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卷234 唐紀五十

Volume 234 Tang Records 50

Chapter 234 of 資治通鑑 · Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance
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1
234
Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, Volume 234
2
[Tang Records 50] From the xuantuan year through the fifth month of the yanmao year—a span of somewhat more than two years.
3
Emperor Dezong of the Tang, eighth year of the Zhenyuan era ( ren-shen, 792 CE)
4
In spring, on the ren-yin day of the second month, Meng Chong was arrested; his offenses were read out, and he was executed. Communications with Yunnan were established for the first time.
5
使
In the third month, on the ding-chou day, Wang Gao, Prince of Cao and governor of Shannan East Circuit, passed away.
6
使使
Liu Xuanzuo of Xuanwu was formidable and resourceful; he lavishly cultivated Li Na's messengers and thus routinely learned their master's confidential plans before they could act. Li Na was wary of him. Though exalted as his mother, she still wove a bolt of silk each day and told Xuanzuo: "You rose from poverty; the emperor raised you to wealth and rank—you owe him your life in service!" It was for this reason that Liu Xuanzuo never once failed in loyalty to the throne. On the geng-wu day, Liu Xuanzuo died.
7
使使
Li Shi, who as regent of Shannan East Circuit handled routine administration, was harsh by nature and cut the troops' food and clothing allowances. The drum-and-horn officer Yang Qingtan led his men in mutiny. That night they burned and looted the city, yet spared the residence of Prince of Cao Gao. Li Shi escaped over the city wall. At dawn Chief Commander Xu Cheng was lowered into the city by rope; once he proclaimed orders forbidding further violence, the rioting ceased. Qingtan and six accomplices were arrested and executed. Li Shi returned to the capital and was appointed vice minister of the Imperial Granaries. He was a great-grandson of Li Yuanqing. On the bing-zi day, Fan Ze, governor of Jingnan, was transferred to govern Shannan East Circuit.
8
使 使 使 使 使
Earlier, Dou Can had served as commissioner of revenue and transport, with Ban Hong as his deputy. Dou Can had promised Hong that after a year he would hand the commission back to him. When more than a year passed with no sign that Can would step aside, Hong grew furious. Zhang Pang, vice minister of the Imperial Granaries, had been Hong's own nominee, yet Dou Can wanted Pang to take over the Jiang-Huai salt and iron monopoly separately—an arrangement Hong refused. When Pang learned of this, he too came to resent Hong. After Dou Can fell out of favor with the emperor, he yielded the revenue commission to Hong; but unwilling to let Hong monopolize all lucrative authority, he recommended Zhang Pang to the throne. Ban Hong was appointed acting revenue commissioner; Zhang Pang became vice minister of revenue and salt-and-iron transport commissioner, but was left nominally under Hong's authority as a conciliatory gesture.
9
Dou Can was secretive, obstinate, and greedy with power; on nearly every appointment or dismissal he consulted his kinsman Dou Shen, a supervising secretary in the Secretariat. Shen traded on his influence for bribes, and contemporaries nicknamed him "Magpie." The emperor had heard of this and told Can: "Shen is bound to become your liability; you should post him elsewhere to quiet public criticism." Dou Can repeatedly assured him that Shen meant no harm, yet Shen showed no sign of reform. Prince of Guo Zezhi, son of Li Ju and grand general of the Left Golden Crow Guards, was close to Shen; Wu Tongxuan, left remonstrance grandee and drafter of edicts, was hostile to Lu Zhi. Fearing Lu Zhi's rise, Dou Shen secretly conspired with Wu and Zezhi to circulate libels aimed at bringing Zhi down. The emperor saw through the whole affair. In summer, on the ding-hai day of the fourth month, Zezhi was demoted to adjutant of Zhaozhou, Tongxuan to adjutant of Quanzhou, and Shen to adjutant of Daozhou. Soon afterward the emperor ordered Wu Tongxuan to take his own life.
10
使使 便 使 婿 使 使
When Liu Xuanzuo died, his officers hid the fact, reported him ill, and asked the court for a successor; the emperor went along with the deception and sent an envoy to the camp to ask: "Would Wu Cou, commissioner of Shaan-Guo, be acceptable as his replacement?" Army supervisor Meng Jie and chief of staff Lu Yuan both approved, and only then was the appointment issued. As Wu Cou's party reached Si River and Liu Xuanzuo's coffin was about to leave camp, the troops asked for a full ceremonial escort; Lu Yuan refused and ordered the regalia held back until the new commissioner arrived. The troops were furious. Xuanzuo's son-in-law and his personal guard donned armor, helped Xuanzuo's son Liu Shining cast off his mourning garb, seated him on the command couch, and proclaimed him acting military governor. They seized garrison commander Cao Jin'an and Junyi magistrate Li Mai, crying: "You were the ones who wanted Wu Cou! Then their noses were cut off. Lu Yuan fled and escaped with his life. Liu Shining lavished money on the troops, took Meng Jie hostage, and sent him to petition the court on his behalf. The emperor consulted his chief ministers. Dou Can said: "The Bianzhou garrison is using Li Na as leverage to demand an imperial commission; refuse them, and they will throw in with Na." On the geng-yin day, Liu Shining was appointed military governor of Xuanwu. Suspecting that Songzhou prefect Cui Liangzuo was not loyal to him, Liu Shining went to Songzhou on the pretext of an inspection tour and replaced him with chief military officer Liu Yizhun. Liu Yizhun was a son of Liu Zhengchen.
11
On the yi-wei day, Dou Can, vice director of the Secretariat and co-equal grand councilor, was demoted to assistant administrator of Chenzhou, and Dou Shen to registrar of Jinzhou. Zhao Jing, left vice director of the Department of State Affairs, and Lu Zhi, vice minister of war, were both appointed vice directors of the Secretariat and co-equal grand councilors. Zhao Jing was a great-grandson of Zhao Renben.
12
簿
Zhang Pang asked Ban Hong for the old salt-and-iron account books; Hong refused. Pang and Hong tried jointly to appoint circuit inspectors, but could agree on no one, and many posts remained unfilled. Zhang Pang told the emperor: "At this rate the office cannot function, and I will have no way to escape blame." On the bing-wu day the emperor ordered Hong and Pang to divide control of the empire's finances, following the Dali-era precedent.
13
退
On the ren-zi day the Tibetans raided Lingzhou, breached the Shuikou branch canal, and ravaged the military farms. The court ordered the Hedong and Zhenwu commands to relieve Lingzhou and dispatched two thousand men from the six Shence armies to garrison Dingyuan and Huaiyuan. The Tibetans then withdrew.
14
殿 使 使 使 退
Lu Zhi proposed that each head of the censorate and secretariat recommend his own subordinates, record their names in the edict, and later, when their performance was graded, reward or punish the recommenders accordingly. In the fifth month, on the wu-chen day, an edict put Lu Zhi's proposal into effect. Before long someone told the emperor: "Every nominee from the ministries was chosen through favoritism or bribery, and none are truly capable." The emperor privately told Lu Zhi: "From now on you should make appointments yourself and not leave them to the ministries." Lu Zhi memorialized in reply, in essence: "In our dynasty, officials of the fifth rank and above receive their appointments by imperial edict—matters on which the chief ministers deliberate and then memorialize for approval. Those of the sixth rank and below are appointed by rescript—the Ministry of Personnel selects talent and assigns posts, and the edict is merely noted for the emperor's information, not subject to refusal. Even in the Kaiyuan era, diarists, remonstrators, supplementers, and censors were still appointed through the Selection Bureau. Later, favored ministers dominated the court, set aside collective deliberation to aggrandize their own power, and abandoned open recommendation for private patronage—so that throughout the bureaucracy, no one could gain office unless he pleased the chief minister." He added: "Since the edict took effect we have recommended only a dozen or so men; judged by qualification and standing, none disgrace their peers, and in conduct and ability none has yet been found wanting. Yet critics have already raised a clamor and troubled Your Majesty's ears. How hard it is to put good policy into practice is all too clear! I ask that accusers be required to specify their charges—who took a bribe, whose nomination was tainted by favoritism—and that the appropriate offices investigate the truth. Recommenders who erred must be punished, and false accusers must suffer in turn. Why shield slander and bribery, refuse cross-examination, and allow anonymous attacks that make the innocent suspect while the guilty go free—when crooked and straight are treated alike, what can the people rely on! Besides, there are only a few chief ministers—how can they know all worthy men in the empire! If every office were ordered to nominate, each would have to canvass through layers of intermediaries—turning public recommendation into private patronage and open selection into back-room lobbying, with favoritism multiplying and the harm far worse. That is why officials appointed under the old system were rarely free of scandal. Even when chief ministers differed and some made appointments on their own, they did so by sounding out their private networks and being steered by them. These abuses are nothing new; Your Majesty sees them clearly." He added: "Today's chief ministers were yesterday's censorate and secretariat heads; today's censorate and secretariat heads are tomorrow's chief ministers. Only the titles differ for a time—the principle of recommendation does not change overnight. How can a man be unable to recommend one or two subordinates as a department head, yet claim to choose hundreds of officials as chief minister? Public rumor runs on endlessly—what confusion this breeds! The superior holds the essentials and the subordinate handles the details; the ruler chooses his ministers, ministers choose department heads, and heads choose their staffs. To secure the right men, no method is simpler. In recruiting talent, breadth matters; in evaluation, precision matters. When Empress Wu sought to win hearts, she promoted men out of turn—not only could others nominate talent, candidates could nominate themselves. Because evaluation was strict and promotions and dismissals swift, her age was praised for knowing men, and later reigns benefited from the many talents she employed." He added: "Empress Wu's method was loose but found talent; Your Majesty's cautious selection is so refined that talent is lost." In the end the emperor revoked the earlier edict and let the policy lapse.
15
使
On the gui-you day, Li Na, military governor of Pinglu, died. The army installed his son Li Shigu as acting military governor.
16
In the sixth month, over a thousand Tibetan horsemen raided Jingzhou, carried off more than a thousand farm-garrison troops, and withdrew.
17
使使 使使使使
The governor of Lingnan reported: "Lately foreign ships have been trading their rare goods chiefly at Annan rather than Guangzhou; we wish to send an aide to Annan to buy them up, and request that a palace envoy accompany him." The emperor was inclined to agree, but Lu Zhi objected: "Foreign merchants follow profit alone—treat them gently and they come; harass them and they leave. Guangzhou has always been where the fleets congregate; if they suddenly prefer Annan, either our exactions are too harsh or we have failed to win their loyalty. They need not even sue at court to unsettle Your Majesty's mind. Besides, Lingnan and Annan are alike imperial territory, and palace envoys and frontier commissioners are alike the emperor's servants—why trust one region and spurn the other, or favor a palace envoy over a frontier official? I urge that this proposal be set aside."
18
使 祿
In autumn, on the first day of the seventh month, Ban Hong, minister of revenue and acting revenue commissioner, died. Lu Zhi recommended the former Hunan commissioner Li Xun as acting revenue commissioner, and the emperor agreed. Soon afterward the emperor wished to appoint Pei Yanling, vice minister of the Imperial Granaries, instead. Lu Zhi objected: "The revenue office must balance all commodities—too harsh breeds trouble, too lax breeds fraud. Pei Yanling is a deceitful schemer; appoint him and you will shock the court and the people alike. If I fail in my duty, the blame for drawing salary without serving should fall on me alone. It may also wound Your Majesty's reputation for discerning men." The emperor would not heed him. On the ji-wei day, Pei Yanling was appointed acting revenue commissioner.
19
使 使西使
Floods struck more than forty prefectures from Henan and Hebei to the Jiang-Huai, Jing, Xiang, Chen, and Xu regions, drowning over twenty thousand people; Lu Zhi urged the court to send relief envoys. The emperor said: "I am told the losses are modest; generous relief now will only invite fraud." Lu Zhi replied in essence: "Vulgar custom favors flattery: tell the ruler what pleases him and the disaster shrinks; tell him what he hates to hear and it vanishes altogether. Misjudging affairs in this way is our chronic disease." He added: "We spend money to buy loyalty. Lose the people and funds are useless; keep the people and funds will follow." The emperor agreed to send envoys but said: "Huai-Xi already owes its tribute; skip it." Lu Zhi pressed again: "Your Majesty has shown mercy even to rebel leaders; how much more should common folk in disaster receive aid? When Qin and Jin were bitter foes, Duke Mu still fed Jin in famine. An emperor should rule by virtue: let the people wrong him if they must, but let him never wrong the people." In the eighth month he sent Xi Zhi of Jingzhao, a drafting officer of the Secretariat, and others to comfort the flood-stricken circuits.
20
使
Li Shigu, former prefect of Qingzhou, was appointed military governor of Pinglu. Wei Gao attacked the Tibetan stronghold of Weizhou and captured the Tibetan general Lun Zanre.
21
使 使 使 簿 使 使 使綿
Lu Zhi argued that frontier granaries were empty because policy was wrong and collection mishandled. He wrote: "Garrison troops answer neither local commanders nor the frontier commander-in-chief. A single city might have its own general, a regiment its own troops—each watched by a palace envoy with a separate imperial commission. Garrisons were scattered across a thousand li with no one commander to coordinate them. A hundred thousand men lined the frontier, yet no chief strategist was named. Whenever enemies struck, the army waited for court approval; by the time relief marched, the raiders were gone. Tibet cannot match China in numbers or craft, yet they attack at will while we barely hold our posts. Their orders issue from generals; ours from the capital. Their armies fight as one; ours in fragments—that is why they win. Your "wrong accumulation" policy: the army-procurement and harmonized-purchase systems were meant to cut transport costs and pay farmers double—at first everyone rejoiced. Officials grew lazy and stingy: in good years they failed to buy and store; in famine they forced farmers to sell. Powerful families and corrupt clerks seized the trade, buying cheap from peasants to hoard for dearth. Influential men and court connections bought grain cheap at frontier posts and sold it dear in the capital, often paying in shoddy silk at face value. On the frontier the silk was useless—too thin for cold weather and unsellable. The court lost trust in the frontier; the frontier answered with fraud. Revenue valuations climbed; army grain prices soared. The revenue office profited by dumping unwanted goods; army quartermasters by marking up what they received. Even the high circuit-inspection office became a money sack. Ledgers were padded and granaries falsely listed—on paper hundreds of millions; in fact not one part in ten." He added: "Because Guanzhong consumed so much, the court annually shipped eastern rice—sometimes costing a coin to move a coin's worth of grain. Conservatives said: "Great affairs ignore expense; transport is burdensome but indispensable." Reformers said: "Each autumn, buy grain around the capital—easy and it helps farmers." Both views have merit; fiscal policy must balance grain against coin. When grain is scarce but money plentiful, spend coin to fill granaries; when grain is plentiful but money tight, hoard grain and conserve coin. Guanzhong has had rich harvests; public stores could feed the capital for years; this summer the Jiang-Huai flooded; rice doubled; multitudes became refugees. Guanzhong farmers were hurt by cheap grain—the court should buy high but lacked funds; Jiang-Huai people were crushed by dear grain—the court should sell low but had no grain to sell. Yet the court still shipped grain from surplus regions to needy ones—the very folly of blind custom. Jiang-Huai rice now costs 150 cash per dou; freight to East Wei Bridge adds 200; the grain arrives coarse and stale, despised in the capital. The market office valued it at only 37 cash per dou. Nine parts in ten were wasted, starving the Jiang-Huai and hurting Guanzhong farmers—a profound blunder. Each year 1.1 million hu were shipped from the southeast: 400,000 stored at Heyin, 300,000 at Taiyuan in Shaanzhou, 400,000 to East Wei Bridge. Heyin and Taiyuan still hold 3.2 million hu; Jingzhao rice sells for 70 cash. Next year ship only 300,000 hu from Jiang-Huai to Heyin, then forward to East Wei Bridge; sell the withheld 800,000 hu in flood districts at 80 cash per dou for relief—640,000 strings gained, 690,000 strings saved in freight. Advance 200,000 strings to Jingzhao to buy grain at 100 cash per dou for Wei Bridge and aid farmers. Send 1,026,000 strings to the frontier for a year's grain for 100,000 troops; reserve 104,000 for next year's purchases. Let the transport commissioner trade Jiang-Huai proceeds into silk and cloth for the capital and repay the treasury advance."
22
西
In the ninth month the court ordered the northwest to buy grain at premium prices to fill frontier granaries. In winter, on the first day of the eleventh month, a solar eclipse occurred.
23
Tibet and Yunnan grew mutually suspicious: whenever Yunnan marched to the border, Tibet mobilized too, claiming support but actually guarding against Yunnan. On the xin-you day Wei Gao again wrote the King of Nanzhao, proposing a joint strike to drive Tibet beyond the Cloud Ridge, destroy its forts, and build a great border city where Tang and Nanzhao would garrison together as one household.
24
使
Jiang Gongfu, a right court gentleman, had long gone without promotion and asked Lu Zhi for help. Zhi whispered: "Dou Can kept nominating you; the emperor refused—he is angry at you." Terrified, Gongfu asked to become a Daoist priest. The emperor asked why; Gongfu dared not repeat Zhi's warning and blamed Dou Can instead. The emperor raged that Dou Can had slandered him. On the ji-si day Jiang Gongfu was demoted to Jizhou and a palace envoy was sent to rebuke Dou Can.
25
西使
On the geng-wu day Yan Zhen of Shannan West reported victories over Tibet at Fangzhou and Heishui Fort.
26
使
Earlier Li Na had seized Hachongduo in Dezhou for its salt works and fortified it. He also garrisoned Sancha City south of Dezhou to keep contact with Tian Xu. When Li Shigu succeeded, Wang Wujun despised his youth and this month marched on De and Di to seize Hachongduo and Sancha City. Shigu sent Zhao Hao to resist. The emperor sent an envoy to halt him; Wujun withdrew.
27
使
When Liu Zong died, Liu Ji was at Mozhou; his half-brother Liu Yong at their father's side summoned Ji by paternal order and handed him the command. Ji made Yong prefect of Yingzhou, promising Yong would succeed him one day. Later Ji appointed his son deputy commissioner; Yong resented this, memorialized the court on his own, and sent a thousand men for autumn defense. Ji attacked Yong and defeated him.
28
宿
Bai Liangqi, grand general of the Left Shence Army, replaced merchants in the ranks with brave recruits; supervisor Dou Wenchang resented it. Once Liangqi's in-laws got drunk and slept in a palace lodge. On the bing-xu day of the twelfth month Liangqi was demoted to Right Army Leader. From this time eunuchs began to dominate military affairs.
29
Emperor Dezong of the Tang, ninth year of the Zhenyuan era ( gui-you, 793 CE)
30
使
In spring, on the gui-mao day of the first month, the tea tax was introduced. Every tea-producing prefecture and major route was assessed; a ten-percent tax was levied at Zhang Pang's request. Zhang Pang argued: "Last year's floods cut revenue; tax tea to fill the gap. Tea revenue would be stored locally and, in future droughts or floods, substitute for field taxes." Yet thereafter 400,000 strings a year were collected and never used for disaster relief. “Pang also asked to ban copper vessels made by melting coinage. Copper mines were opened to licensed mining; private sale was forbidden.
31
使
On the jia-yin day of the second month Zhang Shengyun, acting governor of Yiwu, was confirmed as military governor.
32
使西
After Yanzhou fell, the outer defenses were gone. Tibet repeatedly cut Lingwu and raided Bin and Fang. On the xin-you day 35,000 men were ordered to rebuild Yanzhou; Jingyuan, Shannan, and Jiannan were to raid Tibet to divide its forces; the work took twenty days. Du Yanguang garrisoned Yanzhou and Yang Chaosheng Mubo Fort, securing Lingzhou, Wu, Yin, Xia, and Hexi.
33
使 使
The emperor told Lu Zhi not to discuss weighty matters openly with Zhao Jing but to submit sealed memorials." He also said Miao Can's father had spoken treasonously while regent and that Can's sons bore imperial names; they should be quietly posted far from armies." He also said Lu Zhi was too austere to accept gifts—even boots and whips might be accepted without harm." Lu Zhi replied: "Only Zhao Jing heard my last memorial, yet Your Majesty already labors to shield me in secret. Even among your closest ministers I am constrained—same forms, different trust—such secrecy rarely succeeds. It will seem partial and wound your reputation for openness." He said honors must be public and punishments visible to all. Only then do rewards bring no shame and punishments no rumor—how sage kings make law common property. Slander thrives on secrecy and fears open debate. Some say the matter is too old to investigate; some that it is too delicate to air; some that guilt is unproven and another pretext should be used; some that the man should simply be removed without stating the charge. Their words sound reasonable, but the aim is deceit—to harm the innocent and shield the guilty. Nothing is worse. If the Jinqings are truly guilty, let the law judge them openly; if they are slandered, they must not be quietly exiled. Justice requires facts and evidence. Only when guilt is clear should punishment fall—then the people are not wronged and the throne not misled." He said: "Bribery by overseers is a capital crime even for minor clerks—how then may the chief minister of morals accept gifts? Open the door to gifts and they escalate from boots and whips to gold and jade. Who can resist what the eye desires? Once private ties are formed, how can favor be refused? A trickle becomes a torrent and ravines overflow." If you accept some gifts and refuse others, those refused will think themselves shunned; if you refuse all alike, everyone knows refusal is your rule and no one is singled out."
34
使 使 使 簿
Dou Can had banished Li Xun from the Left Department to Changzhou. When Dou Can was demoted to Chenzhou, Li Xun was Hunan observation commissioner. Liu Shining of Bianzhou sent Dou Can fifty bolts of silk; Li Xun reported that Can was colluding with regional commanders. The emperor wanted Dou Can executed; Lu Zhi argued the crime did not warrant death and the emperor relented—then an envoy told Zhi: "Can conspires far and wide; act at once." Lu Zhi said: "Dou Can is a chief minister; he cannot be killed without clear cause. When Liu Yan was executed without clear guilt, the realm was outraged and rebels used it as propaganda. Dou Can's greed is notorious; but treason is unproven. To execute him without trial would shock the empire. I do not seek to save Dou Can for friendship's sake, Your Majesty, but to keep punishment from excess." In the third month Dou Can was demoted to Huanzhou and his family exiled. The emperor wished to punish Can's clan; Lu Zhi said kin should receive lighter sentences now that Can was spared. His partisans were already punished when he fell; the matter is settled—do not reopen it." The emperor agreed. The emperor wanted to seize Can's estate; Lu Zhi cited law: only rebels lose all property; embezzlers pay restitution. Guilt must be proved before confiscation. The charges are unclear and Your Majesty already shows mercy—forfeiture would sacrifice justice to greed. Palace eunuchs kept slandering Dou Can. Before he reached Huanzhou, Dou Can was ordered to die on the road. Dou Shen was beaten to death; his property and slaves were sent to the capital.
35
使婿 使 使
Zhang Shenglian of Haizhou was Zhang Shengyun's brother and Li Na's son-in-law. During mourning for his father he returned to Dingzhou and publicly cursed Wang Wujun, who reported him. In summer, on the ding-chou day of the fourth month, he was stripped of rank, caned, and imprisoned. Wujun had long coveted rich Dingzhou; he seized Yifeng and carried off more than ten thousand people from Anxi and Wuji to De and Di. Zhang Shengyun shut the city and apologized until Wujun withdrew.
36
The emperor ordered Li Shigu to demolish Sancha City, and he obeyed. Yet he sheltered fugitives and outlaws from the court.
37
使
On the jia-chen day of the fifth month Zhao Jing became chancellor of the Chancellery, Jia Dan vice director of state affairs, and Lu Mai remained right vice director—all as co-equal grand councilors. Lu Mai was a kinsman of Lu Han. Zhao Jing suspected Lu Zhi of monopolizing power, kept himself aloof claiming illness, and fell out with Zhi. Lu Zhi memorialized on six border failures: bad organization, lax discipline, wasted funds, divided command, unfair pay, and delayed orders from the capital.
38
使
" Guandong troops know neither frontier climate nor enemy ways; the court pampers them like spoiled children. They count the days until rotation and live on rations; some hope for defeat so they can flee east; some abandon posts and unsettle the frontier. They do more harm than good. Exiled criminals are worse still—restless men who welcome chaos. This is the first failure: wrong organization. Generals no longer command; the court no longer disciplines them—all merely marking time. Reward one man and others grow jealous; punish one and accomplices fear. Crimes are hidden and merit suspected—indulgence gone too far. The loyal are mocked, the brave resented, the incompetent unashamed, and the tardy call themselves wise. Righteous men grieve and warriors despair. This is the second failure: lax discipline. When raiders strike, generals blame one another and dare not fight. They exaggerate enemy strength and plead insufficient troops. The court only sends more men, helping neither defense nor finance. Villages are ruined by endless levies, salt and wine monopolies included—all to feed the frontier. This is the third failure: wasted funds.
39
退 西西 使
" Tibet's entire army equals only a dozen Chinese prefectures—yet we fear them. Why? Because our command is fragmented and theirs is unified. Unified command unifies hearts and orders; opportunity is seized and spirit strong. Thus few become many and weak become strong. Under Kaiyuan and Tianbao only three commands faced the northwest. After the Restoration only four commands bore the burden. Shuofang was split among three commissioners and nearly forty independent armies, each with its own eunuch overseer—none obeying another. When crisis came, they met as equals without military law. Armies live by morale; gathered it flourishes, scattered it fades. United they are formidable, divided weak. Today's frontier is weak and divided—the fourth failure.
40
使
" Pay and rank should reflect merit so the able strive and the rest accept their lot. Frontier veterans who fought for years are paid barely enough to feed themselves while their families freeze. Guandong troops, cowards in battle, receive several times more. Some border units were nominally transferred to the Shence Army without moving yet tripled their pay. Same service, unequal pay—who would not resent it? This is the fifth failure: unfair pay.
41
退使使 退 使便
" Choose generals by merit and trust them in the field. The court picks pliant generals, splits their commands, and micromanages from afar. Raiders strike like wind; court replies take a month. Local defenders dare not fight; neighboring commands wait for edicts; raiders leave and generals claim victory. Defeats are minimized; booty exaggerated. Generals know the court will not blame them; the emperor does not investigate. This is the sixth failure: remote control. He proposed ending autumn rotations, local pay, local recruitment, and expanded frontier farms. Farmers would fight when raiders came and farm in peace otherwise—unlike rotating outsiders. He urged three frontier marshals to unify scattered commands. Cut waste, standardize pay, delegate authority, and enforce rewards and punishments. Then the frontier would be secure. The emperor could not adopt all of it but greatly respected the memorial.
42
西
Wei Gao's general Dong Mianli raided from the west and took fifty Tibetan forts.
43
On the bing-wu day Dong Jin was demoted to minister of rites.
44
使 使 使
King Yimouxun of Nanzhao sent three missions with gold and cinnabar to Wei Gao. Gold meant constancy, cinnabar loyalty; they carried three copies of Gao's letters to Chengdu. Yimouxun asked to defect from Tibet to Tang, calling himself grandson of the old King of Yunnan and sworn brother to Tibet's tsenpo. Gao sent the envoys to Chang'an with a congratulatory memorial. The emperor issued an edict to Yimouxun and ordered Gao to send envoys to comfort him.
45
With Jia Dan, Lu Zhi, Zhao Jing, and Lu Mai as chief ministers, officials deferred to one another and rarely spoke up. In the seventh month they asked to revive the Zhide practice of rotating chief ministers every ten days; the emperor agreed. Soon it became daily rotation.
46
西
Qiang and tribal leaders of the western mountains who had served Tibet now led their people to submit to Tang. Wei Gao resettled them in Wei, Bao, and Ba and gave them oxen and seed. Lizhi, Tuohu, and Pihe came to court, received offices and rich gifts, and returned.
47
簿 西 使 輿
On the gui-mao day Pei Yanling claimed to have found 8 million strings in prefectural debts, 3 million in withheld funds, and 300,000 in sample goods, and asked for new storehouses. The emperor approved. The debts were uncollectible from the poor; withheld funds were spent; the goods were already in the treasury. Yanling merely moved existing stock to new ledgers and inflated the figures. The emperor believed Pei Yanling enriched the state, though nothing was actually gained. He claimed hundreds of qing of marsh near Chang'an could pasture horses though only a few mu of reeds existed. Inspectors found nothing, yet Pei Yanling went unpunished. Quan Deyu said Yanling counted unspent regular revenue as his own surplus. He repaid the treasury for goods already bought and called it new savings. Frontier troops had received no grain since spring. He urged the emperor to investigate Yanling and punish him if guilty. The whole capital was clamoring—is everyone a conspirator? Your Majesty should reconsider. The emperor refused.
48
西
On the geng-xu day of the eighth month Li Sheng, Prince of Xiping, died.
49
In the tenth month Wei Gao sent Cui Zuoshi to Nanzhao with an imperial edict and his own letter.
50
On the yi-you day of the eleventh month the emperor sacrificed at the Circular Mound and proclaimed a general amnesty.
51
使 使 使 使 西使使 退 使 使便 使 退 使便 使
Many generals refused to obey Liu Shining. He was cruel and licentious, hunting for days while the army suffered. Li Wanrong was popular; Shining stripped his command and made him act for Bianzhou. On the yi-mao day Shining took twenty thousand men hunting. Wanrong seized the office at dawn, told the garrison an edict had recalled Shining and paid each man thirty strings. They bowed in acceptance. The outer camps obeyed as well. He closed the gates and told Shining to leave at once or lose his head. Shining fled to the capital with five hundred horsemen, arriving with only servants. At court he was confined to his house in mourning. Wu Shaoqian of Huai-Xi mobilized at Yancheng and challenged Wanrong. Wanrong mocked him and Shaoqian withdrew. The emperor asked Lu Zhi, who warned that Wanrong acted without imperial authority. This was a critical moment requiring caution. The emperor said delay was dangerous. He would appoint an imperial prince and let Wanrong act as regent. Lu Zhi replied that he was no general but saw the danger. Security depends on circumstance, success on talent. Like a vessel, placement determines stability. Like a load, exceeding capacity brings collapse. Wanrong's memorials were boastful and grasping, not modest. A native of Hua, he favored only three thousand local troops while alienating the rest. He was no true general; success would make him arrogant and ruin the army. Granting his wish would breed insincerity and suspicion. Better to stop him early than when entrenched. The state must teach obedience before rewarding rebellion. Regional commanders are hard to punish—any excuse will serve. If usurpers are rewarded, others will seize power for profit. It would encourage rebellion, not merely disorder. The coup was hasty; garrisons were not united in conspiracy. Each man weighed odds and would not die for Wanrong. Appoint a proper commissioner and comfort the army with an edict. Reward Wanrong for pacifying the mutiny but give command to a court appointee. Then Wanrong could not become a warlord. Lu Zhi offered to accept punishment if wrong. The emperor again refused. On the ren-xu day Prince Chen was named Xuanwu governor and Wanrong regent.
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On the ding-mao day Guo En's daughter became consort to Prince Chun of Guangling. Chun was the crown prince's eldest son. Her mother was Princess Shengping.
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Emperor Dezong of the Tang, tenth year of the Zhenyuan era ( jia-xu, 794 CE)
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西 西使
In spring more than twenty thousand Qiang and tribal households submitted. Wei Gao was made commissioner over nearby tribes and the eight western kingdoms.
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使 使 使
At Nanzhao's capital, Tibetan envoys were present; Yimouxun wanted Cui Zuoshi to dress like a tribal envoy. Cui refused: "I am a Tang envoy and will not dress as a barbarian!" Yimouxun received him secretly at night. When the edict was read, Yimouxun was terrified. Having chosen Tang, he wept and accepted the edict prostrate. Zheng Hui briefed Cui Zuoshi, who urged Yimouxun to kill the Tibetan envoys and restore the name Nanzhao. Yimouxun agreed to all. He carved a gold covenant of alliance. He allied with Cui at the shrine on Cangshan.
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使
Tibet and the Uyghurs fought over Beiting and demanded ten thousand troops from Nanzhao. Yimouxun offered only three thousand; Tibet demanded more. At five thousand Tibet agreed. He sent five thousand ahead, then attacked with tens of thousands at Shen River, took sixteen cities and captured five kings. On the wu-xu day he reported victory to Tang.
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西 使
Liu Yong fled his brother Liu Ji to court with fifteen hundred troops and ten thousand civilians, harming no property on the march. The emperor made him Qinzhou prefect and Longyou commissioner at Purun. His camp struck no night watches and held no music. He nursed the sick and mourned the dead.
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使 使
On the yi-chou day Li Rong of Yicheng died. On the ding-mao day Li Fu became governor of Yicheng. Li Fu was a son of Li Qiwu. He appointed Lu Tan of Luoyang as his aide. Supervisor Xue Yingzhen meddled; Lu Tan resisted on principle. Xue said Lu Tan was always right and he would not oppose him."
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使
Cheng Huairu of Heng-Hai came to court, was rewarded, and returned.
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西
In summer, on the geng-wu day, Xuanwu mutinied and Wanrong crushed it. Wanrong sent three hundred unruly personal troops to the west; they resented it. Generals Han Weiqing and Zhang Yanlin led the mutiny; Wanrong defeated them. Mutineers fled to Songzhou where Liu Yizhun sheltered them. Weiqing fled to Zhengzhou; Yanlin to Luoyang. Wanrong executed thousands of the rebels' families. Soldiers shouted in the market that the city would fall that night. Wanrong executed them and blamed Liu Shining. On the geng-zi day Shining was exiled to Chenzhou.
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使 使
Huang Shaoqing of Qinzhou rebelled; Sun Gongqi asked for Lingnan troops. The emperor refused troops and sent an envoy to mediate.
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使便 退 使 便 退 使退 退
Lu Zhi said the amnesty had not reached exiles. He drafted three lists of exiles to restore. The emperor said exiles should move only three to five hundred li, not near armies. Lu Zhi argued the throne should trust and rehabilitate exiles. Exile warns; mercy encourages reform; without either, punishment escalates without malice. Punishment is temporary; knowing they may return, men will reform. Why fear rebellion or grudges? If exiles are forever suspect, the repentant cannot serve again. Desperate men turn to rebellion. Short moves only burden exiles without helping. Moves near armies and posts signal distrust. He asked the emperor to reconsider. The emperor distrusted ministers and picked every official himself. Once punished, an official was rarely reused; he favored glib men over solid talent; able men were blocked. Lu Zhi said promotion and demotion should cycle like the seasons. Punish faults but reuse the reformed. Then none harbor lasting resentment. Rulers must judge deeds, not eloquence or whim. Use each man's strength and the whole succeeds. That requires magnanimous leadership. Praise and blame must follow facts, not moods. The emperor ignored him.
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Lu Zhi proposed six fiscal reforms:
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調 綿調 調使簿 調 使
First, on the two-tax system's flaws versus the old zu-diao-yong system. Each man received land and paid grain rent (zu). Households paid textiles (diao). Each man owed labor, commuted to silk (yong). Uniform law kept people settled and fraud rare. The An Lushan rebellion destroyed the old system. Jianzhong reformers knew change was needed but botched it. Fix the root cause—time-bound ills need timely fixes, legal ills need new law. Post-rebellion spending was a crisis, not a flaw in zu-diao-yong itself. They replaced it with the two-tax system based on peak Dali-era levies. Revenue must rest on labor, not assets alone. Do not tax farming effort away; do not let wanderers escape duty; do not exempt the idle from corvée. Then people work in peace. The two-tax system taxes wealth, not people. Hidden wealth escapes assessment; visible grain is taxed while mobile trade is miscounted; expensive tools with no income are overtaxed. Uniform cash valuation breeds fraud. Those who move lightly escape tax; those who stay are squeezed. The system rewards evasion and drains the diligent. From the outset the system was unequal: supplies varied in burden, prefects in competence, and local levies in weight; each envoy interpreted policy differently, and once quotas were set, increases were never removed. Old surcharges remained atop the new tax—he asked to cut them."
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調 便
Second, set the two-tax quota in cloth, not coin. Taxes should be paid in grain and cloth suited to the land. The state should control coinage to stabilize prices. Coinage must stay in government hands. Grain and cloth are produced by the people; coin is made by the state. Never before were taxes levied in coin alone. The two-tax forces cash payment and arbitrary surcharges. Farmers must buy and sell at a loss to pay tax. He proposed converting tax quotas back to silk at fair prices. Production is finite; thrift brings sufficiency. Waste brings shortage. Harvests are heaven's; spending is man's. Sage kings spent within revenue. Decadent rulers spent first and taxed after. Jie was prodigal; Tang was frugal."
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使 殿
Third, on perverse incentives for local officials: they lured migrants and fugitives for merit while punishing stable taxpayers. Settled farmers bore heavier taxes than drifters. It was like driving the honest into exile. Prefects served their own stats, not the realm. Laws need adjusting as abuses appear. He asked to reform performance reviews. Reward officials who cut taxes when population grew. Ten-percent cuts ranked merit. Penalize those who taxed the remnant harder."
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Fourth, on harsh tax deadlines: taxes fund the state but must not ruin the people. Tax after the harvest, not before. Silk was taken before cocoons; grain before harvest. Forced sales at ruinous prices followed. He asked for later deadlines."
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Fifth, use tea tax for charity granaries as of old. Tea tax was supposed to fund disaster relief. Storing grain matched that intent."
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便
Sixth, on landlords: private rent was twenty times the state tax. Even middling rents doubled the state levy. Land belongs to the throne, yet magnates took the profit. He asked to cap rents and protect tenants. Moderate rent cuts would aid the poor without ruining the rich."
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CATEGORY:
Work category: Zizhi Tongjian (Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government)”””””
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