garrison officials to meet Jining Circuit officers for joint inspection. Below the restrictive lock, about eighty paces north of the river, two stone gauges were to be placed sixty-five chi apart; boats arriving there must be measured accordingly before entering the lock, and any too long would be punished and turned back. They also met in person with Dongchang Circuit officials and planned, about one li west of the originally established restrictive lock, to set stone gauges at the prescribed dimensions to measure passing boats; those not meeting the original material standard would be punished.
86
使使 使使 使
In the third month of the third year of Tianli (1330), an edict announced to court and country: the Directorate of Waterways reported that Emperor Shizu had spent state funds to open the Huitong Canal for grain transport. Envoys in transit, commoners returning from overseas service, their attendants, and powerful persons from every branch and ortoq arrived at locks without waiting for the proper water level, relied on their influence to beat the lock keepers, and demanded frequent openings. Grain transport boats, whenever the water ran shallow, built earthen dams in the river to store water for gradual passage—and thus damaged the locks. We ask that this be forbidden. Henceforth imperial princes, imperial sons-in-law, envoys of every branch, powerful ortoq persons, and envoys returning from overseas service, together with official grain boats, must open and close locks according to the established rules when they arrive. Those who as before ignored the water level, relied on influence to beat and torture lock keepers and force openings, or built earthen dams in the river and damaged locks, would be punished. If lock keepers, relying on this edict, deliberately delayed when locks should open, obstructed envoys and travelers, and extorted money and goods—that was contempt for ordinary law. Censorial investigators and the surveillance commissions were also ordered to monitor this constantly.
87
使
The Yanzhou Lock—the Yanzhou Lock has already been described above. In the fourth month of the twenty-seventh year of Zhiyuan (1290), Vice Director Ma Zhizhen of the Directorate of Grain Transport reported:
88
西使 沿沿 調使 沿 西 使便 調 使
Per a dispatch from the Shanxi-East and -West Circuit Pacification Commission, he inspected the Yanzhou lock and weir. Earlier, in the twelfth year of Zhiyuan (1275), Chancellor Bayan had inquired about the water route from the Jiang-Huai to the capital. Zhizhen replied that since Song and Jin times the connecting channel between the Wen and Si had been surveyed by Director Guo and could serve grain transport. In the twentieth year (1283) the Central Secretariat memorialized for approval and entrusted Minister Li of the Ministry of War and others to excavate it, planning fourteen stone locks. In the twenty-first year (1284) the province sent Zhizhen with Censor Shang and others to inspect jointly; they planned eight stone locks and two stone weirs. Aside from what was already finished, one stone lock, one stone weir, and the Gangcheng stone weir remained unrepaired to this day. South of Jizhou, towpaths and bridges along Xu and Pi had been repaired after a water station was added at Pizhou in the twenty-third year (1286) and orders sent to riverine prefectures and counties. In the twenty-third year Zhizhen was appointed Vice Director of Grain Transport and charged with managing locks and releasing convoy boats. Along the towpaths there had been no collapses. Under the yearly custom, when hemp and wheat were flourishing, officials were sent to repair lock paths and supervise landowners in cutting the crops. Rice weirs were opened at Tengzhou, the Moyan weir at Siyuan; men were posted at Lüliang, Baibu, and other stations; and at the Jizhou lock Jiang-Huai convoy boats were supervised so they passed posts and left locks without blocking travelers or extorting money. The newly opened Huitong Canal together with the Jizhou connecting channel between Wen and Si was not a naturally flowing river. At Yanzhou a lock and weir restrained the Si flowing west; at Gangcheng a lock and weir divided Wen water into the canal, which joined at Jizhou. Six locks regulated the water, opening and closing to pass boats south to the Huai and Si and into the new Huitong Canal as far as Tongzhou. Last year in the fourth month the Jiang-Huai Directorate of Grain Transport reported that its grain convoys were handed over at Dong'e after passing the Ji River. Formerly the Jizhou transport office repeatedly sent orders to riverine authorities to repair towpaths; for urgent problems responsible officials would be interrogated and reported to the province, and circuit intendants and county darughachi and below could be sentenced on the spot. Now the Jizhou transport office had been abolished and its river section assigned to the Directorate of Grain Transport; if grain had not reached Dong'e, any delay was this directorate's fault. The river stretch to the south now had no overseer; floods often burst embankments and choked the channel. At the Jizhou lock, the chief officer of the former Jizhou transport office had personally supervised, so convoy guards and boatmen dared not quarrel. Now officials dispatched from various offices and convoy guards and boatmen had no unified command; they fought over water levels, cut ahead at locks, beat one another, damaged boats, and sank official grain. It was proposed to assign the Dong'e river section to the Jiang-Huai Directorate for overall supervision so grain transport would not suffer; the Metropolitan Secretariat approved. The Jiang-Huai Vice Director also reported that besides posting officials to guard locks and weirs, the two locks and one weir at Wen-Si-Gangcheng, the Yanzhou lock and weir on the Si River, and the south Jizhou lock were the throat of the Huitong Canal's upper reaches. Last year floodwater had destroyed the Gangcheng Wen River earthen weir and the Yanzhou Si River earthen weir; orders must go to Yanzhou and Tai'an to dispatch labor for repairs. Floodwater had also breached embankments around Mount Liang, draining water into the old river so the new channel ran low and grain boats stalled. They asked investigating officials to relay orders to Dongping Circuit for repairs—the upper reach assigned to the Jiang-Huai transport directorate, the lower reach to Zhizhen. If afterward the new river ran low, the Jizhou lock supervisors and Tai'an, Yanzhou, and Dongping would handle repairs directly. Materials for one Yanzhou stone lock, one stone weir, and one Gangcheng stone lock had been fully prepared and must be built. Although Zhizhen had inspected and accounted for them, they were no longer under his jurisdiction; he asked that the Jiang-Huai transport office be ordered to repair them. For embankments around Gangcheng'an and Mount Liang in Tai'an, the Jizhou lock, and other sites—though assigned to the Jiang-Huai transport office—if future floods destroyed dikes, he also asked that Dongping, Jining, and Tai'an be notified and obey any orders received. At the Anshan lock on the border of Dong'e and Xucheng, grain boats no longer used the old river; the lock supervisor dispatched by Jiang-Huai had departed and no one was watching the lock. Zhizhen had to repair it and temporarily appoint a keeper.
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