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卷六十五 志第十七上: 河渠二

Volume 65 Treatises 18: Rivers and Canals 2

Chapter 65 of 元史 · History of Yuan
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1
Rivers and Canals 2 — The Yellow River
2
The Yellow River rises far upstream and runs high; its current is vast and swift. No scourge has afflicted China more grievously, and earlier histories already set down the calamities of its breaches at length.
3
In the seventh month of the ninth year of the Zhiyuan era (1272), the north bank of the river south of Guangying Granary in Xinxiang County, Weihui Circuit, burst open for more than fifty paces. In the eighth month another stretch of one hundred eighty-three paces gave way; the flood had not yet spent itself, and only thirty paces now stood between the river and the granary. The court then dispatched Ma Liangbi, deputy director of the Directorate of Waterways, together with circuit officials to survey the damage, and corvée laborers were levied to complete the repairs in concert. In the twenty-fifth year (1288), the river broke through at twenty-two places in Yangwu County and elsewhere along Bianliang Circuit, sweeping away grain and dwellings. The Pacification Commission was charged to oversee corvée repairs throughout the circuit.
4
In the fifth month of the third year of the Dade era (1299), Henan Province reported that breaches at Pukou'er and elsewhere had flooded several districts of Guide Prefecture and brought disaster on the populace. Officials were sent to estimate repairs: seven dikes at twenty-five sites, 39,092 paces in all, requiring 404,000 bundles of reeds, 24,720 piles a foot thick, and 7,902 laborers.
5
In the eleventh month of the third year of the Zhida era (1310), the Surveillance Commission of the Hebei-Henan Circuit memorialized:
6
When the Yellow River bursts its banks, harm spreads for a thousand li—walled towns are soaked, dwellings swept away, crops destroyed, and the common people already bear the full brunt of the disaster. Only afterward do officials cast about for remedies, while debate swirls and rival camps argue costs and benefits. Those responsible waver, policy must be referred upward, and by the time the court decides, the damage has only deepened—the classic failure to prepare before calamity strikes. For the most part, when the Yellow River rests in its bed the current seems gentle and hardly looks dangerous—yet once the rains of a wet season arrive, the torrent turns violent in an instant. East of Mengjin the banks are loose and thin, laced with sand and salt, and with no proper channels to guide the flood off—breach and overflow can be expected almost at a glance.
7
使 使
In recent years the people of Bo and Ying were spared only because the river shifted north of the Yellow River plain, yet officials lacked foresight in their planning and allowed ponds and marshes to be turned entirely into farmland. As far east as the triple fork at Qi County, the river had long been divided into three channels to split and tame its force. In earlier years officials of Guide and Dakang petitioned to block the northern and southern branches one after another, merging the three streams into a single course. With the lower reach no longer free to drain, the river naturally backed up and brought disaster. Seen in this light, the authorities had stripped away the very channels that relieved the flood; small wonder that breaches and overflows up and down the course remain unremedied to this day. Even now the current is pressing southward with signs of returning toward Juye and Liangshan. The river's nature is to wander without fixed course; unless far-sighted precautions are taken, within a few years Cao, Pu, Ji, and Yun will inevitably be stricken.
8
Today's so-called river controllers do nothing but argue in circles, none with a sound plan. The Directorate's officers are not carefully chosen, and scarcely one in a hundred truly understands what the Yellow River can do for good or ill. Though they ride the post roads each year on so-called river inspections, they merely go through the motions. Ask them about the lay of the land and they are utterly at a loss; inquire into the strengths and weaknesses of the current, and that lies outside their training altogether. They possess neither genuine ability nor seasoned experience. Some even stir up ill-conceived projects, exhausting the people and obstructing the river's natural course—only to create fresh disasters downstream. The best policy now is to establish a metropolitan water sub-directorate at Bianliang, appointing only upright, capable men who truly understand hydraulics to dedicated posts, maintaining an adequate staff for frequent inspection and vigilant defense—dredging where dredging is needed, blocking where blocking is needed, reinforcing where reinforcement is needed. Once responsibilities are clearly assigned, real results can be achieved. How can that be compared with waiting until the river has already burst, the people already ruined, and then rushing through hasty repairs that only exhaust them further?
9
使 調
The province then ordered the Directorate of Waterways to deliberate, citing the approved memorial of the first month of the tenth year of Dade (1306), when the Directorate was raised to the third rank, two posts added, and a sub-directorate seal cast to patrol the Imperial Canal, repair breaches, dredge shallows, and curb disorderly boat traffic. The proposal was now to charge that sub-directorate with touring the river and supervising repairs. The Directorate replied: "Yellow River flooding is a distinct problem and cannot be equated with the grain-transport sub-directorate that maintains the Huizong Canal with its dams and sluice gates. Officials and a seal were first added for the Imperial Canal with concurrent oversight of the Yellow River; if the sub-directorate were stationed there exclusively, duties on the Imperial Canal would suffer. Besides, the Yellow River already has its own responsible officials in charge. Henceforth sub-directorate officers should depart in the tenth month, tour with local authorities to inspect breaches, tally materials, and supervise repairs to completion by year's end. When the new sub-directorate chief arrives the following spring, duties can be handed over one by one before the outgoing officers return, so that neither river is neglected."
10
使 滿
The Ministry of Works observed that in the ninth year of Dade (1305) the Yellow River had breached and shifted course, pressing close to Bianliang and nearly submerging the city. Local authorities as an expedient opened the Dongpen outlet and diverted water into the Ba River to reduce the main current's force, slowing the channel and drawing the flood toward subsidiary streams. The old Ba River channel was too narrow to absorb the flow. The next year Xiao of the Directorate of Waterways and others were urgently dispatched to seal the outlet, yet the flood only grew fiercer and the effort failed utterly. Harm has recurred year after year from Guide in the south to the Jining region in the north, and has not ceased to this day. This ministry concluded: "The Yellow River cannot be managed like ordinary waterways. Without appointing men who truly understand hydraulics past and present to dedicated charge of the work, no lasting remedy will ever be achieved. The Henan Surveillance Commission's analysis is thorough and sound. The Directorate of Waterways has no better proposal, and to rely merely on old precedent is inadequate. If an appropriate corps of officials is established, selecting only upright, dedicated men who thoroughly understand terrain and current, charged exclusively with river defense and touring the course to dredge or block in due season, the scourge may finally be lifted." The province approved and ordered metropolitan water sub-directorate officers to specialize in river disasters, with orderly handover at the end of each term.
11
使沿 西便
In the eighth month of the first year of the Yanyou era (1314), the Henan Branch Secretariat reported: "When the Yellow River falls low it exposes old ponds and marshes, many of which powerful families have seized. When sudden flooding comes, the water has nowhere to spread and disaster follows. Seen in this light, it is not the river that offends mankind—mankind brings the offense upon itself. We propose dispatching a Directorate officer versed in hydraulics together with the provincial Surveillance Commission to survey the course, opening dikes and barriers where possible and repairing them before the flood season—less labor for greater effect. Moreover, at Sui Prefecture and elsewhere along Bianliang Circuit, several dozen river mouths had burst open. At Xiaohuang Village in Kaifeng County one plan called for a crescent dike, while the metropolitan water sub-directorate proposed flood-barrier dikes and weirs—the schemes did not agree. Provincial officials should be commissioned together with the circuit Surveillance Commission, Bianliang's metropolitan water sub-directorate, and the regular prefectural and county authorities to inspect on site and adopt the soundest plan." Accordingly Guo Fengzheng of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, the former deputy director Bian Chengwu, director Duo'erzhi of the Directorate of Waterways, Right Counselor Shi of the Henan Branch Secretariat, Deputy Surveillance Commissioner Zhamuhe, and Bianliang Administrative Assistant Zhang Chengzhi were dispatched from Heyin down to Chen Prefecture, together with the responsible local officials, to survey the river course. At the Xiaohuang Village outlet in Kaifeng County, measurements showed the channel six feet shallower than before. Chenliu, Tongxu, and Taikang once had extensive reed marshes, but after the western river, Ta River, and other outlets were blocked for farming, breaches recurred year after year elsewhere along the course. The officials jointly concluded: "The art of managing water lies solely in following its natural course. It is said that long ago the great river ran from Yangwu and Zuocheng through Baima and Hejian northeast to the sea, shifting its course endlessly over the years. Every year it floods both banks and sometimes bursts through. Forcible blocking always coincides with the peak of farming season, with piles and fascines levied and corvée laborers mobilized by the tens of thousands at costs beyond reckoning. Prefectures and counties are in uproar and the people can scarcely survive. The Yellow River is ever prone to wander; the only sound policy is to guide it downstream and let it drain freely. On this inspection from Heyin down to Guide, the summer flood stood higher than in an ordinary year, yet thanks to diversion at the Xiaohuang outlet there were no breaches at all—clear proof of the policy's merit. Chen Prefecture proved the lowest and most vulnerable stretch along the river. This year wheat and grain failed entirely and famine was severe. Though rescue was urgently needed, there was nowhere downstream that could be opened to receive the flood. If the Xiaohuang Village outlet were sealed, disaster would simply shift to neighboring prefectures; if the upper course were breached on the south bank, Bianliang would be stricken; if the lower north bank were breached, Shandong would be at grave risk. Both courses cannot be fully secured; the lesser harm must be accepted to avert the greater. Chen Village's corvée and taxes should be remitted and its starving people relieved; disaster households in Chenliu, Tongxu, and Taikang should be surveyed and aided according to precedent. Beyond keeping the Xiaohuang outlet open as before, proposals to build crescent dikes, flood barriers, or seal the mouth altogether are difficult to endorse." A full inventory was then drawn up of every dike under Bianliang's jurisdiction, whether already repaired or still requiring dredging and reinforcement.
12
使 使
In the first month of the fifth year (1318), Deputy Surveillance Commissioner Aotun of the Hebei-Henan Circuit reported: "In recent years the river has burst at the Xiaohuang Village mouth in Qi County and poured south in an unchecked torrent, inundating the fertile lands along the Chen and Ying rivers and driving the people into exile. The flood now presses within a few li of Bian City. Should the rains of a wet season swell the river, what defense could be mounted in time! Now, during the farming lull, the matter should be studied so that the river may be returned to its old course and reach the Yangtze and Huai—not only to restore life to the people of Chen and Ying, but because I fear that Bian City itself may one day be inundated, with harm beyond measure." The Grand Secretariat for Agriculture then directed the Directorate of Waterways to order the Bianliang sub-directorate to undertake repairs. Work began on the eleventh day of the second month of the sixth year (1319) and was finished on the ninth day of the third month, running from the two old dikes at Huai Geda in the north to the Bian dike at Yaowu in the south—a total length of twenty li and 243 paces. A new city-protection dike was constructed, 7,443 paces in length, with a base sixteen paces wide, a crown four paces wide, and a height of one zhang; labor was reckoned at one work unit per sixty feet. Earth was taken from twenty paces east of the dike. Seven inner channels of varying depth and width required 253,680 work units and 8,453 laborers; allowing for days lost to wind and rain, the work was finished in thirty days. The inner drainage channel ran twenty paces wide from north to south with a depth of five feet. Dikes within the river channel were rebuilt with a base twenty-four paces wide, a crown eight paces wide, and a height of one zhang five feet, totaling 120,000 cubic feet of fill. Earth was drawn from somewhat farther away, reckoned at one work unit per forty feet, 30,000 units in all, with one hundred laborers employed. Two large piles per pace were used, forty in all, each one zhang two feet long and four inches thick. One thousand bundles of fascine grass per pace were required, twenty thousand in all. Four securing stakes per pace were driven, eighty in all, each eight feet long and three inches thick. Twenty sailors, two carpenters, two large boats, one set of gangways, and ropes in full supply were deployed.
13
In the seventh month of the seventh year (1320), Bianliang Circuit reported that on the eleventh day of the sixth month the river had breached the east dike at Tahai Village in Xingyang County for more than ten paces, and that two layers of cross-dikes had several gaps as well. On the night of the twenty-third, two fresh breaches opened at Su Village and Qilisi in Kaifeng County. Pacification Commissioner Zhamuhe of the province personally led circuit and Directorate officials in joint repairs. Work began in the first month of the first year of Zhizhi (1321), restoring dikes at forty-six sites for 1,256,494 work units and 31,413 laborers in all.
14
西 西 西西 西 西西 退 西 便
In the sixth month of the first year of the Zhishun era (1330), Hao Chengwu, river-defense officer and magistrate of Jiyin County in Cao Prefecture, reported that on the fifth day of the sixth month the old Yellow River dike at Weijiadao was on the verge of collapse and could not be patched in place. Corvée laborers were therefore mobilized to build a new flood-protection crescent dike 309 paces long east to west, six paces wide at the base, and one zhang high. As the flood spread still wider, a second crescent dike was begun to the north, more than a thousand paces long and nine paces wide at the base, but the work was not yet complete. On the twenty-first day the river suddenly surged. All three dikes, old and new, gave way at once; the next day the outer dike collapsed again. Laborers were rushed to the breach, but the torrent was fierce—snakes were seen writhing in the current—and every stake and load of earth was swept away without a trace. The old dike, worn by years of service, had many gaps; laborers were assigned to rebuild more than twenty paces of it in concert. At Weijiadao the breach in the dike ran more than five hundred paces east to west and over two zhang deep; the outer dike's gap extended more than four hundred paces. The flood-protection dike at Mozikou was likewise low and thin, inadequate to hold the water, and ran 1,500 paces east to west. Weijiadao could not quickly be restored; laborers were first assigned to patch the more manageable sections. At Mozikou work began on the sixteenth day of the seventh month and was completed on the twenty-eighth. On the twenty-second day the inspection reached west of Zhucong Matou, where the old dike had failed for more than 170 paces. Materials were calculated to face the dike outward by five paces, raising its height by one zhang two feet to match the old level, with a crown two paces wide. From the laborers at Mozikou, 310 were detailed for this task. They entered service on the twenty-third day of that month and finished on the fourth day of the intercalary seventh month. Hao Chengwu added: "At Weijiadao, Zhuan'gu, and neighboring villages the dikes lie in ruins. Stakes and earth have been cast in again and again only to be washed away. Any attempt to seal the breach is futile—the ground roundabout is nothing but mud and mire, uninhabitable, with nowhere left to draw fill. In Pei Prefecture the Anle district and others suffered drought last year and flood again this year—crops swept away, dwellings destroyed, the people without food. Corvée labor is scarcely to be had. Villages that escaped the flood have already been levied wholesale to repair dikes at Huangjiaqiao, Mozikou, and elsewhere; a second round of corvée seems impossible. If repairs wait until autumn, when the waters fall and the weather cools, hired labor may restore the people's strength. Seven breaches in old and new dikes now total 12,228 paces in length, with a base twelve paces wide, a crown four paces wide, and a height of one zhang two feet. The estimate calls for 6,304 laborers, 990 piles, 1,320 reed mats, and 16,500 bundles of fascine grass. Labor is reckoned at one unit per sixty feet; barring days lost to wind and rain, the work should be finished in fifty days." The county approved the plan, and by the thirtieth day of the eighth month 2,420 laborers were levied under Hao Chengwu's supervision. Hao Chengwu reported further: "Repairs began on the third day of the ninth month. On the eighteenth came a great gale, on the nineteenth rain, and on the twenty-fourth rain again. The flood barriers at Xinmatou and Sunjiadao collapsed anew, doubling the labor required. He petitioned the county for two thousand additional workers. On the twenty-sixth day, Yuan together with Ding of Chengwu and Tao counties completed 820 paces of repairs at Weijiadao by divided labor. On the second day of the tenth month work reached Xinmatou and Sunjiadao. The breach was remeasured at 140 paces north to south, with fifty paces under water—two zhang deep in places, no less than eight or nine feet in the shallows. Repairs with piles and mats according to the original estimate were completed by the seventh day. A new crescent dike was also built on site, 1,627 paces long on a northwest-southeast diagonal. Chengwu and Dingtao contributed 150 paces by divided labor, leaving 1,477 paces built here; the outer dike head at Weijiadao, included in the original estimate, remained unfinished. Work was to begin at once, but winter cold had frozen the ground; repairs are planned for the coming spring, when joint labor will serve both the state and the people.
15
The Jizhou Canal
16
便 便
The Jizhou Canal was newly excavated to link the grain-transport network. In the seventh month of the seventeenth year of the Zhiyuan era (1280), Participating Counselor Geng and Minister Ali memorialized that, regarding Yao Yan's proposal to open the canal, Ahmad should convene senior ministers to deliberate, with ten thousand ingots of paper money set aside as wages and grain rations provided as well. The Emperor approved. In the ninth month of the eighteenth year (1281), Chief Counselor Huoluohusun and others of the Central Secretariat reported that Director-General Yao and his colleagues asked that one year's tax from Yidu, Zilai, and Ninghai be remitted and converted into wages for opening the canal. Pacification Commissioner Ahmad and the senior ministers concluded that although a year's tax levy was substantial, converting it to wages was far more convenient than disbursement from the treasury. The proposal was approved. In the tenth month Huoluohusun and others reported that the canal Abahsi had opened ran through Jizhou, where another stream lay beside farmland and could conveniently be opened as well. We propose that if this channel is opened, the garrison farms under Abahsi's jurisdiction in that area should be relocated so as not to obstruct the current. The Emperor ordered the relocation. In the twelfth month Oruji, Liu of the Directorate of Waterways, and a skilled calculator were dispatched with an imperial commissioner seal to Jizhou to fix corvée quotas for the excavation, and the newly submitted armies of Daming and Weizhou were ordered to assist.
17
<>便 <>便 <>便 <> <>
In the thirty-first year the Censorate reported that the Jiao-Lai sea route had silted up and could no longer carry shipping. Censor Yisutiemuer added that the province had sent Yiyasushi, who argued that grain transport by river incurred fewer losses than by sea. Grain officials Nangajia Lu and Commander Sun Wei then argued that sea transport was both swift and convenient. Right Counselor Maishuding reported that Wanuwunu Lu had thrice written that Abahsi's canal brought little gain and much loss and was ill suited to grain transport. Twenty thousand sailor-soldiers and a thousand vessels now lie idle; properly deployed, they could move a million shi of grain each year. An earlier edict had awaited Manggu Lu's arrival for joint deliberation: if the sea route proved satisfactory, Abahsi's canal could be abandoned. Manggu Lu had already returned from a successful sea transport, and one or two southerners had volunteered to move ten thousand shi of grain, which permission was granted. Nangajia Lu and Commander Sun petitioned again to test sea transport with troops. Provincial and court officials jointly concluded that Abahsi's canal had employed five thousand sailors, five thousand soldiers, and a thousand boats, which Yangzhou Province had used to train grain transport crews. It was now proposed to redeploy these sailor-soldiers with Pingluan vessels for sea transport from Lijin. The Emperor approved. Abahsi's canal was accordingly abandoned.
18
The Fu Canal — a channel drawing water from the Fu River to supply the moat of Ming Prefecture.
19
西
In the tenth month of the fifth year of Zhiyuan, Mingci Circuit reported that the wells of Ming Prefecture were brackish and bitter, that residents who drank from them fell ill in great numbers, and that deaths were frequent. They asked that the old channel be dredged, dams and sluices installed, and Fu River water led into the prefectural moat to supply the people's needs. The canal was estimated at nine hundred paces east to west, six feet wide and three feet deep, with labor reckoned at one unit per two feet for 475 units total. Civilians were to supply their own tools; the sluices would be opened twice yearly without hindering grain transport. The Central Secretariat approved.
20
The Guangji Canal
21
使使
The Guangji Canal in Huaimeng Circuit drew Qin River water down to the Yellow River. In the second year of the Zhongtong era, Commissioner Wang Yunzhong and Envoy Yang Duanren received orders to open the canal, recruiting 1,651 laborers in all from more than 6,700 water-using households; the work was finished in just over 130 days. The stone weir built was over one hundred paces long, over thirty paces wide, and one zhang three feet high. The stone sluice bridge stood two zhang high, ten paces long, and six paces wide. Four channels of varying dimensions totaled 677 li, passing through Jiyuan, Henei, Heyang, Wen, and Wuzhi and serving 463 villages. When completed the work greatly benefited the people and was named Guangji, "Broad Relief." In the eighth month of the third year, Minister Hulubuhua and others reported that the Guangji Canal Office feared powerful families would in time seize the water shares now allotted after the Qin River canal's completion. An edict was issued confirming the water allotments fixed by the office and forbidding anyone thereafter to encroach upon them.
22
調 便 使 退 使 使退便
In the third month of the third year of the Tianli era, Associate Administrator Ahmad of Huaqing Circuit reported that prolonged drought had withered the summer wheat, autumn seed could not be sown, and the people were starving. On consulting local elders, all praised the Dan River for irrigating hillside fields. The Qin River could serve likewise. In the Zhongtong era Academician Wang, facing similar drought, had opened this canal at the ancient Qin outlet below the Taihang range, excavating four great channels through Wen and Wuzhi to the Yellow River, some five hundred li in all, and naming it Guangji. Officials were appointed to supervise; in drought they weighed water shares by labor rendered, and more than 3,000 qing of farmland in five counties benefited. Within twenty years powerful families had dammed the stream for mills, choking the current; heavy rains then silted the mouth and dikes collapsed. The Canal Office was soon abolished, local authorities undertook no repairs, and the works fell into ruin. After more than fifty years the diversion mouth and old channel can still be traced. If dredged and restored as before to irrigate the fields, the people would benefit greatly. The five counties of Heyang, Henei, Jiyuan, Wen, and Wuzhi should be ordered to supply labor from water-using households to clear the diversion, install sluices and weirs, and commission men versed in hydraulics to plan the work. In drought, sluices should be opened according to the water's pace, shares allotted by labor, and fields irrigated; when heavy rains swell the river, sluices should be closed and the main current restored. It should be forbidden to dam the water for mills or rice paddies. Thus flood and drought would both be provided for, and the people would prosper. Documents should be sent to Mengzhou, Henei, and Wuzhi to commission officials for deliberation. Reports from Mengzhou followed. On inspecting the Qin outlet and consulting elders, they learned that an earthen weir had once diverted the main stream into the Guangji Canal; the northern relief channel could not absorb the flood, and after heavy rains destroyed the crops the outlet had been sealed. If earthen banks are joined above Fangkou and a stone weir set in the main Qin level with it, overflow can be directed over the weir back into the main channel while the relief stream splits the force—harm might thus be avoided. Heyang and Wuzhi magistrates met with elders and concluded that reopening the old Guangji Canal, widening the relief channel, forbidding mills, and installing sluices would allow irrigation in drought and safe drainage in flood, to the benefit of all. Huaqing Circuit reported to the Ministry of Works; the Directorate of Waterways replied directing the circuit to commission officials to inspect and carry out the work.
23
The Sanbai Canals
24
西 使 沿
Jingzhao once had the Sanbai Canals, but since the Yuan conquest of Jin the works had fallen into ruin and the land lay waste. Though the people of Shaanxi wished to farm, they lacked irrigation; tax revenue fell short and military campaigns went underfunded. In the twelfth year of Emperor Taizong, Liang Tai proposed assigning households, cattle, tools, and seed to restore the canals and weirs, promising several times the yield of dry land and grain enough to supply the army. Taizong approved and appointed Liang Tai, bearing the imperial gold plaque, as commissioner for the Sanbai Canals with Guo Shizhong as deputy, reporting directly to the court from an office in Yunyang County. The farming households and livestock required were by separate edict entrusted to Tachai Gunbu at the army front for supply. That month an edict instructed Tachai Gunbu to assign about two thousand households of captured subjects with families, twenty carpenters, and a thousand government cattle including three hundred dairy cows to Liang Tai for the Sanbai Canal project. Any shortfall was to be made up from the chiliarchs and centurions, with full delivery by the eleventh month and work to begin in the twelfth. The grain harvested was to go directly to army rations. If households lacked clothing when dispatched, chiliarchs and centurions were to supply it proportionally. Soldiers were to escort them beyond the border and along the route to prevent flight. Travel rations were set at one sheng for adults and half for children according to distance.
25
西
The Hongkou Canal — located in Fengyuan Circuit. In the tenth month of the first year of the Zhizhi era, the Shaanxi Garrison Fields Office reported:
26
使西 西 使使 西便
From Qin and Han through Tang and Song, each August water households were dispatched to cut the river below Zhongshan west of Jingyang, build the Hong weir, and divert the Jing into the Bai Canal down to Baigong sluice north of Jingyang, where three divisions and a level stone gate apportioned water among five counties. The northern branch supplied Sanyuan, Liyang, and Yunyang; the middle branch Gaoling; the southern branch Jingyang—irrigating more than 70,000 mu in all. Recently in the third year of Zhida, Censor Wang Chengde of the Shaanxi Branch Secretariat argued that expanding the stone channel at Jingyang Hongkou would benefit generations to come. Officials from Sanyuan, Jingyang, Lintong, and Gaoling and garrison officers and elders of Jingyang, Weinan, and Liyang were assembled to deliberate. As approved, the stone channel was expanded eighty-five paces—425 feet long, two zhang deep, one zhang five feet wide—requiring 127,500 cubic feet of stone. Two hundred stonemasons, three hundred laborers, and two smiths using fire and water could cut five hundred feet daily; the work was to finish in 255 days. The government supplied grain and tools; corvée laborers were drawn from water-using households, and craftsmen's wages were shared equally among them. Shaanxi Province calculated that the cost would not equal two years' expense—a true case of labor once, benefit forever—and approved the plan. The metropolitan government commissioned Garrison Fields darughachi Zhilichi to supervise. Work began on the tenth day of the second month of the first year of Yanyou. By the nineteenth day of the sixth month officials reported that the stone was so hard that only one zhang could be cut before springs burst forth. Seventeen additional paces were ordered, requiring 25,500 more cubic feet; with one hundred added workers cutting six hundred feet daily, completion was estimated in 242 days.
27
使 西 便 耀
In the third month of the second year of the Tianli era, Garrison Fields Commissioner Guo Jiayi, who also oversaw canal affairs, reported that sudden rain on the third day of the sixth month last year had flooded the Jing, destroyed the Hong weir and Xiaolongkou, and left the Bai Canal shallow. Repairs would require 149,511 work units and 1,600 laborers over ninety-three days. Labor was levied from water households, each man to bring one jin of hemp, one jin of iron, a forty-foot rope for mud baskets, and a straw mat seven feet by two inches thick. Shaanxi Province approved the Garrison Fields report. From Qin through Song, Hongkou's 120 rapids and three divisions supplied five counties from Jingyang to Lintong, irrigating more than 70,000 qing. Fields supplied 1,600 laborers yearly to repair the weir from the first of the eighth month and release water in the tenth month. Fengyuan had lately suffered five years of drought; people resorted to cannibalism, and seven or eight in ten of those who fled died of plague. To levy laborers and require them to supply their own materials is beyond their means. Jingyang's irrigation, though divided into three branches, cannot reach distant counties like Sanyuan in season. Jingyang lies nearest the headworks on the upper, southern, and middle branches and enjoys the readiest access to water. For this repair, present households should serve as usual, but the quota of fled households should be met by assigning one extra man from nearby Jingyang water households, the government providing one sheng of grain daily. The province approved eight hundred ingots of paper money and commissioned Associate Administrator Li Chenshi of Yaozhou, Commissioner Guo Jiayi, and local officials to purchase grain at current prices for the workers. Li Chenshi supervised the repairs, which were completed on the sixteenth day of the eleventh month.
28
The Yangzhou Canal
29
The canal lay north of Yangzhou. Under the Song troops had once been assigned to dredge it, but after the conquest it gradually silted up. Near the end of the Zhiyuan era the Jiang-Huai Branch Secretariat had raised the issue, and though dredging was ordered, responsible offices complied without visible result.
30
In the eleventh month of the fourth year of the Yanyou era, the Liang-Huai Transport Office reported that the salt levy was heavy, the canal shallow and sourceless, dependent solely on rainfall, and requested repairs. The following February the Central Secretariat directed Henan Province to select officials together with transport and local authorities to inspect the canal and estimate costs. Henan Branch Secretariat Officer Zhang Fengzheng, Huaidong Pacification Commission and transport officials, and local granary officers toured the full length and concluded that of 2,350 li, local authorities should assign riverside landowners to hire labor for 1,869 li; granary and salt offices, without hindering tax collection, would assist in repairing the remaining 482 li. The Transport Office added that tax quotas had risen while boat and salt households grew poorer, and urged comprehensive repairs with reduced official expenditure. Provincial ministers approved hiring ten thousand laborers at two liang daily, totaling twenty thousand ingots drawn from salt revenues and reduced boat fees. Officials of the Directorate of Waterways, Henan Branch Secretariat, and Huaidong Pacification Commission were assigned to supervise, the Surveillance Commission to inspect, and the Privy Council to maintain order, with dredging to proceed jointly during the farming lull.
31
調
Lian Lake lies at Zhenjiang. After the Yuan took the south, powerful families had diked the lake for farmland until it could no longer hold water and began to overflow. Near the end of Shizu's reign, Participating Counselor Andulaci petitioned to restore Song-era supervision of dredging and to levy tax by the mu on encroached land.
32
便 沿 西使
In the twelfth month of the third year of Zhizhi, provincial ministers reported that the Jiang-Zhe Branch Secretariat had stated that the Zhenjiang canal depended entirely on Lian Lake as its source—for official grain transport to the capital, merchant traffic, and farmers alike, all boats passed this way. Under the Song laborers had been assigned to dredge it in season. Lian Lake stored floodwater; releasing one inch of lake water could raise the canal by a foot when it ran shallow. In recent years silting had blocked shipping, forcing official goods to be hauled by civilians at great inconvenience. Officials were to dredge the canal from Zhenjiang to Lücheng Dam, 131 li in length, requiring 10,513 laborers over sixty days. More than three thousand additional workers would dredge Lian Lake in ninety days, each receiving three sheng of grain and one liang of Zhongtong paper money daily. Branch Secretariat and Censorate officials were to supervise separately. Boats and materials were to be prepared this year and work begun the following spring. The plan was approved as proposed by the Jiang-Zhe Branch Secretariat. Once approved, the metropolitan government directed the Jiang-Zhe Branch Secretariat to commission Participating Counselor Dong Zhongfeng to supervise the work in person with all responsible officials. Dong Zhongfeng reported that Ren Fengzheng, former deputy director of waterways and magistrate of Chongming, Mao Zhongyi, commissioner of Zhenjiang, and others had concluded that lake and canal were separate tasks. Following the Jiaoshan method, one thousand boats with three men each using bamboo scoops could dredge three loads daily—270,000 loads in three months—to raise the lake banks with the silt removed. From Chenggong Dam in Zhenjiang city to Lücheng Dam in Wujin County, Changzhou, the canal ran 131 li and 146 paces. The plan called for a surface five zhang wide, a bottom three zhang wide, and four feet of new depth added to the existing two feet for six feet total. Labor was to be levied from major landholding households in Pingjiang, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Jiangyin, and Liyang under Jiankang Circuit. To dredge the lake and open the canal simultaneously would be beyond immediate capacity. During the farming lull the canal should be opened first, and Lian Lake dredged only after that work was finished. The provincial court approved the report, and Wang Zhengshi of the Bureau of General Affairs and others went to Danyang County, Zhenjiang, in the first month of Zhiding 1 to inspect the lake with the supervising officials. They found sandy ridges and yellow soil in the upper lake and dense rush roots in the lower lake—the mud was too hard to scoop. They also argued that running both projects at once would be impractical—the sites were more than three hundred li apart, making supervision and supplies difficult. They proposed using their 13,512 laborers to open the canal first within forty-seven days, then dredge Lian Lake in twenty. The Jiangnan Branch Secretariat censor and the Zhexi Surveillance vice commissioner then arrived, agreed to start with the canal, prepared the necessary reports, and put laborers to work on the seventeenth of that month.
33
便 西 西西
On the eighteenth of the second month, provincial officials memorialized that opening the canal and dredging Lian Lake was major work and should proceed as the branch secretariat had proposed, with officials authorized to act as circumstances required. The supervising officials later reported that the canal had been divided into three sections and dredged to the original depth and width specifications, with work finished on the fourth of the third month. Within the totals, Kunshan and Jiading in Pingjiang actually worked twenty-six days; Changshu, Wujiang, Changzhou, and Wu worked twenty-eight; all others worked thirty. By the seventh of the third month enough water had accumulated for boats to pass. The Lian Lake supervisors reported that, following Councillor Ren's original plan, dikes and existing foundations were raised and widened by one zhang and two feet, with a total sloped height of two zhang and five feet from the flat crest to the lower beach toe. Work proceeded along the old dike from the stone dam west of the middle weir east to Woyang Beach. Where existing dikes already met or exceeded the planned height and width, any breaches were repaired. From the stone dam west of the middle weir to Wubai Po Dike, one foot of earth was added on the west side, and any gaps were filled. From Wubai Po Dike to Malin Bridge Dike the current was mild enough that no major repairs were needed; seepage at the dike base was plugged where it occurred. Ground was broken on the sixth of the third month, labor began on the ninth, and work was finished on the eleventh—three days of actual service. Cross-checked against Deputy Director Ren's original estimates—10,513 men for sixty days on the canal and 3,000 men for ninety days on Lian Lake, at one liang of paper money and three sheng of rice per person per day—the projected cost was 18,014 ingots 20 liang and 27,021 shi 6 dou of rice. In fact 13,512 men served thirty-three days at a cost of 8,679 ingots 36 liang and 13,019 shi 5 dou 8 sheng of grain. Compared with the original estimates, the project saved 9,334 ingots 34 liang in paper money and 14,002 shi 2 sheng of grain. Because Lian Lake work was not yet complete, they inspected the terrain and water conditions for further deliberation."
34
Participating Minister Dong Zhongfeng also proposed staffing Lian Lake with one hundred lake soldiers—forty-three existing plus fifty-seven new recruits drawn from households paying between two and three shi in grain tax. They would be dedicated to repairing the lake banks, with two supervisors, two trench wardens, and three clerks chosen from men of official background. The Ministry of Works replied that the seals issued to Lian Lake supervisors should be treated like those of lake soldiers, and the provincial office should be consulted for a province-wide plan. Zhenjiang Circuit also warned that with the canal and Lian Lake now dredged, failure to establish safeguards would waste all the labor already expended. The circuit darughachi Urus Haiya was to oversee the work overall, while Deputy Commissioner Hasan and Bureau Chief Cheng Xun were assigned specifically to operate the sluice gates. The branch secretariat approved.
35
Wusong River
36
西
The waters of western Zhejiang's mountains flow into Tai Lake and down the Wusong River, gathering at Dianshan Lake before reaching the sea. Tidal action constantly drives muddy sand back up the river mouth, which is why the Song had established dredging troops to maintain the channel. After the Yuan conquered the Song, the dredging troops were disbanded and officials neglected the river. Powerful families leased and reclaimed the marshes as farmland, and local governments, lacking qualified staff, approved the encroachments anyway. The channel silted shut, and public and private interests alike suffered for years.
37
In Zhizhi 3, Zhejiang officials raised the issue and commissioned Gao Chaolie, chief administrator of Jiaxing, and Ding Jiangshi, bureau chief of Huzhou, together with local officials, to survey the old sea outlet channels and new sand bars blocking the flow, plan dredging work, and submit a map. On inspection, Magistrate Ding and his colleagues determined that fifty-five stretches of channel needed dredging. Changshu had nine sites in thirteen segments requiring 1,321,562 units of work. Kunshan had eleven sites over ninety-five li, needing 27,400 labor units and 456 corvée workers. Households in each prefecture holding at least one qing of land should be assessed by acreage, assigned work proportionally, and supply their own rations for dredging. Work was to start in early first month, finish within sixty days, and repeat every two years. Jiading had thirty-five sites over five hundred thirty-eight li, requiring 1,267,059 units of work. At one sheng of grain per person per day—12,670 shi 5 dou 9 sheng of rice in all—and 21,117 daily laborers, the project could be finished in sixty days. Because the project was enormous and the grain requirement heavy, they asked to follow the usual practice of urging riverside landowners who depended on the water to supply their own rations while tenants provided the labor for dredging. But Jiading had suffered disasters year after year, and this year was worse than ever; local capacity was insufficient, and higher authorities would need to arrange relief. Chief Administrator Gao gathered Songjiang officials for inspection and agreed to dredge the channels. Huating County alone had nine sites over five hundred twenty-eight li, requiring 9,684,882 units of work, 161,414 laborers at two sheng of grain per person per day—193,697 shi 6 dou 4 sheng of rice in all. Shanghai County had fourteen sites over four hundred seventy-one li, requiring 12,368,052 units of work. With 26,134 daily laborers at two sheng of grain each—247,361 shi 4 sheng in all—the work could be finished in sixty days. The government would supply grain and hire common laborers to do the dredging. If the next year brought a good harvest, landowners would be urged to contribute one laborer per fifty mu of land, with proportional assignments above ten mu, limited to dredging within their own ward. Powerful families who maintained fish weirs or planted reeds on tidal flats would be subject to the same labor obligations.
38
Shanghai and Jiading had suffered drought and flood year after year because the river mouth was blocked. In drought they could not irrigate; in flood they could not drain. Famine followed repeatedly, harming officials and commoners alike. After Zhiyuan 30 the channels were dredged twice, and harvests improved somewhat. In recent years the channels had silted shut again as powerful families encroached further. Tax revenue continued, but the region's larger economic gains were lost. Shanghai County collected 170,000 shi in official grain and over 30,000 shi in civilian grain annually. Disaster losses alone totaled more than 58,700 shi in Yanyou 7, nearly 49,000 shi in Zhizhi 1, and over 107,000 shi in Zhizhi 2. Drought and flood struck almost every year, leaving official grain short and forcing costly relief efforts. Officials had recently been sent to survey the terrain and discuss dredging, but the main river to the sea could not be remedied quickly; the old irrigation channels linking public and private farmland were now filled in and would have to be cleared to restore farming. They wanted landowners to dredge the channels themselves, but the work was too extensive for local communities to manage alone. They therefore proposed that Shanghai and Jiading channels be repaired by all local landholders—soldiers, civilians, postal workers, salt producers, monks, and Taoists alike—contributing labor in proportion to their holdings, supplying their own rations, under supervision by prefecture and county officials. Encroachments by powerful families on marshland that blocked water flow were to be cleared as well. Local civilian land tax would be fully waived for one year, and official rent cut by half. Work would begin after the autumn harvest during the next year's farming lull, with branch secretariat, censorate, and surveillance officials overseeing it. Huating, Kunshan, and Changshu presented a different level of urgency from Shanghai and Jiading and could not be handled uniformly. In each place, agriculture officials would supervise landowners supplying grain and labor for repairs. If work began too soon, geomancers warned that breaking ground in a guihai year was inauspicious, and asked whether advance approval could be sought.
39
調 便 調
On the nineteenth of the tenth month of Zhiding 1, Right Chancellor Xu Maijie and others reported that Zhejiang officials had stated the Wusong River and other channels were blocked and should be dredged, with sluice gates built to control the flow. The project would require more than forty thousand men. Starting in the twelfth month and finishing by the end of the first month, it could be done in sixty days; with more than twenty thousand men, it would take two years. Corvée labor would be levied evenly from various household categories in neighboring prefectures, with wages and grain paid as at Lian Lake, under joint supervision by branch secretariat, censorate, surveillance, and local officials. We concluded that the proposal served both government and people and should be approved. If enough laborers were available, the work could be finished in a single year. Toqan Taghai and other ministers were ordered to supervise the project jointly, with Left Chancellor Duorzhiban and former Deputy Director of Waterways Ren placed in direct charge. The emperor approved, and orders were sent to the branch secretariat to proceed with dredging. The Zhejiang branch secretariat mobilized labor from every circuit, and work was finished on the fourth of the intercalary first month in the second year.
40
Dianshan Lake
41
西
Tai Lake was western Zhejiang's great reservoir, fed by the mountains of Hangzhou and Huzhou. Its overflow gathered in Dianshan Lake before flowing east to the sea.
42
<> 便 <> 調
Near the end of Kublai's reign, Participating Minister Andula reported that in Song times officials and troops had guarded the lake, encroachment on its margins was forbidden, and blockages were cleared regularly to release floodwater. With no one in charge, powerful families had dammed the outflow and reclaimed land around the lake. The lake grew too narrow to hold floodwater, and heavy rains now caused widespread overflow. Provincial officials including Mangulu had proposed dredging, but the effort stopped after Commissioner Cao paid them off. Participating Councillor Zhang, Pan Yingwu, and others memorialized in turn, and informed opinion agreed the project was worthwhile. We concluded there was no doubt the project should proceed. Military and civilian labor would be combined under capable supervisors. Shan Zhuzi of the branch secretariat, Dong Badujianzi of the branch court, and Haralu of the branch censorate were ordered to inspect the site in person, calculate the labor required, and submit a plan. Kublai replied, "This is a worthy project, and we have waited too long already. Carry it out." Pacifying Minister Tiege then reported that officials had inspected the site and estimated 120,000 laborers could finish the work in one hundred days. We had previously proposed combined military and civilian service, but civilian labor was now sufficient and troops need not be mobilized. Kublai replied, "Share both burdens and benefits equally. Do not hesitate—levy the labor evenly."
43
調 使 殿 殿 殿調
In Zhiyuan 31 Kublai died and Temür succeeded him as Chengzong. Pacifying Minister Tiege reported that Tai Lake and Dianshan Lake had been dredged by 200,000 civilian laborers as previously approved by the late emperor. The rivers now receive tidal flow twice daily and are silting up again. Unless troops are garrisoned as under the Song, the earlier work will be wasted. We noted that the Privy Council already resisted assigning troops for routine labor and would surely refuse to garrison eight thousand men on the river channels. The enclosed fields around Dianshan Lake yielded 20,000 shi in tax grain. That revenue could fund four thousand civilian laborers and four thousand soldiers for joint garrison duty. They proposed establishing a Metropolitan Water and Field Defense Commissionerate to capture sea pirates and maintain the channels and enclosed fields. Bayancha'er and the Privy Council were ordered to deliberate and report back. The Privy Council replied that Dianshan Lake had been garrisoned in Song times and that Fan Diandai, Zhu, Zhang, and others would know the details. They proposed conferring with provincial officials before submitting a final plan, and the emperor approved. Privy Council officials met with Fan Diandai and others. Zhu and Zhang explained that in Song times the channels had been garrisoned by registered troops—about one thousand at major posts and no fewer than three or four hundred at smaller ones—under patrol offices. Fan Diandai argued that assigning four thousand corvée laborers would burden four hundred thousand households, but five thousand garrison troops under a wanhu commander might be workable. We agreed and proposed creating a Metropolitan Water Patrol Wanhu Office subordinate to the branch military court. Privy Council officials added that knowledgeable officials should be consulted in detail and a final decision deferred until the capital. This was approved.
44
Yanguan Prefecture Seawall
45
西
Yanguan Prefecture lay thirty li from the coast. It had originally had two sea dikes, with a salt dike added later; even in Song times these had sometimes failed. In Chengzong's Dade 3 the dike collapsed. The central government sent Ministry of Rites Langzhong You Zhongshun with provincial officials to inspect the site, but loose sand had refilled the breach and made repairs difficult. During Renzong's Yanyou jiwei and gengshen years, abnormal tides repeatedly destroyed homes and submerged more than thirty li of land. Provincial and surveillance officials then agreed to build an earthen dike north of the prefecture's rear gate, followed by a stone dike forty-three li long east to west. Work later halted as tidal sand continued to accumulate.
46
使 禿滿 使退 西
In the second month of the fourth year of Taiding's reign, a violent storm tide breached the smaller sea dike and destroyed four li of the prefecture walls. Hangzhou Circuit reported that, consulting the Metropolitan Field and Water Commissionerate, it had considered building more than forty li of dike to the north but found the cost prohibitive. It proposed instead repairing the salt dike, raising and widening it, filling channels, deepening the northern reserve moat, and driving piles densely in place to hold the line. The Zhejiang branch secretariat approved the plan and ordered the circuit to proceed with repairs. The Field and Water Commissionerate urged immediate mobilization of corvée labor to block breaches as water rushed in, with additional workers drawn as needed from Renhe, Qiantang, and nearby Jiaxing counties. Land was still being lost daily, and the situation was urgent. The Ministry of Works ruled that coastal collapse was a grave matter and ordered the Zhejiang branch secretariat to press the Field Commissionerate, Salt Transport Commissionerate, and local officials to mobilize labor for repairs before the walls were breached and residents harmed. On the fifth of the fifth month, Pacifying Ministers Tummandian'er and Chainai and Participating Minister Shi reported that in April the tide had breached Yanguan Prefecture's coast. Field officials had been ordered to conscript labor for repairs, monks to chant sutras, and envoys sent to the Celestial Master to perform rites. We recalled that when the coast had collapsed under Kublai, envoys had the Celestial Master perform rites and the tide receded. Bayan, attendant of the Direct Metropolitan Household, should now be sent with imperial incense for the Celestial Master to perform the rite as before. The emperor replied, "So ordered." Hangzhou Circuit then reported that since August the autumn tide had grown fiercer. An earthen dike more than eighty paces long was under construction, with wooden cages and stone cribs placed at the critical breach points. Left Chancellor Tuogan and others proposed deploying 4,960 stone cribs to resist tidal erosion as an emergency measure, modeled on Zhejiang's stone dike construction for a more lasting solution. The projected cost was more than 794,000 ingots of paper money and over 46,300 shi of grain, with construction to continue."
47
使使 便 調 西
In the third month of Zhihe 1, provincial officials reported that Zhejiang and Field Commissionerate officials had built the sea dike with bamboo revetments packed with stone in layered rows to resist the tide, but it had submerged again. They submitted a repair plan and asked for a durable long-term solution. We agreed this was a grave matter, but the emperor was soon departing for the Upper Capital and officials were being assigned to the escort, leaving no time for a full council. Households Minister Li Jianu, Works Minister Li Jiabin, guard commander Qingshan of the Privy Council, deputy Hong Hao, and Xuanzheng Commission officer Nan Geban were therefore dispatched to confer with Left Chancellor Tuogan and officials of the branch censorate, branch Xuanzheng Commission, and Field Commissionerate on repair methods. The labor required, apart from troops already garrisoning prefectures and passes, would be assigned as appropriate, with supplementary rations provided as needed. Corvée was to be levied from nearby landowners and from monks, Taoists, Christians, Muslims, and other registered households. During the work no one was to obstruct or sabotage the project; offenders would be punished. All related business was to be reported upward by the supervising officials for approval and execution. The proposal was approved by edict. On the twenty-eighth day of the fourth month, court commissioners met with branch secretariat, censorate, surveillance, and Garrison Fields officials and noted that stone seawalls planned in the Dade and Yanyou eras had never been completed. In the spring of the fourth year of Zhiding abnormal tides overwhelmed heightened earthen dikes. Plank walls were considered but the surge made work impossible, so rush-mat timber cribs were tried, though some washed away. Officials returned to the earlier plan of a stacked stone seawall for a lasting defense. Because the ground here was loose and unstable, unlike Dinghai, Zhejiang, or Haiyan, stone cribs were stacked at the breaches as an emergency measure. More than twenty-nine li of stone cribs had been set without collapse, showing modest success. The Garrison Fields Office and circuit officials agreed to link the stone cribs for ten li east and west, build the sixty-li dike with earth from the old channel beneath it, and quarry Dongshan stone against future collapse.
48
西 西 西西 西 西
In the eleventh month of the first year of the Tianli era, the Directorate of Waterways and Garrison Fields reported that during the great tide from the tenth to the nineteenth day of the eighth month, the surge was moderate and the sea calm. On the fourteenth day the goddess of the sea was invited into her temple; from the prefectural shrine eastward along the coast the northern protective banks lay in continuous line. From the fifteenth through the nineteenth day the shoreline accreted sand for more than seven li east to west, varying from thirty paces to hundreds of paces wide, until north and south gradually met. Westward to the stone cribs the work reached the fifth ward, linking the sea-defense and salt dikes straight to Yanmen to shield the cribs. Eastward it ran to the sixty-li dike of the eleventh ward and the estuary at Dongdajianshan repaired by the three circuits of Jiaxing and Pinghu. On the first and second days of the eighth month the sea was sounded at two zhang five feet; by the nineteenth and twentieth it had shallowed to one zhang five feet where it had been two zhang, and to one zhang where it had been one zhang five feet. Westward from the sixth ward at Renhe County's Zhe and Lei mountains, new silt had spread through the fifth and fourth wards and both wards of Yanguan Prefecture, leaving the water everywhere shallow. On the twentieth day a fresh inspection from east to west showed the accreted sand higher and broader than on the seventeenth. From the twenty-seventh day of the eighth month through the fourth day of the ninth, during the great tide, waters east and west of the prefectural shrine remained shallow. Sand built east beyond Qianjiaqiao, and the stone cribs and timber already in place held firm. The waters fell and the people were secure. Yanguan Prefecture was accordingly renamed Haining Prefecture, "Pacified by the Sea."
49
The Longshan River Channel
50
使 便
The Longshan River outside Hangzhou's walls had long been choked with silt. In the first year of the Zhida era, clerk Pei Jian of the Jiang-Zhe Branch Secretariat reported that the Qiantang River near Hangzhou had silted up in recent years, leaving the tide fifteen li from the north bank and preventing vessels from reaching shore. Traveling merchants had to hire porters for seventeen or eighteen li, goods were hoisted and hauled at great cost, the people were displaced, and official relay transport became a serious burden. Inquiry revealed that in Song times an ancient north-south channel called the Longshan River had run along the bank. From Zhejiang Pavilion south to Longshan Sluice, some fifteen li, it was now filled with refuse, with encroachments by residents on both banks. Given the terrain, the transport canal should be restored, sand excavated, sluices opened for loading, and traffic led straight to Zhejiang and into the two market channels, sparing porterage and benefiting the populace. The province ordered Hangzhou Circuit to inspect the stretch from the upper south corner of Qiantang County city along the Longshan River to Henghe Bridge. It was the old channel, now built over by residents; if cleared and linked to the transport canal, the benefit to public and private interests would be great. The project was estimated at 157,566 work units and 5,252 daily laborers, to be finished in thirty days. Labor was levied from wealthy households in the circuit record office and in Renhe and Qiantang counties, each man bringing baskets, poles, hoes, and shovels. Each laborer received two sheng of official grain daily, totaling 3,151 shi 3 dou 2 sheng of rice. The channel ran nine li and 362 paces, with eight stone bridges and upper and lower sluices, at a cost of 163 ingots 23 liang 4 qian 7 fen 7 li in paper money. The province approved placing Chief Counselor Toto in overall charge. Work began on the seventh day of the third month of the third year of the Yanyou era and was completed on the eighteenth day of the fourth month.
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