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卷九十七 志第四十五下: 食貨五

Volume 97 Treatises 50: Finance and Economics 5

Chapter 97 of 元史 · History of Yuan
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1
Finance and Economics, Part Five
2
The earlier treatises on finance and economics drew their chapter headings from the Jingshi Datian; there are nineteen sections in all, and for the period before the Tianli era the account is already thorough. For the period after the Yuantong reign, whatever can be verified about fluctuations in sea transport, revisions to paper currency, and the gains and losses of the salt and tea monopolies—whether drawn from the Liutiao Zhenglei or from investigations by the relevant agencies—is recorded here in full for consultation. Material lost in the chaos of collapse and no longer extant has been left blank.
3
Maritime Grain Transport
4
西
After Emperor Shizu adopted Bayan's proposal to ship southeastern grain to the capital by sea each year, the annual volume grew from just over forty thousand piculs at the start in Zhiyuan 20 to more than three million by the Tianli and Zhishun reigns—a pillar of the dynasty's fiscal policy. Over time abuses multiplied: drought and flood came in succession, and both state and populace were squeezed dry. The three southeastern provinces were worked to exhaustion to meet the fixed annual quota, while escort officers, supervising officials, and treasury clerks plundered at will, porterage wages were paid late, accounts never balanced, ship owners fell into poverty, and losses mounted steadily. Unpredictable storms, roving pirates, and the disasters of raiding and sinking after the Zhiyuan reign change became too numerous to recount. For these reasons the annual haul gradually fell below earlier totals. In Zhizheng 1, even counting Henan grain together with shipments from the three Jiangnan provinces, the total reached only 2.8 million piculs. In the second year the court also ordered the Jiang-Zhe Secretariat and the Central Secretariat revenue bureau to ship every picul of grain allocated to temples and monasteries, yet the total still reached only 2.6 million piculs. After revolt erupted in the Ru and Ying region and Huguang and Jiangyou fell one after another, Fang Guozhen and Zhang Shicheng carved up eastern and western Zhejiang. Though the court lavished noble ranks on them as supposed bulwarks of the realm, they withheld tribute and taxed the populace for their own upkeep, and for years no grain fleet reached the capital.
5
In the nineteenth year the court dispatched Minister of War Bayan Temür and Minister of Revenue Qi Lüheng to requisition sea transport in Jiang-Zhe; they sailed to Qingyuan and then proceeded to Hangzhou. Tash Temür was then chief councillor of the Jiang-Zhe Secretariat, Zhang Shicheng held the title Grand Marshal, and Fang Guozhen was vice councillor. The edict assigned Zhang to furnish grain, Fang to supply vessels, and Tash Temür to supervise the operation. After the imperial orders arrived, the two warlords distrusted each other. Zhang worried that Fang would load his grain but never send it to the capital; Fang feared Zhang would detain his fleet and strike while he was exposed. Bayan Temür reported to the chief councillor, rebuked both sides in plain terms and reasoned with them gently, dispelled their mutual suspicions, and brought the transport through. Sea vessels were first stationed at Ganpu in Jiaxing while Pingjiang grain was relayed in stages to Shidun near Hangzhou, then carried one more leg to Ganpu before loading. The coast was shallow and treacherous; he endured the hardship in person, and the ships finally carried 110,000 piculs of grain. In the fifth month of the twentieth year the fleet reached the capital. That autumn the court again sent Minister of Revenue Wang Zongli and others to Jiang-Zhe. In the fifth month of the twenty-first year grain reached the capital in the same quantity as before. In the ninth month the court again dispatched Minister of War Cheche Buhua and Vice Minister Han Qi to requisition one million piculs by sea. In the fifth month of the twenty-second year the fleet reached the capital with only twenty thousand piculs more than the year before. In the ninth month Minister of Revenue Toghto Qanchar and Minister of War Temür were sent to Jiang-Zhe. In the fifth month of the twenty-third year 130,000 piculs were again shipped to the capital. In the ninth month Vice Minister Boluo Temür and Supervisor Sayin Buqa were again dispatched to collect sea transport. Zhang Shicheng pleaded pretexts and refused; from that year onward southeastern grain no longer reached the capital.
6
輿
In Zhizheng 10 Right Chancellor Toghto proposed revising paper currency and convened officials from the Secretariat, Privy Council, Censorate, and the Academies of Scholarly Worthies and Hanlin to deliberate. Earlier Wu Qi, a director in the Left Secretariat, had argued: 'Since Emperor Shizu established paper currency, aside from setting aside reserve funds and exchanging worn notes nationwide, every statutory payment was supposed to pass through reserve notes at the general treasury—keeping circulation smooth and benefiting the people. In recent years the court has abandoned the original intent of the ancestral currency policy. Without those transfers, notes scarcely circulated among the populace, and counterfeits proliferated.' The court approved his proposal, and all statutory payments were again routed through the general treasury. By then Minister of Personnel Jiezhidu and Wu Qi were both eager to align themselves with the chancellor. Jiezhidu urged a new currency scheme in which one standard string of paper notes, equivalent to one thousand cash, would be the parent and coin the child. Everyone murmured agreement and stayed silent, until Grand Academician and Imperial College Rector Lü Sicheng alone spoke up boldly: 'The Zhongtong and Zhiyuan notes already have parent and child—the higher denomination is parent, the lower is child. It is like a Mongol asking to adopt a Han as his son—he still ends up a Han's son in the end. How can worn paper be the father and copper an adopted heir!' The whole room burst out laughing. Sicheng went on: 'Whether using coin or notes, the insubstantial stands in for the substantial—the principle is the same. If you split circulation into five categories—old and new coin, Zhongtong notes, Zhiyuan notes, and Jiaochao—the people will hoard what is real and discard what is paper. That can hardly benefit the state.' Jiezhidu and Wu Qi replied: 'Zhiyuan notes are widely counterfeited—that is why we must change them.' Sicheng retorted: 'The Zhiyuan notes are not false—the forgers are. Issue Jiaochao and you will have forgeries of that too. Besides, Zhiyuan notes are like old relatives—even children in every household know them. Jiaochao would be like new kin—people must accept it, yet they do not know it, and counterfeits would multiply all the more. And how can you lightly alter the settled institutions of the ancestors?' Jiezhidu said: 'When ancestral institutions fail, they too may be changed.' Sicheng said: 'By changing the law you would slander Emperor Shizu from above—you are trying to outdo the founding emperor himself. Every emperor since Shizu has borne the posthumous title 'Filial.' Is it filial to overturn his settled institutions?' Wu Qi again urged concurrent circulation of coin and notes. Sicheng said: 'If coin and notes circulate together, their relative weight is out of order—which is parent and which is child? You know neither past nor present and repeat street gossip—how can that be policy? You only flatter powerful ministers with your tongue—is that acceptable?' Jiezhidu asked: 'If our plan will not work, what is yours?' Sicheng answered: 'I have a three-word plan: it cannot be done, it cannot be done.' He added: 'Chancellor, do not listen to them. Remember the Jinkou River project: if it succeeds they take the credit; if it fails the chancellor bears the blame. Toghto, struck by his blunt honesty, hesitated and could not decide. Censor-in-Chief Yeshi Temür said: 'Rector Lü is partly right and partly wrong, but he should not shout in the council chamber. If we heed him, will the reform never go forward!' The next day he prompted the censors to impeach Lü, who stayed home in bed. The currency reform was then settled and memorialized. An edict declared: 'We have heard that sage rulers adapt policy to the times; the art of reform lies in timely change. At the founding of his reign Emperor Shizu issued Zhongtong Jiaochao denominated in cash; though minting rules were not yet complete, the intent to circulate coin and notes together was already established. Later Zhiyuan notes were issued at a one-to-five ratio, called 'parent and child in mutual balance,' though coin was never actually put into circulation. Over the years the currency grew hollow, prices soared, counterfeiting spread, and the populace was left destitute. We consulted court ministers and gathered public opinion; all agreed that rescuing the system required thorough reform. One standard string of Zhongtong Jiaochao shall equal one thousand cash and two strings of Zhiyuan notes; Zhizheng Tongbao shall be minted and circulate alongside earlier coin to back the paper currency. Zhiyuan notes shall continue to circulate as before. Parent and child in balance, new and old in support—fulfilling the founding intent of Emperor Shizu's monetary law.'
7
滿 貿
In the eleventh year the Baocuan Intendant Office was established to mint Zhizheng Tongbao and print Jiaochao for general circulation. Soon after implementation prices more than tripled—indeed rose tenfold. Meanwhile civil war engulfed the realm; military supplies, rewards, and consolation payments required daily printing beyond measure. Ships and carts hauled endless loads, axle to axle; paper money lay scattered everywhere. Worn, limp notes were no longer accepted. In the capital ten ingots of reserve notes could not buy a single dou of grain. Soon every prefecture and county bartered in kind; public and private hoards of notes alike ceased to circulate; people treated them as scrap paper, and state finances collapsed.
8
Salt in Dadu: In the fourth month of Yuantong 2 the Censorate relayed a supervising censor's memorial: 'The capital region is densely populated, and salt is indispensable in daily life. During the Dade era merchants cornered the market and salt grew costly, so the government set up bureaus to sell it directly. One string of Zhongtong notes bought four jin eight liang of salt. Even after the price was doubled, households could still afford it. By the Taiding era unsuitable bureau officers were appointed, superiors failed to enforce discipline, and short-weighting became common. Great merchants then cultivated patrons at court, cited bureau corruption, and had the offices abolished so private trade could resume. From then on one string bought only one jin of salt. Unlicensed ruffians illegally crossed salting boundaries, boiled and sold salt for private profit, and encroached on official revenue. Salt grew ever costlier; many poor households could no longer afford it—far from the court's intent to care for common people. If the court restores the bureaus and sells salt directly, revenue need not suffer and the people will benefit.'
9
便 便 滿 滿 調 調 便
The Dadu Circuit then relayed petitions from the three patrol offices and from Daxing and Wanping counties, and the Minister of Revenue memorialized in the same terms as the censor. The Ministry of Revenue replied: 'The salt monopoly was originally meant to enrich the state and benefit the people. In Dade 7 the Dadu Transport Commission was abolished and the Hejian commission took over. Each year's retained salt quota was distributed to rice shops for resale. Later, because wealthy merchants monopolized profits, fifteen bureaus were set up in the northern and southern cities for official sale. The regulations were then strict and clear, and the people benefited greatly. In Taiding 2, citing corruption among bureau staff and transport crews, the government restored private sales and abolished the bureaus. Within a few years officials repeatedly reported the harm of merchants raising prices. Transport-boat fraud, as the commission alleged, stemmed from lax legislation and failed oversight. Every region has government salt shops alongside merchant trade without conflict—why abolish official sale only in the capital? The ministry recommends approving the minister's proposal and the Dadu Circuit's petition, and restoring fifteen bureaus in the northern and southern cities under the former system. Each bureau shall sell ten yin per day, with two salt officers appointed for one-year terms and charged to sell faithfully in the public interest. One string of Zhongtong notes shall buy two jin four liang of salt, without adulteration or false weights. Purchases exceeding ten strings are forbidden; for amounts under one string, sell the amount requested. If at year's end there is no shortfall, loss, or failure to meet the fixed quota, reduce one term of service and promote them; if there is embezzlement, pursue and punish according to statute for the salt they should have sold. The Hejian Transport Commission shall deliver in four seasonal shipments to the capital depots, receive them on official standard scales, and distribute to each bureau. Sale proceeds in notes shall be remitted every ten days under rotating supervision by ministry officials. Inspectors shall remain posted; any powerful profiteer who repeatedly buys bureau salt and resells it outside at inflated prices shall be severely punished by the supervising officials. The transport commission shall strictly supervise escort crews and prevent transport-boat crews from cheating. Merchant salt may be sold alongside as convenient. On the twenty-sixth day of the fourth month the Secretariat memorialized and approved the Ministry of Revenue proposal.
10
In the third month of Zhiyuan 3 the Dadu capital granaries reported to the Ministry of Revenue: "Pursuant to recent orders we transported 15,000 yin of salt from the Zhiyuan 2 capital stock for sale, received on the even balance, and reported the full amount to the ministry. After deducting 848 yin lost or short from sunk convoys, the granaries actually received 14,152 yin; 10,100 yin were issued to the bureaus for sale; only 4,052 yin remain and stock is nearly exhausted. Zhiyuan 3 salt should, as usual, be transported 15,000 yin from the Hejian commission to the capital so households do not go without.' The ministry approved and proposed: 'This year the capital should receive 15,000 yin from Hejian; porterage, matting, and rope costs shall be drawn from salt-tax revenue by the transport commission. Recruit property-owning ship households under mutual guarantee; form convoys of 1,000 yin each; assign one field official plus a commission envoy or salt patrol officer per convoy; verify quantities at Xingguo and other Dadu depots under branch supervision; receive on the even balance; deliver to capital granaries within three months and obtain cancellation documents from the ministry. Any adulteration with sand or earth, dampness, or short weight shall be compensated equally by convoy crews, escort officials, envoys, and supervisors, who shall be punished according to statute.' The Secretariat approved the Ministry of Revenue plan.
11
便 調 使 使 便
In Zhizheng 3 supervising censors Wang Sicheng, Hou Sili, and others proposed: 'Since Dade 7 the Dadu Salt Transport Commission was abolished and fifteen official salt bureaus were set up; Taiding 2 abolished them as inconvenient; Yuantong 2 restored them; ten years on, entrenched abuses have appeared. At sea there is embezzlement and leakage; in the bureaus there is adulteration with ash and earth. The price is one string for two jin four liang, but buyers receive less than one jin. Clean, unadulterated, full-weight salt is found only where senior officials personally supervise. Changbai salt of 1,500 yin uses fifty ships yearly from the fourth month; official salt of 20,000 yin uses fifty ships from the seventh month; yet transport commission agents abuse their power from Linqing south to Tongzhou north, blocking waterways to extort every passing vessel. Called contracted hire, it was in fact forcible seizure. Within a year and a thousand li, grain-laden merchants and officials moving household goods were stopped wholesale and released only after heavy bribes; those detained were the poor and powerless. Their boats were small and flimsy; leakage and theft produced endless abuses. After reaching the capital granaries they could not be received on time; months dragged on; many sold wives and children or pawned their boats while waiting. This is why merchant shipping stalls and capital prices soar—it stems from this. Official salt of 20,000 yin at seven strings porterage per yin totals 3,000 ingots; salaries for fifteen bureaus add 576 ingots yearly; rent, short haulage, and matting are extra. Bureaus were set up only because salt was costly for the people; they never imagined official sale would prove worse than merchants—why waste state funds and make everything dear? The Censorate should memorialize the Secretariat to abolish the salt bureaus and, when transport resumes next year, announce that salt merchants may freely enter the capital to trade. The fifty ships for changbai salt should be built in equal number where Jiangnan builds small craft. Once built, let the transport commission hire carriers so shipping flows and merchants gather; then capital goods will be cheap and salt will not be costly.' The Censorate relayed this to the Secretariat, and the Hejian Transport Commission reported likewise.
12
The Ministry of Revenue stated: 'After investigation the transport commission and Dadu Circuit agree with the censor: abolish the salt bureaus and allow traveling merchants to trade. Changbai salt is required by the inner palace; transport shall continue as before and be reported through the metropolitan secretariat.' On the fifth day of the second month the Secretariat memorialized and approved the Ministry of Revenue proposal.
13
Salt in Hejian: In Zhizheng 2 the Hejian Transport Commission reported: 'We fulfill 380,000 yin yearly including surplus salt, totaling 1.14 million ingots in tax notes—a heavy burden on state finance. Private and boundary-violating salt sales have proliferated because officials failed to enforce prohibition, encroaching on official revenue and stalling the salt law. We ask that this be forwarded to the metropolitan secretariat for an edict ordering strict compliance.' The ministry memorialized the Secretariat; on the seventeenth day of the fourth month an admonitory edict was issued.
14
In the seventh month the Hejian commission again reported: 'Our tax revenue depends entirely on salt-consuming districts buying official salt. Last year Hejian and other circuits suffered drought, locusts, and famine despite relief; the populace has not recovered and salt consumption is low. Officials at Gubeikou and elsewhere failed to pursue smugglers, and Dadu subordinates failed to patrol, so people sold kediyan salt in the streets by the dou or on plates, openly trading it. At Zijing Pass smugglers led by Zhang Jiaoqun were captured with more than 1,600 jin of kediyan salt. Since Zhiyuan 6, third month, offenders have approached a hundred cases. If we do not report, we fear missing the annual quota and bearing unjust blame.' The ministry memorialized the Secretariat and notified the Privy Council to issue prohibitory placards.
15
In the third year the Hejian commission again reported: 'Generating wealth and practicing economy are constant principles of statecraft; light taxes and easy corvée are the great foundation of governing the people. Our annual quota is 350,000 yin; recently 30,000 yin surplus was added; of 5,774 registered saltern households only 4,301 remain after flight. Each year exhausted remaining households are compelled to fulfill the fixed quota under contract. This year the old quota cannot be boiled with available manpower. Moreover salt districts suffer repeated drought and locusts; the people lack funds to buy salt. If the court shows compassion, exempt the 30,000 yin surplus from Zhizheng 2 onward until harvest years return.' Because expenditures were insufficient, the ministry provisionally proposed suspending 10,000 yin and memorialized the Secretariat. On the twenty-eighth day of the first month the Secretariat approved the ministry proposal.
16
便
The transport commission then stated: 'In Zhiyuan 31 we fulfilled 250,000 yin; the quota was later raised to 350,000. In Yuantong 1 another 30,000 yin surplus was added; this was already memorialized. The metropolitan secretariat approved suspending 10,000 yin. The remaining 20,000 yin, if compelled from present households as before, is truly unbearable. Suspending the remaining 20,000 yin surplus would truly be beneficial.' The ministry again memorialized and provisionally suspended 20,000 yin surplus for one year, resuming in Zhizheng 4. On the twelfth day of the fourth month the Secretariat approved.
17
便
Salt in Shandong: In Yuantong 2 the ministry submitted: 'Per the Shandong Transport Commission, following Jinan officials Wanzhe and Jarlig Temür, compared with Dadu and Hejian, establish twelve dedicated salt-patrol officials. Shandong fulfills over 750,000 ingots yearly across 30,000 li with only one transport judge—he cannot cover it all; private salt will encroach on revenue. Having deliberated with Jinan Circuit, the commission recommends approval.' The Secretariat ordered reconsideration; the ministry stated: 'Hejian has twelve envoys and sixteen patrol officers; Shandong has twenty-four envoys; add patrol officers proportionally but reduce twelve envoys.' Memorialized and approved.
18
便 便 便 使 便
In the third year, second month, Linqu, Yishui, and other counties petitioned: 'We are nine-tenths mountain; residents are few; formerly salt-consuming, later changed to salt-selling; the people eat costly salt to public and private inconvenience. If reverted to salt-consuming districts with tax assessed by household, official and people would benefit and private salt abuses end.' Branch offices and prefectures deliberated and agreed salt-consuming was convenient. Commissioner Xin proposed: 'For scattered salt areas, like Deng and Lai appoint bureau officials, issue seals, set up bureaus, and sell to the people—revenue will not suffer, the state avoids private-salt worry, and the people avoid penal servitude.' The ministry deliberated: 'Add eleven bureaus in Teng, Yi, and elsewhere following Deng and Lai's thirty-five; appoint officials from revenue officers—convenient for all. Responsible offices have deliberated; follow the proposal.' Memorialized and approved.
19
使 便
In Zhiyuan 2 the Censorate relayed Zhangqiu County: 'The commission fulfills 280,000 yin yearly; 130,000 yin remain unsold and year-end revenue falls short. Nearby counties should become salt-consuming with 8,000 yin assigned—yet the commission, without authorization, arbitrarily distributed salt and pursued taxes, unsettling the people. In Zhiyuan 1 the Secretariat twice ordered fixed rules for salt districts and forbade compulsory assignment. The commission disobeyed, concealed the documents, and pressed counties to collect consuming-salt taxes by post—clearly harmful. They should be interrogated for defying law and harming the people, but during tax season the Censorate should handle it. Supervising censors also memorialized on this matter. Immediate interrogation falls in tax season; submit to the Secretariat.' The ministry submitted: 'Salt districts have fixed places; correct them. Interrogating the commission is hard to separate from comprehensive salt-law planning.' The Secretariat approved.
20
西西西 西 西 便西 西 西 便
Salt in Shaanxi: In the ninth month of Zhiyuan 2 censor Temür Buhua proposed: 'Shaanxi salt officials distribute warrants to every prefecture and pursue payment within ten days regardless of means. Elsewhere transport officials summon merchants; only Shaanxi recently distributes to households. Shaanxi salt-consuming households owe more than 203,164 ingots. Part is fixed assessment; the rest was reduced four-tenths after famine in Zhishun 3; deficits remain after three years. Households are decimated; returnees are destitute; notes are hard to obtain despite good harvests. Officials compel uniform distribution of at least two or three yin at three ingots each—unbearable for rich and poor alike. A year's grain cannot pay one yin; they borrow or pawn families. They cannot transport and sell cheaply to local merchants. Old debts unpaid, new warrants arrive—endless levies. Ningxia weihong salt is sweet and cheap beside bitter dear jie salt—private trade is unstoppable. Hedong ponds should sell quota yin through merchants recruited by transport officials. Salt-selling districts must not encroach on weihong salt rules. Rotate officials yearly to supervise gathering, tax by statute, sell at three ingots per yin. West of the Yellow River let people consume freely while fulfilling the original quota. Smuggling east is punished as private salt; Shaanxi jie merchants are not forbidden. Thus official and people benefit and revenue is preserved.'
21
西使西 西 西 使西 西西便
Hu Tongfeng memorialized: 'Salt clerks ignore people's suffering, collect money, and delay delivery for months. Distance makes porterage difficult. East of the river buy jie salt by quota; west pay per mouth for weihong salt—officials unharassed, people unruined. Jie salt forms in wind, weihong from earth—who chooses bitter over sweet? If Shaanxi pays jie tax uniformly but eats weihong salt, clerks avoid patrol toil and people benefit. The regional commission held that the salt regulations it had laid out should be drafted by the provincial ministries, forwarded in full to the Central Secretariat, and referred to the Ministry of Revenue for review. The ministry recommended that the Metropolitan Secretariat appoint officials to travel to Shaanxi and confer there with representatives of the branch secretariat, the regional commission, and the Hedong salt transport bureau on whether the proposed changes would actually help, then submit a clear memorial on their findings.
22
西 西使西便西 西 西
In the third year the metropolitan Secretariat instructed the Shaanxi branch secretariat to appoint again a chief officer from the Hedong salt transport commission to join the province in a further round of deliberation. On the second day of the third month, Shaanxi provincial officials met with Censor Li, Transport Associate Commissioner Hao Zhongshun, magistrates from Gongchang, Yan'an, Xingyuan, Fengyuan, Fengxiang, Binzhou, and other jurisdictions, and with regional commander Wang Tongyi. All agreed to adopt the proposal of Censor Temür Buqa and Commissioner Hu Tongfeng: the Yellow River would mark the boundary; Shaanxi residents might use Wei and Hong salt freely; Jie salt would continue to flow west as before; and Hong salt would not be allowed to cross eastward. For the three recorder offices at Xianning and Chang'an that had not yet been abolished, they should be treated like the prefectures and counties already discharged from the old system: a uniform dry quota would be assessed, matching the salt-certificate prices the transport commission had set for the abolished districts. Under the dry quota now accepted, Shaanxi would remit seventy thousand ingots of paper money each year in quarterly installments, and the transport commission would no longer need to issue salt certificates. In this way the populace would be spared hardship while revenue obligations would still be met. Associate Commissioner Hao alone objected: 'The transport commission must deliver four hundred fifty thousand ingots in revenue each year. Shaanxi's share is two hundred thousand. If the province now accepts only seventy thousand, where will the remaining one hundred thirty thousand come from?' The parties could not agree, and the conference adjourned without resolution. The province reviewed the transport commission's annual returns and found that Shaanxi had in fact remitted only a little over seventy-two thousand ingots. Hao then pleaded illness and stopped attending meetings. No final settlement was ever reached.
23
西
The Ministry of Revenue cited a prior precedent from the second year of Zhishun, when the Central Secretariat had sent Military Affairs Bureau Director Jing Chaosan to confer with Shaanxi officials and fix the Baijia River in Jing Prefecture as the permanent boundary within which residents might lawfully consume local salt. Local military and civil officials were also ordered to enforce the boundary strictly so that Wei and Hong salt could not cross into the zone and undermine official revenue. The Central Secretariat approved the plan and put it into effect.
24
使 西 使 沿
Salt in the Two Huai region: In the eighth month of the sixth year of Zhiyuan, the Lianghuai salt transport commission implemented a directive from Wang Zhengfeng, Minister of Revenue and transport commissioner. He reported that the bureau, founded in the fourteenth year of Zhiyuan, had initially had no fixed salt quota and had met its obligations as best it could. The quota had since risen cumulatively to six hundred fifty-seven thousand and seventy-five certificates. Merchants purchased certificates and collected salt directly from the production sites. Depot officials extorted the salt-furnace households, padded the measures, favored private traders, and corrupted the salt monopoly. In the fourth year of Dade the Central Secretariat approved a reform: warehouses were established, convoy transport was organized, and salt was issued by the sack in order to eliminate the old abuses. The commission's salt was marketed throughout the circuits of Jiangzhe, Jiangxi, Henan, and Huguang along the upper and lower Yangtze, wherever the monopoly applied. During the Zhida reign an additional three hundred thousand certificates of surplus salt were boiled on top of the regular quota, bringing the total to nine hundred fifty-seven thousand and seventy-five certificates. Merchants brought their salt to the East Pass at Yangzhou and moored inside the city canal to await clearance. At least three or four hundred thousand certificates were backed up there, far too many to release on schedule. In the fourth year of Zhishun the former transport commissioner Han Dazhong and others reported again that annual sales of quota salt amounted to nine hundred fifty-seven thousand and seventy-five certificates. Merchants bought certificates, received verification tallies, drew salt from the warehouses, and hired boats and labor. Transport to a distant warehouse cost twelve or thirteen strings per certificate; even a nearby warehouse cost at least seven or eight. They then hauled the salt to Yangzhou's East Pass and waited their turn for clearance. Boat crews took advantage of owners who could not supervise them, treated the cargo as their own, and stole freely. The resulting abuses were countless. Even when offenders were caught and severely punished, the thefts could not be stopped. When stolen salt was assessed in cash, offenders were typically fined only the value of their old boats. Full restitution was impossible. Inland merchants lost their investment; traders on the outer waterways were routinely cheated; and commoners paid high prices for adulterated salt. Both government and populace suffered.' Along both banks of the river outside Yangzhou's East Pass,' they noted, 'there is abundant vacant land held by officials and private owners.' If approved, salt merchants could lease or purchase sites, build warehouses, haul their sacks of salt to the depot, register them in order of arrival, and store them until clearance. When clearance came due, boats could carry the salt to Zhen Prefecture for sale. That would prevent theft and yield lasting benefit—a substantial improvement to the salt monopoly.'
25
The proposal went to the Central Secretariat, the Ministry of Revenue, and the Henan branch secretariat. Memorials shuttled back and forth for a long time without resolution. Eventually the Ministry of Revenue decided that the transport commission should allocate ten thousand ingots from the canal-dredging surcharges already collected from merchants to build the warehouses. The Metropolitan Secretariat would instruct the Henan branch secretariat to send officials with the transport commission to survey vacant land and proceed only if no legal obstacle was found.
26
Salt in the Two Zhe region: In the fifth year of Zhiyuan the Liangzhe salt transport commission reported to the Central Secretariat:
27
便
Our bureau was established in the thirteenth year of Zhiyuan, when no fixed quota yet existed. A quota was first set in the fifteenth year at one hundred fifty-nine thousand certificates. It later rose cumulatively to four hundred fifty thousand certificates. In the first year of Yuantong an additional thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt were added, for an annual total of four hundred eighty thousand. The official price per certificate was initially five strings of Zhongtong notes. It was later raised to nine, then ten, and eventually to thirty, fifty, sixty, and one hundred strings. The current price is three ingots. Annual regular revenue now totals one million four hundred forty thousand ingots of Zhongtong notes. Compared with the founding year, the certificate quota has risen tenfold and the price thirtyfold. As quotas grew heavier, production became harder, and the registered population within the monopoly zone was limited. Merchants had previously been allowed to collect salt directly from the production sites. Inspection offices were set up to check sacks leaving the fields. Because direct collection led to delays and stockpiling, the seventh year of Yanyou brought reform on the Lianghuai model: warehouses were built, convoy officers escorted boats from the fields, salt was stored in warehouses, and merchants drew their allotments there. The system was convenient at first, but over more than twenty years the convoy, field, and warehouse officers have been unfit for their posts and devoted themselves chiefly to extortion. Moreover, the Huai and Zhe regions differ in conditions. Lianghuai spans four provinces. Although its quota is large, its territory is vast, its population numerous, and its consumers many, so the quota can still be met. Our territory lies between river and sea, with boiling sheds and furnaces scattered along the coast. Inland waterways border Lianghuai; the open sea connects with Liaodong. Foreign vessels come and go, and smuggled salt appears everywhere, undermining official revenue. Penalties exist, but complete control is impossible. The salt monopoly has collapsed and the shed households are ruined. There are five major abuses:
28
仿
The commission oversees thirty-four field offices, each staffed with a director, deputy, controller, and clerk to supervise salt-furnace households and boiling laborers. Labor falls in the hottest summer months, with work continuing day and night. When rain sets in, they can only wait helplessly. Poor small households have no other livelihood. Food and clothing depend entirely on wages from boiling. Fewer than one household in ten still has assets to pledge. Officials ignore their hardship and conscript them for other labor duties as well. The fields originally registered more than seventeen thousand salt-furnace households. Floods, drought, and plague have since driven many away or to their deaths, leaving little more than seven thousand. No replenishment registrations have been approved. The abandoned quota salt is simply forced onto the remaining households to boil. Unless households are registered and relieved soon, the survivors will be ruined and major revenue will be lost. This is the first abuse.
29
沿
The thirty-five convoy transport offices recruit boat households and, according to each field's daily production and monthly quota, pay official freight charges. Salt sacks are loaded at the fields: four hundred catties per certificate plus ten catties allowance for loss, packed in two sacks, then escorted by convoy officers to the assigned warehouses for delivery. Merchants drew salt from the warehouses between the second month and the river freeze in the tenth month, with transport considered complete when delivered. The regulations were thorough in design. Convoy boat crews have operated for many years, and fraud grows worse every day. Whenever salt is loaded at the fields, crews bribe depot officials and weighmasters to overweight the sacks. After leaving the depot they sell salt along the route and refill the sacks with ash and dirt. At the receiving warehouses, officials and weighmasters take bribes again, fail to inspect the cargo, and use improper scales. Long warehouse storage causes further loss through seepage and evaporation. Uneven sack weights are no minor matter. It would be better to restore direct collection by merchants at the fields. That would eliminate convoy salaries and freight charges and renew the salt monopoly. This is the second abuse.
30
The commission produces four hundred eighty thousand certificates of quota salt annually. The monopoly zone in Liangzhe and Jiangdong contains more than nineteen million registered persons. At four mace, one fen, and eight li of salt per person per day, total consumption amounts to a little over four hundred forty-nine thousand certificates. Even if every person bought the full allotment, more than thirty-one thousand certificates would remain unsold. Every year officials are pressed to verify household registers and compel purchases. Years of famine have driven many into exile. Along rivers and coasts smuggled salt circulates openly because military and civil officials fail to enforce the law. As a result, more than nine hundred thousand certificates of unsold salt have accumulated in the warehouses year after year with no way to distribute them. If fixed regulations were issued promptly for officials to follow, with clear rewards and penalties, smuggling would decline and household salt consumption would not collapse. This is the third abuse.
31
退退 調滿 使退
Each quarter the commission also collects surrendered certificates. When merchants bring salt to a sales point, they must first report their route and lodging and surrender the used certificate. Yet supervising officials in many places fail to investigate properly and allow clerks, runners, and ward heads to demand customary fees. If their demands are not met, they invent endless delays. When sales are slow, merchants move elsewhere. They may report their route but fail to surrender the certificate. Certificates are lost or hidden at home and used to cover smuggling, while officials fail to recover them. Timid merchants hand their certificates to village runners as soon as they finish selling official salt. Craftier men never surrender them to the government but collude with smugglers, keeping the certificates as proof to trade in illicit salt. If officials were given clear penalties for dereliction, surrendered certificates would truly be returned to the government and could no longer shield smuggling. This is the fourth abuse.
32
Since the seventh year of Yanyou the commission has operated seven warehouses including Hangzhou under departmental supervision. Convoy boats deliver salt sacks for storage until merchants draw them in order. All of this is governed by fixed regulations. In recent years warehouse superintendents have indulged their greed and profited from both receipts and disbursements. Whenever convoy boats arrive, superintendents take bribes from the crews and accept sacks adulterated with ash and dirt. When crews deliver good salt but cannot pay bribes, superintendents invent obstacles that force boats to moor along the bank, where salt is stolen or sold off. Warehouse officials and transport staff commit many abuses. More than nine hundred thousand certificates of salt have piled up in the warehouses, old stock and new together, filling the halls beyond capacity. The salt cannot be distributed, seeps away, and evaporates—a serious loss. Although merchants have already paid for this salt and revenue has entered the treasury, the problem grows worse every year. If merchants were again allowed to provide their own transport and load salt at the fields, the backlog might be avoided. This is the fifth abuse.
33
Of the five abuses, warehouse stockpiling is the most urgent. Annual sales capacity is only a little over four hundred forty thousand certificates. Even two years of full sales would not clear the stock, yet more salt is boiled and delivered to the warehouses, and the surplus keeps growing. We beg permission to memorialize the throne, appoint a senior statesman of standing, and convene the relevant agencies for thorough deliberation. They should weigh present conditions, reform the regulations, establish sound rules, relieve the people, and preserve major revenue. Boiling of the thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt has been suspended, and an envoy has been sent with a memorial from the Jiangzhe branch secretariat to the Central Secretariat requesting review.
34
調
The Ministry of Revenue reviewed the transport commission's report. Aside from the thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt, which would be considered separately, the remaining issues had not yet been clearly resolved by the branch secretariat. A directive was sent for further deliberation. In the fifth month of the sixth year the Central Secretariat memorialized to appoint officials to reform the Jiangzhe salt monopoly and placed Right Chancellor Nalin of the Jiangzhe branch secretariat and chief officer Zhao Langzhong in charge of the effort. Nalin later declined for other reasons.
35
使
In the first year of Zhizheng Transport Commissioner Huo Yazhong reported again: 'The Lianghuai and Fujian transport commissions both have surplus salt, and boiling has already been suspended. Our bureau is in the same position. If we too are permitted to suspend boiling of thirty thousand certificates on the same precedent, the major quota should be easier to meet.' The Central Secretariat memorialized the throne and received approval to suspend the thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt temporarily until the monopoly functioned again, when production could resume.
36
In the tenth month of the second year Right Chancellor Toghto of the Central Secretariat, Pacification Commissioner Temür Tash, and others memorialized: 'Salt policy in Liangzhe harms the people severely. Officials of the Jiangzhe branch secretariat and the transport commission have reported this repeatedly. We propose to follow the old regulations of Emperor Shizu. Within ten li of the salt fields, residents would continue to purchase salt directly. The existing warehouses and convoy transport would be abolished. Merchants would buy certificates from the transport commission, collect salt at the production sites, and sell within the monopoly zone, eliminating compulsory distribution. Four inspection and verification offices would be established, staffed with honest and capable men directly under the transport commission. When merchants transport salt through them, officials would weigh the cargo by regulation, standardize sack weights, and verify certificates, with transport commissioners conducting regular inspections. Since the thirteenth year of Zhiyuan the annual salt quota was small and the price low. It has now risen to four hundred fifty thousand certificates at a much higher price, and distribution has stalled. The Ministry of Revenue has decided that beginning in the third year of Zhizheng the Liangzhe quota would be reduced by one hundred thousand certificates until the monopoly functioned again, when the original quota would be restored. Compulsory household distribution would also be suspended.' The throne approved.
37
便
Salt in Fujian: In the first month of the sixth year of Zhiyuan the Jiangzhe branch secretariat received a report from the Fujian transport commission. The bureau's annual quota was one hundred thirty-nine thousand certificates and a little over one hundred eighty catties. An audit of seven fields including Haikou found that by the end of the intercalary eighth month of the fourth year of Zhiyuan they had accumulated one hundred one thousand nine hundred sixty-two certificates and two hundred sixty-two catties of attached surplus and additional production salt. On review, given the accumulated surplus salt and the fifth-year quota of Zhiyuan, we propose to follow the precedent of the first year of Tianli: suspend boiling of fifty thousand certificates of regular quota, pay no production subsidies, count fifty thousand certificates of the surplus above as regular quota, save twenty thousand ingots of official capital, and spare the shed households further hardship. This year the commission would boil only eighty-nine thousand certificates and a little over one hundred eighty catties of quota salt, while roughly one hundred thirty-nine thousand certificates in all would be released for general sale and the main tax collected. More than fifty thousand certificates of surplus salt would be held back to advance next year's ration salt for troops and civilians, a genuine benefit to the administration and the public." The province endorsed the proposal and reported it to the Central Secretariat. The memorial went to the Ministry of Revenue for review, which approved it as proposed. The remaining fifty-one thousand nine hundred sixty-two certificates of surplus salt were sold for notes and forwarded for collection throughout the circuit. The secretariat replied to the province and ordered the plan carried out.
38
使便
In the first year of Zhizheng an edict declared: "In Fujian and Shandong the compulsory household sale of salt inflicts severe harm on the people. The branch secretariat, the regional censorate, and the surveillance commission should summon the responsible officials and conduct a joint inquiry." In the sixth month of the second year the left councillor of the Jiangzhe branch secretariat, regional censors, Fujian surveillance officials, Transport Commissioner Li Pengju of Changshan, and the chief magistrates of Zhangzhou and the other seven circuits concluded that the salt monopoly was unworkable. They listed three reforms: first, thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt, which could not be folded into the regular quota, should be abolished outright. Second, the quota was excessive; following the Guanghai precedent, the price should be capped at two ingots per certificate. Third, compulsory household salt distribution should end and traveling merchants should be allowed to trade freely.
39
使 便
Fujian's salt monopoly dated from the thirteenth year of Zhiyuan, when production stood at six thousand fifty-five certificates at nine strings of notes each. In the twentieth year fifty-four thousand two hundred certificates were produced, each priced at fourteen strings. In the twenty-fifth year the price rose to one ingot per certificate. In the thirty-first year a salt transport commission was established and the quota was raised to seventy thousand certificates. In the second year of Yuandezhen the price per certificate rose by fifteen strings. In the eighth year of Dade the transport commission was abolished and its duties folded into the pacification commission. In the tenth year a chief transport directorate was created and the quota reached one hundred thousand certificates. In the first year of Zhida the fields together produced thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt. In the fourth year the transport commission was restored, the quota fixed at one hundred thirty thousand certificates, and the price raised to two ingots of notes. In the first year of Yanyou the price rose again to three ingots, and the transport commission once more altered the rules at its discretion. Jianning, Yanping, Tingzhou, and Shaowu still allowed merchant trade as before, but Fuzhou, Xinghua, Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou imposed fixed household salt quotas—a abuse that has persisted for more than thirty years. The region is mountainous and arable land scarce; the soil is thin and the people poor. The population has not grown, yet the salt quota keeps climbing. Annual autumn grain for the eight circuits totals barely two hundred seventy-eight thousand nine hundred shi; summer tax yields no more than eleven thousand five hundred ingots—while salt revenue alone is one hundred thirty thousand certificates, worth three hundred ninety thousand ingots. Popular hardship deepens daily. Under collection pressure the poor pawn their wives and sell their children to meet the levy; when they can do nothing else, they flee elsewhere. The recent unrest in Zhangzhou stems in part from this burden. Transport officials see the suffering firsthand, yet because their mandate is to maximize revenue, they can extend no relief. If the court follows the edict's intent—abolishing thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt, ending compulsory household distribution, and allowing merchants to trade freely across the eight circuits—both the administration and the populace would benefit. For regular-quota salt, pricing should follow the Guanghai rate of two Zhongtong ingots per certificate, to be decided by the metropolitan secretariat.
40
The Jiangzhe branch secretariat forwarded the left councillor's findings to the Central Secretariat and the Ministry of Revenue. Beginning in the third year of Zhizheng, thirty thousand certificates of surplus salt would be temporarily exempted and compulsory household salt distribution would be suspended. A cut in the regular-quota price could not be reconciled with the Guanghai precedent and was left for separate deliberation. On the twenty-eighth day of the tenth month Right Chancellor Toghto, Pacification Commissioner Temür Tash, and others presented the plan to the throne and it was approved.
41
使
Salt in Guangdong: In the second year of Zhiyuan the censorate endorsed a memorial from the Jiangnan regional censorate citing Supervising Censor Han Chengwu. The Guangdong salt directorate had handled only six hundred twenty-one certificates from the sixteenth year of Zhiyuan, but the quota had risen repeatedly to thirty-five thousand five hundred, and in the Yanyou era surplus salt was added, bringing the combined total to fifty thousand five hundred fifty-two certificates. Shed households buckled under production quotas while officials and commoners alike faced relentless collection. Their distress had lasted more than a decade. During the Taide reign the censorate and pacification commissioners filed repeated memorials that secured a reduction of fifteen thousand certificates of surplus salt. In the first year of Yuantong the metropolitan secretariat, facing a revenue shortfall, temporarily restored the reduced surplus salt to production. Three years later it had still not been suspended. Critics assume that because Guangdong commands the sea lanes, trades with foreign ports, and draws wealthy merchants, the region can easily meet any quota. They do not understand conditions on the ground. The seven circuits and eight prefectures under its jurisdiction contain almost no flat land. Miasma and epidemic disease are endemic; farmers slash-and-burn on cliff faces and live in cliffside shelters under brutal conditions. Poor families eat plain food year-round—who would buy salt levied beyond the quota? What prosperity exists is confined to a handful of city merchants and ocean traders. Three or four salt workers in ten have fled. Fearful of punishment, officials compel the households who remain to cover the shortfall. Worse, the circuit borders tribal territories whose peoples are fierce and unruly. If officials press collection too hard, resentment could spark unrest—a matter of no small consequence. If the court would surrender this minor revenue to show good faith, the exhausted populace would be deeply grateful." The memorial went to the Central Secretariat and the Ministry of Revenue, which ordered that from the third year of Yuantong the Guangdong directorate's surplus salt quota be cut by five thousand certificates. On the ninth day of the tenth month the Central Secretariat reported to the throne and received approval.
42
Salt in Guanghai: In the third month of the fifth year of Zhiyuan the Huguang branch secretariat reported to the Central Secretariat that the Guanghai salt directorate's regular quota was thirty-five thousand one hundred sixty-five certificates and its surplus quota fifteen thousand. Li rebellions had lately ravaged the region and left the people destitute. More than forty thousand certificates of regular-quota salt sat unsold in the warehouses. Restoring surplus production before the population recovered risked further unrest. The stakes are high. We beg the court's compassion to exempt the surplus so the original quota can be met without bringing disaster on the frontier population." The ministry replied: "Full restoration of the surplus is inappropriate because it lies outside the original quota. The directorate sits at a remote corner of the sea; shed households have been raided repeatedly, and many have died or fled, leaving the region devastated. We propose cutting five thousand of the fifteen thousand certificates of surplus salt to relieve the populace." The Central Secretariat submitted the plan and the throne approved.
43
使
Salt in Sichuan: In the third year of Yuantong the Sichuan branch secretariat relayed a report from the salt and tea transport commission. In the fourth year of Zhishun the Central Secretariat had ordered ten thousand certificates of surplus salt plus an attached five thousand from the Liangzhe transport commission, all to be boiled with the regular quota. Expenditures had been covered, but the arrangement was under review. Because the fields produced no surplus, the bureau had no choice but to force shed households to meet the attached quota—which they had barely fulfilled. Unless the court is petitioned again, shed households will flee and regular revenue will suffer. We beg compassion: report to the Central Secretariat and reduce the attached Liangzhe quota within the ten thousand certificates of surplus salt." A sub-commission transport officer added: "Sichuan's brine wells lie deep in the mountains. Conditions differ utterly from the interior and Lianghuai. The attached surplus quota is crushing the producers." The branch secretariat reported to the Central Secretariat and received approval to suspend temporarily the five thousand certificates of attached surplus salt.
44
西 便 西 便 便
In the second year of Zhiyuan the Jiangxi and Huguang branch secretariats reported Wan Jialü, vice commissioner of the tea transport commission, on expanding printed tea vouchers. The commission's annual quota was two hundred eighty-nine thousand two hundred ingots. Aside from gate and inspection fees, one million tea certificates at twelve taels five qian each accounted for two hundred fifty thousand ingots. Bulk tea already bore official canisters, bags, and seals. Vouchers for loose and inferior tea totaled thirteen million eight hundred five thousand two hundred eighty-nine jin annually, worth twenty-nine thousand eighty ingots. Each tea certificate covered ninety jin and was sold to traveling merchants. Household purchases and small-scale picking in Jiangnan tea districts all required voucher documentation. Vouchers were issued in spring, but by summer and autumn the supply ran out, leaving the public without documentation. The vouchers were too few and lightly taxed—convenient for ordinary users but inadequate. Certificates carried a heavier levy and served mainly merchants, yet many remained unsold at year's end. The proposal was to increase annual voucher production by two-tenths, adding two million six hundred seventeen thousand fifty-eight jin. Charging one qian three fen eight li eight hao eight si per jin on the added volume would yield seven thousand two hundred sixty-nine ingots seven liang, offset by cutting twenty-nine thousand seventy-six certificates—keeping certificates from sitting idle and curbing hoarding. The Central Secretariat and Ministry of Revenue approved: the Jiangxi tea transport commission would issue one hundred thousand documents and one million certificates annually, worth two hundred eighty-nine thousand two hundred ingots. Certificates suited merchants, but hill farmers depended entirely on vouchers. Annual vouchers of thirteen million eight hundred five thousand two hundred eighty-nine jin at one qian one fen one li one hao two si per jin would yield five thousand eight hundred sixteen ingots seven liang four qian one fen, with twenty-three thousand two hundred sixty-four fewer certificates. Each certificate authorized ninety jin of tea and a levy of twelve taels five qian. Adding two-tenths to the vouchers—two million six hundred seventeen thousand fifty-eight jin at one qian three fen eight li eight hao eight si per jin—would bring seven thousand two hundred sixty-nine ingots seven liang without reducing official revenue, while easing life for ordinary users." The plan was approved as the province proposed, sent to the Central Secretariat, and relayed to the branch secretariat for implementation.
45
便 滿 仿 西便
In the second year of Zhizheng Li Hong's memorial included a section on problems with tea certificates at the Jiangzhou bureau: "State monopolization of tea did not exist in antiquity; the Tang dynasty first established a full regulatory system. The dynasty founded the Jiangzhou tea transport directorate and seven regional supervisory offices at tea-producing circuits, each charged with selling certificates and meeting the national quota—none could resist them. Each December officials were sent to summon the supervisory commissioners and issue the next year's certificates. After they reached the directorate, a month might pass before all commissioners could assemble. Clerks and runners extorted bribes until every demand was met before certificates were handed over. By then spring was already gone. Back at the directorate they would begin distribution—while branch officials toured the circuits to verify households and sell certificates on site. For every ten certificates, beyond the official levy of one hundred twenty-five taels, clerks extracted twenty-five liang of Zhongtong notes as "surcharge precedent fees" to fund branch officials' entertainment. Though called tea monopolies, the supervisory offices could not actually control certificate sales—they merely raised revenue for transport commissioners. What superiors do, subordinates imitate—inevitably so. Seeing branch officials behave this way, the supervisory offices copied their delays. Tea growers did not get their certificates home until the fifth or sixth month. Officials also hoarded two or three thousand certificates, claiming growers were exhausted, and resold them to newcomers. Each certificate brought another twenty-five liang in Zhongtong notes, split between superiors and subordinates for private profit. No one could say where this money came from; the growers' suffering defied description. Once certificates were in hand and grinding had barely begun, clerks and runners appeared at the door demanding the first installment. The tea had not been sold—where was the money to come from? Only well-off households could raise the cash elsewhere. The poor were routinely imprisoned and often forced to sell family property illegally to meet official deadlines. Those who missed the final deadline faced relentless pressure, repeated summons, and unlawful torment. The root cause was late issuance by the transport commission and excessive levies by the branch offices. Growers who sought profit found only injury; exhaustion and flight grew daily—a plight that merited compassion. Li Hong proposed restoring the old rule: every first month the transport commission must deliver all certificates to the supervisory offices for immediate distribution, with none held in storehouses, no surcharges, and no delay into the tea-making season; late delivery would be separately punishable by law. The transport commission must not, like the branch offices before, sell certificates on its own; violators would be prosecuted by the surveillance commission. That way the tea bureau might curb its corruption and growers would escape ruin." The Central Secretariat referred the memorial to the Ministry of Revenue and notified the Jiangxi branch secretariat to work with the tea transport commission. If the reforms proved beneficial, they were to be enacted as proposed."
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