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卷一百五十七 列傳第四十四: 劉秉忠 張文謙 郝經

Volume 157 Biographies 44: Liu Bingzhong, Zhang Wenqian, Hao Jing

Chapter 157 of 元史 · History of Yuan
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Chapter 157
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1
Liu Bingzhong
2
使 鹿 使 使 使
Liu Bingzhong, styled Zhonghui, was originally named Kan. Having entered the Buddhist clergy he was also known as Zicong, and took his present name only after he received office. His forebears were from Ruizhou; for generations they served the Liao dynasty and formed a family of officials. His great-grandfather served the Jin as deputy military commissioner of Xingzhou and established the family there, so from his grandfather Ze onward they were counted as men of Xing. In the gengchen year Muqali captured Xingzhou, set up a supreme command headquarters, and appointed his father Run as its commander-in-chief. Once order was restored he was reassigned as prefectural recorder, then served in turn as chief administrator of Julu and Neiqiu counties; everywhere he went he won the people's affection. Bingzhong was born with striking presence and a bold, unfettered spirit. At eight he began his studies and could recite several hundred characters each day. At thirteen he was sent as a hostage to the command headquarters. At seventeen he became a clerk in the Xingtai military commissioner's office in order to support his parents. He was often gloomy and discontented. One day he cast aside his brush and sighed: "For generations my family has been gentry—must I sink to life as a petty clerk with knife and brush? When a man finds no place in the world, he should withdraw and pursue his purpose in seclusion." At once he resigned and went into seclusion in the Wuan mountains. After a time Chan Master Xuzhao of Tianning sent disciples to fetch him and have him ordained; because he excelled at literary composition he was put in charge of correspondence. Later he traveled to Yunzhong and took up residence at Nantang Temple. While the future Shizu was still at his princely residence, Chan Master Haiyun was summoned to court; passing through Yunzhong he heard that Bingzhong was broadly learned and skilled in many arts, and invited him to travel together. After he was presented, his replies pleased the prince and he was consulted again and again. Bingzhong read books of every kind; he was especially deep in the Book of Changes and Shao Yong's Treatise on the Ages of the World, and in astronomy, geography, calendrics, the Three Styles, Six Ren, dunjia, and the like there was nothing he did not master. When he spoke of affairs under Heaven it was as if he were laying them out on his palm. The future Shizu came to love him dearly; when Haiyun returned south, Bingzhong stayed on at the princely residence. Several years later he hurried home for his father's funeral; he was granted a hundred taels of gold for burial expenses and an envoy was sent to accompany him to Xingzhou. When his mourning was over he was summoned again and, by imperial order, returned to Karakorum. He submitted a memorial of several thousand words; its gist was as follows:
3
Institutions, ritual and music, laws, and the teaching of the Three Bonds and Five Constants were fully realized under Yao and Shun; the Three Kings carried them on, and the Five Hegemons debased them. From the founding of Han down to the Five Dynasties, across more than thirteen hundred years, only five rulers truly followed this Way: Wen and Jing of Han, Guangwu, Taizong of Tang, and Xuanzong—and even Xuanzong was not without blemish. Yet whether the age is well governed or in turmoil rests with Heaven and is brought to pass through human effort. Heaven produced Genghis Khan: he raised a single host, brought the states to submission, and within a few years seized the realm. Through labor and care he left this great inheritance to his descendants, hoping it might endure for ten thousand generations and forever secure boundless blessing.
4
I have heard it said: "An empire won on horseback cannot be governed on horseback." In antiquity King Wu was the elder brother; the Duke of Zhou was the younger. The Duke of Zhou pondered good for the realm day and night; whenever he grasped one matter he would sit awaiting dawn to act on it, thereby upholding the house of Zhou and preserving the Zhou realm for more than eight hundred years—such was the Duke of Zhou's power. Your Highness is the elder brother; the Great King is the younger. To reflect on the Duke of Zhou's example and act upon it is a matter for this very day. An opportunity that comes once in a thousand years must not be missed.
5
Among what Your Highness must appoint within the realm, nothing is greater than a chief minister, who leads the hundred officials and transforms the myriad people; outside, nothing is greater than a general, who commands the Three Armies and secures the four quarters. For inner and outer offices to support one another is the state's urgent business and must come first. Yet the realm is vast and lies beyond what one man can encompass; myriad affairs are minute and lie beyond what one mind can examine. Descendants of the dynasty's founding ministers should be chosen and posted as supervisors in the capital, prefectures, and commanderies to oversee the old officials and enforce the royal laws; surveillance commissioners should also be sent out to promote the able and dismiss the incompetent. Then the realm may be settled without exhausting the people.
6
調使 祿使 退
Households in the realm number more than a million; since the judicial office at Khodoein-Oron, corvée and levies have grown very heavy, and to these are added military requisitions, the harassment of envoys, and officials' exactions—the people cannot endure it and therefore flee. Levies should be cut by half compared with former rates, or reduced by a third; taxes should be fixed on those presently registered, fugitives recalled to their fields, and then a definitive assessment made. Officials have no fixed ranks: the upright have no path to promotion, and the corrupt no path to demotion. Ancient precedents may be followed to fix the ranks, salaries, and regalia of the hundred officials, so that their households are secure and their persons honored. Those who wrong the people should have statutes drawn up and penalties defined. Majesty and favor belong to the ruler's prerogative; to receive and execute orders is the minister's duty. Today officials wield majesty and favor on their own; promotion, dismissal, life, and death follow their whim—this should be forbidden and corrected.
7
使
The people have not yet received moral instruction; those now in prison should be pardoned and clear edicts issued to teach them reverence, and offenders will then grow few of themselves. Once instructional edicts are set they should not be numerous; adding a dozen or so articles suited to the people to the great court's old precedents is sufficient. Once such edicts are in force, cases not warranting death should all be reviewed by the surveillance office before judgment; capital cases should be reported and re-examined before execution, so that the innocent are not punished.
8
The Son of Heaven takes the realm as his home and the multitude as his children; when the state is short it draws on the people, and when the people are short they draw on the state—they depend on each other as fish on water. Those who hold a state establish treasuries and granaries also to aid the people; those who have bodies cultivate estates and open fields also to supply the state. Debts owed by officials and people should now be reckoned; where loans were truly taken for obligatory levies, in accordance with the late emperor's edict principal and interest should be repaid by the government. All debts without proper title, false contracts, and sums already repaid beyond the original principal should alike be remitted.
9
便 使
When grain tax is delivered to distant granaries and one in ten is wasted, payment to nearer granaries should be allowed for convenience. On courier routes, prefectural cities bear heavy costs for food and lodging; expenses should be calculated and requisitions set accordingly. Regular tolls at passes and bridges should be one part in fifteen, following the old system. Arbitrary exactions should be forbidden and tax burdens lightened to benefit the people. Granary surcharges are very heavy; standardized weights and measures should be ordained as a single law so that every smallest unit is true, thereby preserving trust and rooting out fraud. Pearls, shells, gold, and silver are won only by washing sand and smelting ore and are not easily come by; yet in a moment they are wrapped in silk thread, used to adorn leather, smeared on wood and stone, and lavished on weapons and gear—spent for a moment's splendor and reduced to dust without profit. This is deeply wasteful and should be forbidden. Apart from regulated dress for imperial kin, great ministers, and high officials, those without office must not imitate them. The land is broad and the people few; levies are heavy and the people have no respite—how can they plough and sow to build up their estates? An official to encourage agriculture should be appointed to lead the people in sericulture and husbandry—this would be a great benefit to the state.
10
In antiquity school and academy education was never abandoned; today although commanderies and counties have schools, they are not state-founded. The old system should be restored: build the three schools, appoint professors, and open selection of talent, giving first place to the classics, with rhapsodies, discourses, and policy essays next. The civil service examinations have already been ordered by the late emperor's edict; to speak of them again is to urge what is already easy to enact. In founding schools, descendants of founding ministers should be chosen to receive instruction, and outstanding talent selected for office.
11
西 使 使
Nothing under Heaven is greater than the court and ministries; nothing closer to the people than the district magistrate. Though the court has laws, the magistrate must be carefully chosen; when the magistrate is upright, the people will of themselves be at peace. Shaanxi and Henan are broad and fertile, yet because armies and horses pass constantly through them, though governed they are not yet thriving. Officials should be appointed to encourage settlement; within a few years the people will return and the land be opened—this will supply the armies and horses and is truly a great matter for the state. Vice Censor-in-Chief Yisala monopolized salt, iron, and other products and imposed commercial levies on wine, vinegar, and trade to fix official revenue; even when required to collect in accord with actual yields, shortfalls were again taken from the people, and failure to meet quotas was already no small hardship. The Orokholman memorialized to double the monopoly over the old quota and often levied collections on the people. With monopoly levies running together, the people had nowhere to turn. The old monopoly quotas should be followed, or further reduced; cumbersome items abolished and only regular levies imposed—so that none who seek profit by harming the people may injure the state. For widowers, widows, orphans, the solitary, and the disabled, poorhouses for the aged should be established and clothing and grain provided for their upkeep. When envoys reach prefectures and commanderies, guest lodges should be provided; they must not be lodged in government offices or private homes.
12
使 使
Confucius was teacher to a hundred kings and established law for ten thousand generations; though many temple halls are now ruined, those that remain should be ordered in prefectures and commanderies to offer sacrifice according to the old rites. In recent times ritual instruments and musical implements have been scattered and lost; an inventory should be ordered and retired officials of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices sought to instruct later students, so that implements are complete and masters remain and may gradually be restored—this is truly the foundation of great peace and the root of the kingly Way. Today the realm is vast; though this came through Genghis Khan's majesty, it is also what Heaven and the spirits in the hidden realm bless. Renowned Confucians should be sought, old rites followed, and sacrifices to spirits above and below honored, harmonizing the qi of Heaven and Earth and following the seasons, so that spirits receive offerings and the people rely on them, virtue reaching to the hidden and manifest realms, and the realm secured by one man's blessings.
13
使
The Liao calendar now in use is considerably in error for solar and lunar eclipses; it is said the Astrological Bureau has compiled a new calendar that has not yet been promulgated. On the new ruler's accession the calendar should be issued and the era name changed. The capital, prefectures, and commanderies should set water clocks so the people may know the hour. When a state perishes its history is preserved—this is antiquity's constant rule; the History of Jin should be compiled so that one generation's ministers and achievements are not lost to posterity—this would be greatly inspiriting.
14
宿使 使
The state is vast as Heaven; taking one man in ten thousand to support eminent scholars and established Confucians who possess no estates to manage, so they do not fall into want— or where they do manage estates, in accordance with prior imperial edicts they should pay planting and raising taxes as due, while all other great and small miscellaneous levies should be remitted so they may support themselves—this is truly the state's great work of nourishing talent and encouraging men. An enlightened ruler employs men as a master craftsman employs timber, fitting each piece's thickness, length, and shortness to compass, square, cord, and ink line. Confucius said: "The noble man cannot be judged by petty tasks yet can bear great responsibility; the petty man cannot bear great responsibility yet can be judged by petty tasks." The noble man keeps what is great in view and cannot exhaust petty matters—or he may have one fault; the petty man is confined in what is narrow and cannot match the noble man's breadth—or he may have one strength. To employ each according to his talent—this is the way to success.
15
使
The noble man does not reject a man because of his words, nor reject words because of the man. To open wide the road of counsel—this is how to perfect the realm and secure the multitude. Heaven and Earth are vast, sun and moon are bright—yet even they may sometimes be obscured. What obscures Heaven's brightness is cloud and mist; what obscures a person's clarity is private desire and slanderous counsel. When ordinary men have these, they obscure a single mind; when a ruler has them, he obscures the whole realm. Remonstrating ministers at the ruler's side should be regularly chosen to counsel before faults take shape and to deliberate in the utmost secrecy. The mind of the noble man rests wholly on principle and righteousness and is filled with loyalty and integrity; the mind of the petty man rests wholly on profit and desire and is filled with slander and flattery. When the noble man gains position he can tolerate the petty man; when the petty man gains power he is sure to drive out the noble man. When an enlightened ruler sits above, this distinction cannot be neglected. Confucius said "Keep flatterers at a distance" and also "I hate glib tongues that overturn states and families"—this is what is meant.
16
使
Today those who speak of profit are many; they do not truly seek the state's good at the people's expense but wish to injure the people for their own gain. Essential workshops and smelters among the people should be assigned to each circuit's tax office to fix monopoly quotas; all other profit-seekers should be dismissed. Of old enlightened kings did not treasure exotic goods; what they treasured was talent—when the worthy hold office and the capable serve in posts, this rests on one man's keen wisdom and the worthy king's supporting hand. In antiquity well-governed ages equalized the people's estates; since the well-field system was replaced by crisscross paths, later ages could not restore it. Today the destitute grow poorer while the rich grow richer. Profit-seekers should be forbidden to rely on official power; officeholders should not encroach on the people's livelihood; merchants and people should trade in good faith without arbitrary seizure or fraud—this is truly the state's gain.
17
使
Regulations for beating with rod and whip should reconcile ancient and modern practice into a single law so that none dare overstep. Private prisons should be forbidden so the innocent are not harmed. Back-whipping should be forbidden to manifest the virtue of cherishing life. Establish the court and ministries to govern the hundred officials, divide bureaus to manage myriad affairs, down to the capital, prefectural, and commandery offices that serve the people—let none be lacking; when discipline is correct above and laws enforced below, the realm is governed without exhausting the people. After the new ruler's accession, the court and ministries should be established as the foundation of government. As for the rest of the hundred officials, what matters is not their number but obtaining the right men.
18
滿 使使
The future Shizu praised and accepted this. He also said: "Xingzhou once had more than ten thousand households; since warfare began it has fallen to fewer than several hundred, and ruin grows worse daily. With good governors like Zhang Geng of Zhending and Liu Su of Luoshui it might still be restored." The court thereupon appointed Geng pacification commissioner of Xingzhou and Su as vice commissioner. Thereupon displaced people returned to their fields and Xing was promoted to Shunde Prefecture.
19
In guichou he followed the future Shizu on the campaign against Dali. The following year he campaigned in Yunnan. Each time he urged the ruler with Heaven and Earth's love of life and the kingly way of martial prowess without slaughter; therefore on the day a city was taken not one person was killed without cause. In jiwei he followed the attack on Song; again he strongly urged at court what he had said regarding Yunnan, and wherever he went the lives spared were beyond counting.
20
In the first year of Zhongtong, when the future Shizu took the throne, he asked about the great principles for governing the realm and good methods for nourishing the people; Bingzhong gathered ancestral statutes and, adding what was fitting from ancient systems for the present, listed them and reported. Thereupon an edict was issued to establish the era name and year count, and to establish the Secretariat and pacification offices. Old ministers of the court and scholars hidden in mountains and forests were all employed, and cultural institutions shone anew.
21
祿
Earlier the emperor had ordered Bingzhong to survey a site east of the Luan River at Huanzhou and build walls at Longgang; in three years it was completed and named Kaiping. It was later promoted to the Upper Capital, and Yan was made the Central Capital. In the fourth year he again ordered Bingzhong to build the Central Capital and first established the ancestral temple and palace halls. In the eighth year he memorialized to establish the state name as Great Yuan, and the Central Capital was made Dadu. Other matters such as promulgating robes and caps, establishing court ritual, granting salaries, and fixing the official system all originated with Bingzhong and became institutions for a generation.
22
In the eleventh year he accompanied the emperor to the Upper Capital; there was South Screen Mountain, where he had once built a hermitage and lived. In the eighth month of autumn Bingzhong died without illness, seated upright, at the age of fifty-nine. When the emperor heard, he was startled and grieved and said to his ministers: "Bingzhong served me for more than thirty years, careful and discreet, not shunning hardship, speaking without concealment. His mastery of yin-yang arts and numerology, divining affairs and knowing what is to come, was as though matching tally seals—only I know this; others could not hear of it." He issued money from the inner treasury for the coffin and burial and sent Vice Minister of Rites Zhao Bingwen to escort the funeral back for burial in Dadu. In the twelfth year he was posthumously granted Grand Tutor, enfeoffed as Duke of Zhao, with posthumous title Wenzhen. Under Chengzong he was further granted Grand Preceptor with posthumous title Wenzheng. Under Renzong he was further advanced to Prince of Changshan.
23
Bingzhong loved learning from youth to old age without decline; though he reached the highest rank, he lived simply on vegetables, calm all day no different than before. He styled himself Hermit Who Hides Spring. He often took pleasure in composing poetry; his poems were spare and tranquil, like the man himself. He had collected works in ten juan. Having no son, he took his younger brother Bingshu's son Lanzhang as heir.
24
使 使 西使
Bingshu, styled Zhangqing. He loved reading; in his early twenties he studied the Book of Changes under Liu Su and thereby mastered Neo-Confucian learning. His elder brother Bingzhong, serving the future Shizu, took recommending scholars as his duty and, scrupulous about favoring kin, alone did not recommend Bingshu. Those at the ruler's side reported this; he was summoned and then likewise attended the princely residence. The future Shizu once granted Bingzhong a thousand taels of white gold; he declined, saying: "I am a rustic of mountain and wild who met fortune by chance; my garments and vessels all come from the imperial workshops—gold is of no use to me." The future Shizu said: "Have you no kin and friends to leave it to?" Unable to decline further, he accepted it and distributed it. He gave two hundred taels to Bingshu; Bingshu said: "My elder brother has toiled for years and should receive this reward; I have no merit—how can I presume on favor?" In the end he did not accept. In the first year of Zhongtong he was promoted to Vice Minister of Rites and vice pacification commissioner of Xingzhou. In the second year he was granted a gold tally and transferred to Vice Minister of Personnel. In the third year Xing was promoted to Shunde Prefecture; he was granted a gold tiger tally and made pacification commissioner of Shunde. In the first year of Zhiyuan, when the official system was reformed, he was changed to Grand Master for Glorious Discussion and served in succession as chief administrator of Zhangde, Huaimeng, Zilai, Shuntian, and Taiyuan circuits. In Zilai Prefecture there were six condemned prisoners and the case was already concluded. Bingshu doubted the case; through detailed review he obtained the truth and the six men were spared death. Wherever he went he showed benevolent government. He was summoned and appointed Minister of Rites. He went out as pacification commissioner of Huaixi; when the Huaixi pacification office was merged with the province, he served in succession as chief administrator of Huzhou and Pingyang circuits. When Pingyang suffered famine and the people had hard fare, he promptly opened granaries to relieve them and many were preserved alive. At sixty he died in office.
25
○ Zhang Wenqian
26
使
Zhang Wenqian, styled Zhongqian, was a man of Shahe in Xingzhou. From childhood he was clever and quick to memorize; he studied together with Grand Preceptor Liu Bingzhong. When the future Shizu was at his princely residence and received the Xingzhou allotment, Bingzhong recommended Wenqian as capable. In the dingwei year he was summoned and presented; his replies pleased the prince and he was ordered to manage the princely residence correspondence, gaining daily trust. Xingzhou lay on a vital route; when the allotment was first made, two thousand households were set as fiefs for meritorious ministers; each year men were sent to supervise who knew nothing of comfort and governance—exactions issued on every side and the people could not bear it, some appealing to the princely residence. Wenqian spoke with Bingzhong to the future Shizu, saying: "The people's livelihood is exhausted and nowhere is it worse than Xing. Why not choose men to go govern it, hold them accountable for results, and let the four quarters take it as a model—then the whole realm would equally receive blessing." Thereupon those near at hand Tuotuotuo, Minister Liu Su, and Vice Minister Li Jian were chosen and sent. The three reached Xing and worked together in governance, washing away corruption and removing greedy violence; displaced people returned, and within a month households increased tenfold. Thereby the future Shizu came to value Confucian scholars and employ them in government—all this began with Wenqian.
27
便
In the first year of Zhongtong, when the future Shizu took the throne, the Secretariat was established; Wang Wentong was first appointed equal-rank administrator and Wenqian left vice administrator. They established discipline and explained what was harmful and beneficial, taking securing the state and benefiting the people as their task. When edicts and orders issued forth, the realm had hope of great peace. Yet Wentong was by nature jealous and obstructive; in deliberations they often opposed each other and resentment accumulated; Wenqian hastily sought to leave and an edict sent him in his present office to conduct affairs of the Daming and other circuits pacification office. On departing he said to Wentong: "The people's distress has been long; moreover there is great drought—if we do not consider reducing taxes and levies, how can we comfort the hope of revival?" Wentong said: "The new ruler has just taken the throne; state expenses rely solely on taxes and levies—if we again reduce them, how can we meet needs?" Wenqian said: "When the people are sufficient, is the ruler not also sufficient? Wait until times are harmonious and harvests abundant—collecting then is not yet late." Thereupon regular levies were remitted by four-tenths and commercial wine taxes by two-tenths. In the second spring he came to court and again remained in the central government. The left and right departments were first established and myriad affairs were carried out in detail—largely through Wenqian's effort. In the third year Ahmad took charge of the left and right departments and overall managed finances, wishing to memorialize solely without reporting to the Secretariat; an edict ordered court ministers to deliberate and Wenqian said: "Dividing management of finances has ancient precedent; for the Secretariat not to participate—there is no such precedent. If the Secretariat does not inquire, will the Son of Heaven personally attend to it?" The emperor said: "Zhongqian's words are correct."
28
西 使簿
In the first year of Zhiyuan an edict ordered Wenqian as left vice administrator of the Secretariat to conduct provincial affairs in Western Xia Zhongxing and other circuits. Qiang custom was by nature crude and affairs had no unified discipline; Wenqian obtained five or six Shu scholars who had fallen captive, sorted out their cases and released them, and had them study clerkly affairs; within a month documents had proper form, sons and younger brothers also knew how to read, and custom was transformed. He dredged the Tanglai and Hanyan canals and irrigated several hundred thousand qing of fields; the people received the benefit. In the third year he returned to court. Powerful families claimed thousands of households that should serve as their private slaves, and the debate dragged on without resolution. Wenqian argued that the household registers of the yiwei year should be the cutoff: unregistered slaves might be returned to the powerful families, but there was no grounds for turning ordinary citizens into slaves. The decision was settled and upheld as law. In the fifth year a Zizhou sorcerer named Hu Wang misled the people; when the plot was exposed, more than a hundred were arrested. Chief Councillor Antong, citing Wenqian, memorialized: "The common people are ignorant and were led astray; it is enough to punish the ringleaders." The emperor at once ordered Wenqian to adjudicate the case; only three were executed in the marketplace, and all the rest were released.
29
使
In the seventh year he was appointed Director of the Grand Secretariat of Agriculture. He memorialized to establish circuit-level offices to encourage farming, to tour the realm urging cultivation, and to open ceremonial fields and perform rites to the First Farmer and First Silkworm. He again joined Dou Mo in requesting the establishment of the Directorate of Education. An edict appointed Xu Heng Chancellor of the Directorate and selected sons of noble families for their education. At the time Ahmad proposed confiscating private iron, casting farm tools at state forges, and selling them at inflated prices to the people; he also proposed establishing travelling household bureaus at Dongping and Daming to print paper money, along with circuit transport commissions—all of which meddled in government and harmed the people. Wenqian argued against each measure before the throne until they were abolished. In the thirteenth year he was promoted to Vice Director of the Censorate. Ahmad, fearing the Censorate would uncover his crimes, memorialized to abolish the circuit inspection commissions in order to undermine Wenqian; Wenqian memorialized to have them restored. But knowing himself to be hated by corrupt officials, he pressed hard to leave office. Just then, because the Great Illuminations Calendar had drifted out of accuracy over the years, the future Shizu ordered Xu Heng and others to compile a new calendar. Wenqian was appointed Grand Academician of the Hall for the Glorification of Literature and placed in charge of the Astronomical Bureau to direct the project. In the nineteenth year he was appointed Vice Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs. A little over a year later he died of illness in office, at the age of sixty-eight.
30
Wenqian had studied early under Liu Bingzhong and mastered the arts of calculation and divination; in later years he came to know Xu Heng and grew especially accomplished in the study of moral principle. In character he was upright, lucid, restrained, and grave; everything he presented before the throne was the path of humaneness and righteousness taught by Yao and Shun. He often crossed those in power and favor, yet he never gave a thought to gain or loss, right or wrong. His household held nothing but books, numbering in the tens of thousands. He made recommending talent a personal duty, and contemporary opinion increasingly praised him for it. He was posthumously ennobled cumulatively as Faithful-in-Sincerity, Equal-in-Virtue, Aid-to-the-Dynasty Meritorious Subject, Grand Preceptor, Grand Master of the State with the Three Honors of Opening an Office, and Upper Pillar of the State; posthumously enfeoffed as Duke of Wei with the posthumous title Loyal and Expansive.
31
西
His eldest son Yan rose to Vice Director of the Censorate; he was posthumously ennobled Equal-Rank Administrator of the Shaanxi Branch Secretariat, enfeoffed as Duke of Wei, and given the posthumous title Cultured and Tranquil.
32
○ Hao Jing
33
西 使
Hao Jing, styled Bochang, came from a family originally of Luzhou that had moved to Lingchuan in Zezhou; for generations they devoted themselves to Confucian learning. His grandfather Tian Ting was once studied under by Yuan Yu. At the end of the Jin dynasty his father Siwen settled in Lushan in Henan. When Henan fell into chaos, the people hid in underground cellars; marauding troops smoked them out with fire, and many died, including Jing's mother, Lady Xu. Jing mixed honey with pickled vegetable brine, forced open his mother's clenched teeth, and made her drink it; she immediately revived. Jing was then nine years old, and everyone regarded it as miraculous. After the fall of the Jin they moved to Shuntian. The family was poor: by day he carried firewood and grain to support them, and in the evening he studied. After five years he came to the attention of the local commanders Zhang Rou and Jia Fu, who took him in as an honored guest. Each household possessed a library of ten thousand scrolls, and Jing read widely until nothing was beyond his reach. As he traveled between Yan and Zhao, Yuan Yu often told him, "You look like your grandfather, and your talent is extraordinary. Apply yourself." In the second year of Möngke, the future Shizu, then serving as the emperor's younger brother, established his residence at Jindianchuan and summoned Jing to consult him on the governance of the state and the welfare of the people. Jing submitted several dozen proposals in detail. Greatly pleased, the prince retained him at his court. At that time war with Song continued; Möngke entered Shu and ordered the future Shizu to command the eastern armies. Jing accompanied him as far as Pu. Someone then obtained and presented Song policy memorials urging careful border defense and the holding of strategic passes, setting out seven routes in all; the document was sent down for the generals to discuss. Jing said, "Those who unified the realm in antiquity did so through virtue, not through force. Song shows no sign of imminent collapse, yet we would empty the state to march forth while lords at home watch for their chance and the common people suffer abroad. I see the danger in this, not the gain. Your Highness would do better to cultivate virtue and extend benevolence, treat your kin generously and select the worthy, soothe distant peoples, secure the circuits, form alliances, and ready your defenses while awaiting the western armies. Align with Heaven above and with the people's hopes below, and move when the time is right—then Song will not be worth contending for." The future Shizu, surprised that a Confucian scholar should speak so, exclaimed, "Did you discuss this with Zhang Batu?" Jing answered, "In my youth I lived in Zhang Rou's household and once heard his views. What I have just said is my own opinion; Rou knows nothing of it." He then submitted a memorial of more than seven thousand characters on the seven routes. Yang Weizhong was then appointed Pacification Commissioner of the Jianghuai, Jinghu, Hunan, and northern and southern circuits, with Jing as his deputy. Leading the Guide army, they went ahead to the river, proclaimed imperial benevolence and good faith, and received those who surrendered. Weizhong wished to go back privately to Bian, but Jing said, "You and I received the same commission to campaign south; I have heard no commission to return to Bian." Weizhong grew angry and refused to listen. Jing led his troops south with banners flying. Weizhong, alarmed, apologized and then marched on with him.
34
Learning that Möngke was in Shu and that the campaign had dragged on without success, Jing submitted his "Eastern Army Memorial," the gist of which was as follows:
35
使 西
I have heard that to plan for the realm before trouble arises is easy, but to rescue the realm once trouble has already arisen is hard. Even within what has already happened there remain things not yet happened; to keep the past from being lost and the future from being ruined is harder still. Our state, with the force of a single brigade, rose from the northern desert and wrestled with fate for the empire; wherever our horses turned, nothing stood unbroken. We destroyed the Jin, annexed Western Xia, overran Jing and Xiang, took Chengdu, pacified Dali, crushed the frontier peoples, and swept the four seas. For eighteen years we held the realm, encompassing all the old territories of Northern Wei and the Jin and more besides—vast beyond compare. Only Song would not submit, and unification remained incomplete; linked campaigns have brought disaster for more than twenty years. Why was it once so easy to take, and now so hard even to plan?
36
In taking the realm, some conquests may be won by force and others secured by strategy. Force cannot be sustained for long; drawn out, it grows spent and slack and cannot recover. Strategy cannot be hurried; hurried, it turns on chance and is hard to bring to completion. From Han and Tang onward, founding conquests lasted five or six years and never more than ten, so that force was not exhausted and great success could at last be secured. Jin's conquest of Wu and Sui's conquest of Chen both required more than ten years of careful preparation, so that strategy ripened and unification was finally achieved. Whether the time required is long or short, success comes only when action is timely and nothing is done rashly.
37
使
Our state has upheld the throne and opened its succession for nearly fifty years, yet has relied on arms alone; the surviving people and broken clans, their spirits shaken and their souls in terror, have been battered and scattered almost to extinction. Never in history have arms been employed so long and so relentlessly—how could our strength not be exhausted! Moreover, troops are conscripted and taxes collected; an order given in the morning sends armies out by evening; the ruler himself dons armor and crosses mountains and rivers; the whole state is mobilized in a great campaign against Song in pursuit of unification. In resolve we are keen, in strength we are mighty, in territory we are vast—yet strategy has not been fully applied. If, once the other states had been pacified, we had rested the armies and soothed the people, brought government to completion and civilization to fruition, created laws and established institutions, spread regulations throughout the realm, made high and low orderly and undisturbed, entrusted seasoned men with ministerial office, raised outstanding men as generals, selected the worthy and capable for service, gathered wisdom into the pivot of statecraft, balanced taxes to meet expenses, and established garrison farming to meet food needs, then internal order would have been complete and external defense secure. If they still would not submit, we could first send written proclamations; if they refused, we could then watch for openings and signs of disorder and launch the righteous punitive campaign ordained by Heaven. From the Eastern Sea to Xiang and Deng, heavy forces in several columns, banners linked and ranks continuous, would serve as the main army. From Hanzhong to Dali, light forces darting swiftly to strike the enemy's vital point and threaten his flank would serve as the strategic army. With the right commanders and armies that march by rule, the ruler could sit high within the palace while the realm beyond the seas was secured. Instead of doing this, a great campaign is launched every few years; court and country are shaken, war breeds disaster, and safety ends in peril. This is what has already happened and can no longer be stopped. Before the eastern army marches, while Your Highness is still benevolent and clear-sighted, there remain matters not yet lost—should we not discuss them?
38
西 西 穿西 輿
Our state wages war entirely by its own customs, without taking antiquity as its guide. Without regard for the size of the army, the difficulty of the terrain, or the strength of the enemy, we must always surround the foe, spears at the ready, and hunt him down like birds and beasts. Gathering like mountains, dispersing like wind and rain, swift as thunder and lightning, sharp as hawks and falcons, they obey the whip and keep to the appointed day across ten thousand li without fail. This is the strategist's way of deception, and our strength lies in the use of surprise. At the battle of the Fen River we rode victory down into Yan and Yun, then withdrew our troops and departed—as if we had no intention of taking the land at all. After breaking the Uighurs and destroying Western Xia, we sent troops down through Guan and Shan to defeat the Jin—only then learning how to take territory in depth. That was our excellence in surprise. Then came the flank assault, passing through Jin and Fang to circle behind Tong Pass and strike at Bian; the plan to strike where the enemy was empty, entering directly from Xihe through Shiquan, Wei, and Mao to take Shu; and the scheme to feign distance, cutting from Lintao and Tibet through the southwest to pacify Dali. All of these relied on surprise. Only by attacking where the enemy is unprepared and appearing where he does not expect can surprise be used. How can one mass a million men in a line ten thousand li long, with the imperial carriages thundering forward and the ruler himself taking the field, exhausting the realm, overturning the four seas, shaking heaven and earth, reaching to the farthest frontier and probing into every alley—striking the bell while stopping one's ears, biting one's navel while covering one's eyes—and call that the use of surprise? That is like clutching a jade disc worth a thousand gold and hurling it against tiles and stones.
39
At first we won through surprise because north of Guan, Long, and the Huai and Yang rivers lie broad plains and open country, and we excel at cavalry, so that wherever we turned none could withstand us. Our armies were fresh and sharp, the enemy's people and goods densely packed; pressed and crowded, districts and towns collapsed of themselves, and because we excel at assault, nothing we struck failed to break. That is why, by using surprise, we won so swiftly. Now we are hemmed in by great mountains and deep valleys, choked by layered passes and repeated obstacles, and twisted along dangerous paths and winding tracks. For us to use terrain for surprise is hard; for the enemy to use terrain against us is easy. Moreover, as invaders we are at a disadvantage; our intentions are exposed; we have no plunder for supplies and no captives for labor; with limited strength we brave limitless danger. Even the cleverest stratagems have nowhere to be applied. Strength with nowhere to apply it is no strength at all; courage with nowhere to deploy it is no courage at all; plans that cannot be executed are no plans at all. We have the momentum of Mount Tai crushing an egg and the power of rivers and seas extinguishing a flame, yet we are blocked and stalled, circling without advancing—like the tip of a strong crossbow that cannot pierce a piece of Lu silk.
40
西使退 殿使 殿西 使殿 宿 使 使沿 使 使 便 使 沿
The plan for the present should be to remedy what has already gone wrong and guard against what has not yet gone wrong. The western campaign has already begun and cannot suddenly be undone. It is like two tigers fighting who plunge together into a rocky ravine: those who see them shrink back in terror. How then can reason persuade them to withdraw of their own accord? Song knows its peril and will exhaust the state in a fight to the death; we insist on taking it and cannot turn back. War breeds disaster—when will it end? Your Highness should send someone to report to the emperor's headquarters. With the main army pressing the border, send envoys to Song, offer great assurances of good faith, and require them to submit formally, present tribute, cede territory, and send hostages. Song will surely accept; for the moment make peace, halt the war, and rest the people so that we preserve our strength for a later campaign. That would be a blessing for Heaven, Earth, humankind, and the spirits alike. If they refuse the orders you report upward, Your Highness will have done all that righteousness requires; only then should our army advance—slowly, carefully, and without rash haste. Lay plans in advance, keep them upright and grand in scope, use the western campaign as a strategic diversion, and commit our main force where it counts. When the army turns south, show kindness and good faith first: send official communications and explain the consequences of submission and resistance, so they understand that Your Highness is merciful and does not delight in killing, that you do not love war or the seizure of land, and that you take up arms only when you must. Once sincerity is plain and kindness and trust have taken hold, review the troops and pick out the brave and seasoned. Form a separate army as Your Highness's personal force, appoint mature, experienced commanders, rotate guard duty, and keep reserves ready against the unexpected. Assign the rest of the army to the princes and nobles, and have the great officials and senior ministers of our headquarters divide command among them as the assault force. The newly recruited units, ignorant of war though called soldiers and in truth little more than laborers, should be sent forward along the border to build fortifications, locking with enemy prefectures and districts like interlocking teeth, as garrison troops. Winnow out the weak, round up deserters and fugitives, reorganize the ranks, and put eminent ministers in charge of their care and training. Place them under overall command of nearby old garrisons as defensive troops. Only when schemes to check and constrain us can no longer succeed, when reckless schemers dare not stir, and when defenses within and without are sound should the advance proceed—measured, controlled, and in due order. Once inside their territory, keep formations solid and dense, and advance slowly. They are skilled at defense, so we do not assault them. They rely on walls and battlements to wear us down without fighting; we encircle them in a long siege and wear them down without fighting. We use our strengths; they cannot use theirs. Choose a position convenient for advance and withdrawal as a base for a long encampment, and show the momentum of an army that means to take what it besieges. Do not burn dwellings or harm the people. Leave them a way to live and so win their hearts. Harass them constantly to wear them down, and use many stratagems to confuse and exhaust their strength. Once our military momentum is strong and our reserves are in place, send light troops to raid the Two Huai, cut off firewood and foraging, and block grain routes. Sever their lifelines so that each city stands alone and seems not worth the cost of taking. Then advance the main army straight to the Yangtze. Up and down the river, line the banks with camps and ten thousand cooking fires. Keep orders clear and discipline strict, link van and rear, equip every unit with boats, and proclaim an intention to cross directly. They will surely be shaken in their fortifications and throw themselves into disorder. Their elite troops are all in the Two Huai. The river is broad, they rely on rocky barriers, and their soldiers are soft and untested; since the war began they have never fought a real battle. How can such men stand against our battle-hardened veterans? Once one point gives way, the rest will flee at the mere rumor of defeat. Arm and thigh will be severed, outer defenses cut off from inner reserves. The brave will have no room to fight and the timid will not stand. Those in the rear cannot retreat and those in front cannot hold. Pressed on land and water alike, they will fall into our hands. This is what strategists call avoiding the strong and striking the weak, shunning the solid and hitting the empty.
41
穿西 西 西殿使
If the aim is to preserve strength and advance step by step toward complete security, then take Jing first and Huai next, Huai first and the Yangtze next. Their long-standing doctrine holds that "with Jing and Xiang one can hold the Huai region, and with the Huai region one can hold Jiangnan." We ourselves once held Jing and Xiang, the Huai region, and the upper Yangtze—and lost them all through our own errors. Now we should turn what they rely on to defend themselves into the axis of our attack: send one army out from Xiang and Deng, cross the Han River directly, build boats into bridges, and move troops by land and water together. Send light troops to seize Xiangyang and cut their grain routes, while heavy forces rush on Hanyang by surprise and watch for an opening on the Yangtze. Alternatively, press Xiangyang with heavy troops while light forces dash through Jun and Fang, strike deep at Gui and Xia, and coordinate with the western campaign. If elite troops break out from Jiao, Guang, Shi, and Qian, if Kuimen is left undefended, and the main current sweeps downstream, then unite the armies and advance in force: smash Jing and Ying, sweep through Xiang and Tan, and form a pincer. Send one army out from Shouchun, ride its momentum, and take Jingshan as well. Bridge the Huai to link north and south. Raid Shouchun with light troops while heavy forces spread between Zhongli and Hefei, secure the lake marshes, seize the passes, hold Ruxu, block Wankou, push south into Shu and He and west to Qi and Huang, and roam freely to reconnoiter the river mouth. At Wujiang and Caishi, post garrison patrols widely, scout the difficulty of crossings, measure the strength of defenses, plan at leisure, and only then advance the army. This is what is meant by rupturing the heart of the Two Huai and seizing the Yangtze's vital passes. Send one army out from Yangzhou. Chu sprawls across this route; it crosses the long Huai and borders our chief enemy. Tong, Tai, Haimen, and the Yangzi stretch along the river face close to their capital region, and all are heavily fortified. A rash assault would only wear out the army and drain the treasury. Press Yangzhou with heavy troops, combine in a long encirclement, and show that it must be taken. Meanwhile send light troops out from Tong and Tai to block Haimen, Guabu, Jinshan, and the Chaiqu river mouth. Let roaming cavalry move up and down the coast as if to swallow river and sea alike, show authority and restraint together, and wait months to watch how they respond. This is what is meant by building a slow, enduring strategic position. With three routes advancing together and east linked to west, Your Highness may take command of one army and coordinate the whole, keeping our forces always with reserve in hand. Then future disasters may yet be averted, and mistakes already made may one day be set right.
42
西
Critics will surely say that advancing on three routes divides the army and weakens its momentum, and that it would be better to combine all force in one direction so that none could stand against us. They fail altogether to see that the art of conquering a state is not the art of seizing territory: to combine force in one direction is the art of seizing territory; to advance on every route at once is the art of conquering a state. Every power that unified the realm in the past did the same. When Jin took Wu, six routes advanced; when Sui took Chen, nine routes advanced; and when Song moved against Southern Tang, it advanced on all three sides. I have never heard of a single brigade conquering a whole state. If such a thing ever happened, it was luck, not strategy. How can a great power in all its dignity, fielding a million men, stake everything on a lucky gamble? Moreover, Song has ruled south of the Yangtze for more than a century. Its institutions are well ordered, its customs sound, its ruler and ministers harmonious, and it has no internal strife. Its domain stretches ten thousand li in every direction. It is not to be underestimated. Since the alliance was broken, not a day has passed without a muster of arms and a call to readiness. Though it has wavered and turned back upon itself a hundred times, it has faced our main force without suffering great defeat. It cannot be called weak. How can we despise such a foe, pretend that "there is no one in Qin," and expect one army to win by sheer luck? When the King of Qin asked Wang Jian about attacking Chu, Jian said, "It cannot be done with fewer than six hundred thousand men." The King of Qin said, "General, you are old." He sent Li Xin with two hundred thousand men, but Li Xin failed. In the end he gave Jian six hundred thousand troops, and only then was Chu conquered. Numbers have their necessary uses, and circumstances cannot be staked on a lucky stroke. That is why the acts of a true king must be fully secure. Those who gamble on fortune are upstarts and adventurers.
43
西 退
Alas! The western campaign set out so long ago that the season has already turned to midsummer, and still it has not achieved its aim. The state's full strength lies on the eastern front. If it presses straight forward with sharp resolve and takes Jinling and Lin'an in one stroke, that would be one thing. But if our strength is exhausted, the campaign drags on, advance and retreat alike become impossible, and the enemy turns our hesitation against us—then what good will regret do? This is exactly why one must be cautious, thorough, and deliberate, and plan by strategy rather than impulse. As I said before, to preserve our strength is what is called winning without fighting. Even so, there is still cause for alarm. The state has gathered and seized kingdom after kingdom in swift, fierce campaigns, winning fundamentally by force. Now, for no good reason, we launch a great campaign. If the arrangements are again mishandled and we fail to break the spirit of our heroes and win the hearts of the realm, then men long steeped in evil and treachery will spy our weaknesses and thrust themselves into the breach. The interior will be hollow and easily shaken. That is why I have spoken so earnestly and at such length about the eastern campaign, insisting again and again that the danger lies not in what has already happened, but in what has not yet happened.
44
Thereupon the armies were united, the Yangtze was crossed, and Ezhou was besieged. When word came that Emperor Xianzong had died, the prince summoned his generals to counsel together, and Jing again offered his advice, saying:
45
退 殿 退 退
The Book of Changes says, "He who knows when to advance and when to retreat, when to survive and when to perish, and does not lose the right course— is he not a sage?" Your Highness is intelligent and wise, fully equal to command; resolute, strong, and firm, fully equal to decide. You have long known the right way of advance and retreat, survival and destruction. At Shatuo you once told me, "The time is not yet right." You also said, "Of all words, 'time' is the one that most deserves careful attention." You also said, "When the time to act arrives, you yourself will know it." How great those words were! The way of "riding the six dragons at the proper time"—you have known it long. Since the army marched out and advanced without retreating—what I could not understand—I spoke at Zhending, at Cao and Pu, and at Tang and Deng. I spoke urgently again and again, but received no approval. Now that matters are critical, I must again offer these rash words.
46
退 使退 使 便 退 退退
Since the state pacified the Jin, it has pursued advance alone and not heeded the lesson to nourish strength and bide one's time. For thirty years it has worn out its armies and wasted its treasury, yet achieved nothing. When Möngke Khan came to the throne, the state should have rested and sought tranquility. Instead it suddenly launched a great campaign and advanced without retreat. When the prince was given the eastern army, he should not yet have marched—but he marched at once. Believing he had his orders and not daring to pause on his own account, he pressed on to Runan. Once he heard the news of the emperor's death, he should at once have sent envoys to every commander to withdraw in order, make peace with Song, and return to settle the succession. He should not have advanced further—but he advanced again at once. Because there was a campaign deadline, he met the armies at the riverbank. He should have sent envoys to Song to halt the war and rest the people, then withdrawn his forces and returned. He should not have advanced further—but he advanced again. If it was already unwise to cross the Huai, how can it be wise to cross the Yangtze? If it was already unwise to advance rashly, how can it be wise to besiege a city? If one insists that the moment must not be lost and the enemy must not be allowed to recover—since the Yangtze has already been crossed and the advance cannot be halted—then one should seize the moment, take Ezhou, divide the army four ways, and strike straight for Lin'an like thunder before the ears can cover. Then Song might still be taken. If that is not possible, then knowing the difficulty and withdrawing would be no disgrace—no worse than Wanyan Zongbi. The army advanced when it should not have, the river was crossed when it should not have been, the city was attacked when it should not have been. We should have withdrawn quickly but did not; we should have pressed forward quickly but did not. The campaign drags on while we linger on the riverbank. Our intentions are exposed and our momentum broken. All the military power of the realm cannot take a single city. We are exhausted while the enemy is full. What, then, are we waiting for? Moreover, plague has already struck four or five men in ten throughout the armies. If we delay month after month until the turn of winter and spring, the pestilence will surely rage—and then we may wish to withdraw and be unable.
47
西沿
They have no worry on the upper Yangtze. Lü Wende has already combined his forces to resist us. Knowing our weaknesses, their fighting spirit has doubled. The armies of the Two Huai are massed at Bailu, the Jiangxi forces at Longxing, the Lingnan and Guang troops at Changsha, and great ships from Fujian and Zhejiang are arriving along the coast one after another, waiting for an opening to strike. If we are blocked at the Jiang and Huang crossings, intercepted at Dacheng Pass, cut off at Shimen in eastern Han, and hemmed in by the lake marshes of Ying and Fu—where then can our army retreat? If there is no other course, we would have to burst into Jiangsu and Zhejiang and strike their heartland. But if Lin'an and Haimen already have imperial barges ready, such a thrust would come to nothing; and on the return, when we reach Jinshan and the enemy is ordered out to meet us, will there not be commanders like Han Shizhong waiting? Moreover, Ezhou and Hanyang stand on either side of Great Bi Mountain with a vast lake between them—a position called the Living City. Even if we took it only by pressing flesh to flesh and bone to bone, the defenders would abandon the broken walls and slip away. Upstream lies Dongting and the route to Jing and Xiang; downstream, elite troops and swift ships would burst past Hu and Huang and not easily be stopped. We would merely waste lives. What would we gain? A single minor city: to take it would bring little glory, but to fail would greatly damage our prestige. What are we waiting for?
48
使
Even so, by the prince's own intent: he did not wish to cross the Yangtze; having crossed, he did not wish to attack cities; having attacked, he did not wish to stake everything on one throw. He would not burn dwellings, harm the people, change their dress, or destroy their tombs, and beyond three hundred li he would not permit raiding. Some urged him to strike straight for Lin'an. He said its people are densely packed; even without slaughter, they would be trampled underfoot—and that he could not bear. If Heaven grants us victory, there is no need to kill; if Heaven does not grant it, what good would killing do? In the end he would not go. The generals blamed the scholar-advisers, saying they were useless and that the city could not be taken because killing was forbidden. He said, "Their defender is only one scholar-official, Commissioner Jia. Your hundred thousand men cannot defeat him. Months of slaughter have not taken the city. The fault is yours—how is it the scholar-advisers' fault?" He forbade killing all the more strictly. Standing firm in benevolence that reaches up to Heaven, he had long wished to withdraw but could not bring himself to do it. Yet now the crisis is upon us, and a decision cannot be postponed.
49
西 便
The Song now fear a great enemy; though their armies for self-defense are fully gathered, they have no leisure to plot against us. Only at home we are hollow; Prince Tacha and Regional Commander Li cling to each other like arm and thigh, at our back and flank; the various Hu of the Western Regions spy on Guanlong and cut off Prince Hulagu; suffering people and various traitors each wait on two sides, watching who will be established, all coveting the throne and licking their lips. Should one be crafty and rouse martial intent, strike first, and we be attacked front and rear, the great affair is lost. Moreover Ariq Böke has already issued an amnesty, appointing Toliči judicial officer and acting Secretariat, holding Yan capital, checking registers, commanding the circuits, and performing imperial affairs. Though Your Highness has long enjoyed popular esteem and holds heavy troops, have you not seen what befell Jin Shizong and Prince Hailing? If he is truly resolute, claims the testamentary edict, establishes his title, issues edicts in the Central Plains, and proclaims amnesty on the Yangtze—could you still return?
50
西 輿 使 西西
Yesterday by order I inspected New Moon City with Zhang Zhongyi; from southwest to northeast it would withstand ten thousand men, chariots could pass abreast on the ramparts, rafts and towers were set in rows, structures layered in repetition—it cannot be taken; we can only make peace and withdraw. Withdraw the army decisively, fix the great plan at once, and extinguish disaster before it arises. First order crack troops to block the river, negotiate peace with Song, promise to cede the Huainan, Hanshang, and Zikui circuits, and fix borders and annual tribute. Leave baggage, return with light cavalry, cross the Huai by post road and go straight to Yan capital—then descending from Heaven, their treacherous plots and usurping ambitions will melt like ice. Send one army to meet Prince Möngke's funeral carriage and receive the imperial seal. Send envoys to summon Hulagu, Ariq Böke, Möngke, and the princes and imperial sons-in-law to assemble for mourning at Karakorum. Dispatch officials to Bianjing, Jingzhao, Chengdu, Xiliang, Dongping, Xijing, and Beijing to comfort and settle, summon Crown Prince Jingzhen to guard Yan capital and display the situation. Then the great inheritance will have its place and the altars of state will be secure.
51
宿使翿 退
At that time Jing enjoyed great reputation and Equal Administrator Wang Wentong envied him. After Jing had departed, Wentong secretly instructed Li Tan to send troops in secret against Song, wishing to use another's hand to harm Jing. When Jing reached Jinan, Tan sent a letter stopping him; Jing reported Tan's letter to court and continued on his way. Song defeated Tan's army at Huai'an; Jing reached Suzhou and sent Vice Envoy Liu Renjie and Adviser Gao Hao to request a date for entering the state—no reply came. He sent letters to the chief ministers and Huai commander Li Tingzhi; Tingzhi's reply showed suspicion of Jing, while Jia Sidao was taking repelling the enemy as his achievement and feared that if Jing came his plot would leak—ultimately he detained Jing at Zhenzhou. Jing thereupon memorialized the Song ruler, saying: "I wish to follow Lu Lian's example and settle difficulties and dissolve strife; who knew that men like Tang Jian, with courteous troops, would mislead the state." He again repeatedly wrote to the Song ruler and chief ministers, fully setting forth the advantages and harms of war and peace, and requesting an audience and return to his state—all without reply. Post clerks set thorn walls and locked doors, guarding day and night, wishing to break Jing—Jing would not bend. Jing had always been strict with subordinates, and after long detention many below bore resentment. Jing instructed them, saying: "Earlier, receiving orders and not advancing was my fault. Once I entered Song territory, life, death, advance, and retreat are for them to decide; I can never humiliate myself and disgrace my commission. You are unfortunate and should endure and wait; I observe that Song's fortune will not last long." After seven years, followers fought in anger and several died; Jing alone remained with six men in a separate lodge. After another nine years, Chancellor Bayan received orders for the southern campaign; the emperor sent Minister of Rites Zhongdu Haiya and Jing's younger brother Acting Privy Council Executive Hao Yong into Song to inquire about the crime of detaining an envoy; Song was afraid and sent Chief Administrator Duan You to escort Jing home with ceremony. Jia Sidao's plot had already leaked and soon he died in flight as well. When Jing returned he fell ill on the road; the emperor ordered the Privy Council and imperial physicians and close attendants to welcome and comfort him; wherever he passed, elders gazed and wept. The next summer he reached court, was granted a feast in the great hall, consulted on government affairs, and rewarded according to rank. In the seventh month of autumn he died at fifty-three; officials escorted the funeral for burial and he was given posthumous title Wenzhong. The following year Song was pacified.
52
使
Jing as a man valued integrity; in learning he pursued what was useful. When detained he wished to entrust words to posterity and compiled the Continuation of the Book of Han, Outer Commentary on the Changes and Spring and Autumn Annals, Elaboration of the Supreme Ultimate, Record of Antiquity, Calligraphy of the Comprehensive Mirror, Jade Balance and Constant Observation, and other books and collected works, altogether several hundred juan. His prose was rich and bold, and he excelled at disputation. His poetry was often strange and towering. Detained in Song for sixteen years, his followers all became versed in learning. His clerk Gou Zongdao later reached office as Chancellor of the National University. In the year Jing returned, people of Bian shot geese at Jinming Pool and obtained attached silk with a poem saying: "Frost falls and wind rises—go where you will; the day you turn homeward is the start of spring. The Son of Heaven of the Upper Park draws his bow with silken cord; the minister long exiled at the edge of the sea has a message on silk." The later inscription read: "On the first day of the ninth month of the fifth year of Zhiyuan a goose was released; whoever obtains it should not kill it. Written by credentialed envoy Hao Jing at the new lodge of the Loyal and Brave Army camp at Zhenzhou." Such was his loyalty.
53
使
Two younger brothers Yi and Yong were both renowned. Yi, styled Zhongchang, lived in seclusion and died of old age; Yong, styled Jichang, ended as prefect of Yingzhou. His son Cailin was also worthy; he began office as magistrate of Lin Prefecture and served to Surveillance Commissioner of the Shannan Jiangbei Circuit for Purging Corruption.
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